This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The case arose from an automobile accident on August 6, 1991, in which the Plaintiff, who was 18 to 22 weeks pregnant, sustained blunt trauma injuries to her abdomen. Following the accident, an emergency Caesarean section was performed, resulting in the delivery of a nonviable fetus with cardiac activity. The fetus died within minutes of birth due to extreme immaturity (paras 2, 4).
Procedural History
- Trial court: Granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendant, holding that no independent cause of action exists for the wrongful death of a nonviable fetus and granted partial summary judgment on the issue of hedonic damages (para 2).
Parties' Submissions
- Appellant (Plaintiff): Argued that the viability of the fetus should not be the determining factor for recovery under the New Mexico Wrongful Death Act, asserting that the live birth of the fetus rendered the issue of viability irrelevant (paras 8, 15).
- Appellee (Defendant): Contended that the Wrongful Death Act does not recognize a cause of action for the death of a nonviable fetus and that viability is a necessary condition for recovery (paras 5, 13).
Legal Issues
- Does the New Mexico Wrongful Death Act recognize an independent cause of action for the wrongful death of a nonviable fetus?
- Is the issue of viability relevant when the nonviable fetus is born alive?
Disposition
- The Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the New Mexico Wrongful Death Act does not recognize a cause of action for the wrongful death of a nonviable fetus (para 18).
Reasons
Per Franchini J. (Baca C.J. and Ransom J. concurring):
The Court held that the term "person" under the New Mexico Wrongful Death Act does not include a nonviable fetus. The Court emphasized that viability, defined as the ability of a fetus to survive outside the womb, is a necessary condition for maintaining a wrongful death action. This standard aligns with the majority of jurisdictions, which limit recovery to viable fetuses to avoid speculative claims and ensure consistency in the law (paras 7, 11, 14).
The Court rejected the Plaintiff's argument that live birth alone should define fetal rights, reasoning that viability provides a more logical and predictable standard. The Court also noted that recognizing a wrongful death action for a nonviable fetus would contradict the survival statute's principles, as a nonviable fetus lacks the capacity to survive independently (paras 15-17).
In the absence of a clear legislative directive to extend liability to nonviable fetuses, the Court declined to expand the scope of the Wrongful Death Act (paras 9, 14).