This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The Plaintiff, a nurse, underwent a pre-employment physical in 1986, including a chest x-ray performed by the Defendant, X-Ray Associates. The x-ray revealed a mass in her lung, which was misdiagnosed as a harmless arteriovenous malformation (AVM). Subsequent scans in 1986 and 1988 confirmed the mass but did not correct the misdiagnosis. In 1990, the Plaintiff was informed that the mass was cancerous, requiring surgery to remove part of her lung and kidney. In 1992, she learned the cancer had metastasized, leading to a bleak prognosis (paras 2-7).
Procedural History
- District Court, April 25, 1994: The Plaintiff's malpractice claim against the Defendant was dismissed as barred by the three-year statute of repose under Section 41-5-13 of the Medical Malpractice Act (para 8).
Parties' Submissions
- Plaintiff-Appellant: Argued that her cause of action did not accrue until 1992, when she learned the cancer had metastasized. She contended that the statute of repose should be interpreted to include the resulting injury as part of the "occurrence" and that barring her claim before the injury was discovered violated her constitutional rights to equal protection and due process (paras 12-16, 17, 32).
- Defendant-Appellee: Asserted that the three-year statute of repose began on the date of the last alleged act of malpractice in 1988, making the Plaintiff's 1993 claim untimely. The Defendant argued that the statute was constitutional and served a legitimate governmental purpose (paras 11, 19-20).
Legal Issues
- Is the three-year statute of repose under Section 41-5-13 of the Medical Malpractice Act constitutional?
- Does the statute of repose bar the Plaintiff's malpractice claim against the Defendant?
Disposition
- The Supreme Court of New Mexico upheld the constitutionality of the three-year statute of repose under Section 41-5-13.
- The Plaintiff's malpractice claim was barred by the statute of repose (para 9).
Reasons
Per Franchini J. (Frost C.J. and Ransom J. concurring):
Constitutionality of the Statute: The Court applied the rational-basis test, finding that the statute of repose was reasonably related to the legitimate governmental interest of addressing the medical malpractice insurance crisis and preventing stale claims. The statute was not unconstitutional under equal protection or due process guarantees, as it applied uniformly to all patients treated by qualified health care providers (paras 20-30, 36-40).
Equal Protection: The distinction between qualified and non-qualified health care providers was rationally based on the legislative goal of ensuring adequate malpractice insurance coverage. The Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge this classification as it pertained to health care providers, not patients (paras 26-30).
Due Process: The statute of repose was not unconstitutional for barring claims before injuries were discovered. The Court emphasized that statutes of repose inherently cut off claims after a fixed period, even if the injury is latent, to balance fairness to defendants and the need for finality (paras 33-41).
Application to Plaintiff's Claim: The Court held that the statute of repose began on the date of the last alleged act of malpractice in 1988. The Plaintiff discovered her injury in 1990, leaving her ample time to file a claim before the statute expired in 1991. Her failure to act diligently resulted in her claim being time-barred (paras 57-59).
The Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the Plaintiff's claim.