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STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOHN WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW MEXICO
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY, Neil
C. Candelaria, District Judge, Presiding
Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender,
Sheila Lewis, Assistant Public Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant
Gary K. King, Attorney General, Nicole
Beder, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee
CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice. WE
CONCUR: PATRICIO M. SERNA, Justice, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice, RICHARD C.
BOSSON, Justice, EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice
AUTHOR: CHARLES W. DANIELS
{1} Defendant John
Williams was convicted of first-degree murder for the shooting death of Raymond
Green, a man Defendant believed had shot and killed his childhood mentor a
decade earlier. Defendant was also convicted of simple possession of a
controlled substance. The issues Defendant raises in this direct appeal are (1)
whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion that Defendant
killed with the requisite intent for first-degree murder, and (2) whether the
district court erred in denying Defendant’s
Batson claim. We reject
Defendant’s claims and affirm his convictions.
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
{2} The test for
sufficiency of the evidence “is whether substantial evidence of either a direct
or circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction.”
State
v. Sutphin,
107 N.M. 126, 131,
753 P.2d 1314, 1319 (1988). Applying the
sufficiency of the evidence test, “we resolve all disputed facts in favor of
the State, indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the verdict, and
disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary.”
State v. Rojo,
1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 19,
126 N.M. 438,
971 P.2d 829 (filed 1998) (“Contrary
evidence supporting acquittal does not provide a basis for reversal because the
jury is free to reject Defendant’s version of the facts.”). The appellate
court’s role is to scrutinize the evidence and supervise “the jury’s
fact-finding function to ensure that, indeed, a rational jury
could have
found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential facts required for a conviction.”
State v. Baca,
1997-NMSC-059, ¶ 13,
124 N.M. 333,
950 P.2d 776.
{3} On a Saturday night
in September 2006, Defendant and his friend Bobby McKenzie drove to the
downtown Albuquerque nightclub “Raw” to have drinks and socialize. The victim,
Raymond Green, also went to Raw that night with a group of friends including
Habib Thomas, Demetrio Lee, and Richard Ward. While at the club, Defendant was
informed that Green was the man who gunned down his childhood mentor, Lamar
Johnson, outside a different Albuquerque nightclub almost ten years earlier.
Defendant testified he had never seen Green before that September night, but he
had been apprised of details about Johnson’s killer over the years. For
instance, Defendant knew that the shooter’s name was “Ray,” he was connected to
New Orleans, he had killed other people, and he had not been brought to justice
for Johnson’s murder.
{4} By all
accounts, Defendant did not confront Green at the nightclub. Defendant
testified to having three drinks over the course of the evening. The State
presented evidence that after Raw closed for the night, Defendant and Bobby
McKenzie followed Green and his three friends to the third floor of a nearby
parking garage. Demetrio Lee testified that McKenzie’s car was stationed a
short distance from Lee’s car and approached rapidly as Green’s group attempted
to enter the car. Lee claimed McKenzie’s car stopped abruptly in front of his
car, and Defendant immediately jumped out of the vehicle, walked quickly up to
Green, pointed a handgun at Green, and asked, “Are you Ray? Are you Ray?” Lee
claimed that Green pleaded, “No, man, no,” and lunged for the gun, but
Defendant pulled back and discharged a bullet into Green’s neck. Green later
died at the scene from the large amount of blood loss caused by the gunshot
wound.
{5} After Green fell to
the ground, Defendant picked up his cell phone that had fallen in the melee,
entered the passenger side of McKenzie’s car, and told McKenzie to drive.
Nearby police officers heard the gunshot and intercepted the fleeing vehicle
before it could leave the parking garage. After Defendant was arrested, he
stated to an officer at the scene, “my friend had nothing to do with this . . .
I did this myself.”
{6} Defendant
tendered an even more complete confession at the jailhouse. There he confessed
to tricking McKenzie into taking him to the parking garage, claiming that
“McKenzie . . . has nothing to do with what happened. . . . he was oblivious to
the fact to what I was gonna do.” He further stated, “the blood was on me. I
got the blood on me man . . . .”
{7} Defendant
explained in detail his reasons for killing Green. “I had to avenge my
brother’s death. He killed my brother ten years ago man.” “I killed a killer. .
. . You know I justified probably all the other bodies he done killed. . . .
There’s more . . . justice on the street than there is here man with you guys .
. . . You guys let this guy walk around for an entire 9 years man.” Defendant
seemed at peace with his actions, stating, “I’m justified. In my mind, in my
heart, I’ll do or die man.” “I’ll take the murder man for real.” “An eye for an
eye man. You know and if I lose my life then so be it man. . . . I can sleep
better at night. I can see my brother face man.”
{8} At trial,
Defendant gave a different explanation for his actions. He claimed that
although he was devastated by Johnson’s murder, he had not been trying to find
the killer and had no intention of doing anything after Green’s identity was
revealed to him at the club. He claimed that after Raw closed for the evening
and as McKenzie went to retrieve the car, Defendant started talking and walking
with a childhood friend, Habib Thomas, who gave him some codeine pills.
Defendant testified that after McKenzie picked him up, he tricked McKenzie into
driving to a nearby parking structure by telling him they were going to “holler
at some females.” He claimed he tricked McKenzie so he could get more codeine
pills from Thomas, not so he could exact revenge on Green.
{9} Defendant
claimed that as they drove through the parking structure, he saw Green and
instructed McKenzie to turn around because he recognized him as the person
identified as Johnson’s killer earlier that evening. Once McKenzie stopped,
Defendant got out and greeted Thomas, who was getting into the same car as
Green. Defendant then asked Green whether he was Ray because Defendant was
leery about the way Green was leaning into the car, as if to arm himself.
Defendant testified that upon hearing the question, Green, a larger man,
immediately rushed towards him with arms swinging. Defendant claimed that he
raised the gun to defend himself, but Green grabbed it and the gun accidentally
discharged during the struggle.
{10} Defendant
argues that no rational jury could have found he had the requisite intent for
first-degree murder based on the evidence adduced at trial. We disagree. In New
Mexico, first-degree murder includes “any kind of willful, deliberate and
premeditated killing[.]” NMSA 1978, §
30-2-1(A)(1) (1994). A deliberate
decision is one “arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought
and the weighing of the consideration for and against the proposed course of
action.” UJI
14-201 NMRA.
{11} The State
presented ample evidence from which a rational jury could have found Defendant
deliberately killed Green. The State’s eyewitnesses, Defendant’s testimony, and
Defendant’s post-killing confessions supported findings that (1) Defendant was
embittered by the murder of his childhood mentor and the killer’s lack of
prosecution, (2) Defendant had gathered information about his mentor’s killer
over the past ten years, (3) that night at Raw someone informed Defendant that
Green was the killer, (4) Defendant waited until Raw closed and tricked
McKenzie into following Green to the parking garage to confront Green, (5)
Defendant purposefully approached Green with gun drawn and asked him whether he
was Ray, (6) Defendant then fired a bullet into Green’s neck and killed him,
(7) Defendant attempted to flee the scene of the crime, and (8) Defendant
admitted to police that he killed Green to avenge his mentor’s death.
{12} Although at
trial, Defendant offered a new explanation for his actions, claiming that
Green’s death was a mixture of coincidence, self-defense, and accident, “the
jury was not obligated to believe Defendant’s testimony, to disbelieve or
discount conflicting testimony, or to adopt Defendant’s view.”
State v.
Foxen,
2001-NMCA-061, ¶ 17,
130 N.M. 670,
29 P.3d 1071.
{13} Defendant
cites
State v. Garcia,
114 N.M. 269,
837 P.2d 862 (1992), in support of
his sufficiency argument. “The facts in
Garcia have been distinguished
many times by this Court.”
State v. Flores,
2010-NMSC-002, ¶ 21,
147
N.M. 542,
226 P.3d 641. Despite superficial similarities, the facts are distinguishable
here, as well. The
Garcia killing was the culmination of a drunken brawl
between two friends that spanned several hours. There was no indication that
Garcia had a grudge against his victim or any premeditated reason for killing
the victim. In fact, it was the victim who was angry at Garcia for a previous
altercation. In the present case, Defendant’s motives for killing Green, to
exact revenge on his mentor’s killer, were established by the evidence,
manifested in Defendant’s actions, and candidly articulated by him in his
contemporaneous admissions to the police.
{14} Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that a reasonable
jury could have concluded that Defendant killed Green with deliberate intent.
{15} Defendant
argues that an African American on the jury venire was improperly excluded from
serving on the jury for racially motivated reasons, contrary to
Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding in part that the Equal Protection
Clause forbids prosecutors from challenging potential jurors solely on account
of their race).
{16} This Court’s
review of a
Batson challenge is two-fold: First, we review the district
court’s factual findings using a deferential standard of review, “as it is the
responsibility of the district court to (1) evaluate the sincerity of both
parties, (2) rely on its own observations of the challenged jurors, and (3)
draw on its experience in supervising voir dire.”
State v. Bailey,
2008-NMCA-084,
¶ 15,
144 N.M. 279,
186 P.3d 908 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Second, we apply a de novo standard of review to the district court’s
determination as to “whether a stated reason for a challenge is
constitutionally adequate.”
Id.
B. Background Information
{17} The following
factual findings are undisputed. Three African-American jurors were among the
venire array: Marcus Lathon, the thirteenth juror drawn; Tisha Barreiro, the
twenty-sixth juror drawn; and Allan Lamb, the sixty-fifth and last juror drawn.
Mr. Lathon was struck for cause on the State’s motion, and the Defendant does
not challenge that ruling. When the trial court reached the twenty-sixth juror
drawn, Ms. Barreiro, the State moved to peremptorily excuse her, and the
Defendant objected, stating, “I’d like to make a record that this is an African
American juror.” The court, believing that Ms. Barriero was the last African
American on the panel, asked “the State to tell [the court] why they[ were]
using a preemptory [sic] on her.” The State responded that
. . . the reason the State is
striking her is because she had stated that she had been raped, she was not
happy with the way A.P.D. handled the case and that she didn’t think that they
were sufficiently trained and that she thought they needed more training. She
had some concerns.
I think she’s had legitimate issues
with A.P.D. She indicated that they didn’t arrive for a couple hours later
after she had claimed the rape. She was not happy about the fact that only one
investigated the case, and it seemed that she was unhappy with A.P.D.
And, Judge, we believe that the
evidence in this case -- at least that will be tried to be raised -- is the
fact that the same circumstances happened to the defendant’s brother, Your Honor,
in that he was murdered. No case came out of that, and that’s why he took his
vengeance, Your Honor.
{18} The defense
countered that “basically what she said was quite innocuous. She said that she
was unhappy with the A.P.D., the way that the training had been done. She had
nothing against an individual officer in the case.” The court initially ruled
against the State, finding insufficient reasons to strike Ms. Barreiro, given
that she was the only African American left on the panel and that she had made
assurances “that she could be fair in spite of all of that. ”
{19} Once the
State pointed out that Mr. Lamb was African American and was still in the
venire, the court changed its ruling, stating, “I don’t think the defense has
established that there is a pattern here going on, so I will allow you to use a
preemptory [sic].” The defense countered that it would be impossible to reach
Mr. Lamb because he was the last juror drawn, but the court refused to modify
its ruling. The court stated, “I think that under the law there has to be
established some sort of pattern. That hasn’t been established, so I’ll allow
them to go ahead and use the preemptory [sic].”
{20} After the
parties selected the remaining jurors, without reaching Mr. Lamb, the defense
and the State were allowed to perfect the record on the
Batson issue:
[Defense]:
Judge, just to clarify, I’m challenging the selection of the jury based on Batson, that the State has purposely excluded
African American jurors from the panel, and my challenge is based on the fact
that the jury panel consisted of only three African American jurors....
[Allan Lamb was] seated in the 65th
position[, which is] the last position in the jury seating chart. In essence,
in order to get to Mr. Lamb, we would have to exclude all the previous jurors.
I haven’t done the math on it, but I’m not even convinced that if we all
exercised all of our challenges, we would even get to Allan Lamb.
. . . [T]he State successfully
argued over my objection for a cause removal of . . . Marcus Lathon. . . . Then
they used a preemptory [sic] on what I would argue would be the only remaining
African American juror, which would be . . . Tisha Barreiro . . . .
And then we would never get to the
third one, Allan Lamb, because of the way he is seated in the jury panel. So
this effectively excludes all African Americans from the jury, and that’s our
challenge.
[State]: .
. . I just want to make clear that it’s, first, the burden on the defendant to
show a prima facie showing that there is some kind of racial issue here, Your
Honor. . . .
[A]s to Mr. Lamb, if we would have
got to Mr. Lamb, the State would have taken him. The State asked questions of
Mr. Lamb during voir dire, and I quite frankly liked his answers to those
questions, but we did not get to that, and we do not control the draw of the
jurors here, Your Honor. And I think the State gives a racial neutral reason
why we struck [Ms. Barreiro].
And just to add to the record,
Judge, [Ms. Barreiro] also stated that some of these names sounded familiar and
that she wouldn’t know these people until they came into the courtroom and then
she might know them. And she said she might know them by nickname, and we
didn’t have the nickname to respond to her about that, Your Honor. That was another
reason why the State struck her.
So again, Judge, I don’t believe
that there is a prima facie showing at this point of the State having a pattern
of discriminating based on race.
{21} State v.
Bailey,
2008-NMCA-084, ¶ 14,
144 N.M. 279,
186 P.3d 908, outlines the
proper three-step
Batson procedure. Under the first step, it is the
defendant’s burden to show a prima facie case of discrimination by proving
“that (1) the State exercised its peremptory challenges to remove members of [a
racial] group from the jury panel and (2) [the] facts and other related
circumstances raise an inference that the State used its challenges to exclude
members of the panel solely on account of their race.”
Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Under step two, if a defendant is able
to make a prima facie showing that the State used its peremptory challenges in
a racially discriminatory way, then it is the State’s burden to “provide a
racially neutral explanation for its challenges.”
Id. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). And finally, under step three, if the trial court
finds that the State’s explanation is racially neutral, then the defendant is
given an opportunity to rebut by showing that “the reason given is in fact
pretext for a racially discriminatory motive.”
Id. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
Step One: Prima Facie Showing
{22} In this case,
the judge initially proceeded through all three
Batson steps and ruled
in Defendant’s favor. Then, the judge changed his mind on the first
Batson step
and changed his ruling, on the mistaken premise that the availability of
another African American in the venire meant that the defense had failed to
make out a prima facie
Batson claim resulting from the State’s excusal
of the earlier juror.
{23} We have never
limited the showing of a prima facie case to demonstrating a clear and perfect
pattern of discrimination. “This type of discrimination is deemed to be so
invidious that . . . [e]ven a single instance of purposeful exclusion may
establish a prima facie case of discriminatory intent.”
State v. House,
1999-NMSC-014, ¶ 84,
127 N.M. 151,
978 P.2d 967.
See also State v. Jones,
1997-NMSC-016, ¶ 2,
123 N.M. 73,
934 P.2d 267 (“Jones objected with a prima
facie showing of racial discrimination in that . . . the challenged juror was
the only African-American in the venire who could serve on the jury.”). In
fact, a prima facie showing of discriminatory intent can be made even where the
State accepted some members of the challenged racial group.
State v.
Gonzales,
111 N.M. 590, 597,
808 P.2d 40, 47 (Ct. App. 1991) (“We do not
believe that the fact that some Hispanic jurors were not stricken, or the fact
that the state did not use all of its peremptory challenges is determinative as
to whether defendant has made a prima facie showing.”). Contrary to the
district court judge’s belief “that under the law there
has to be
established some sort of pattern” (emphasis added), showing a pattern of
discrimination is not the only way of making a prima facie case of
discrimination.
There are a number of ways [a prima
facie case can be made]. The important inquiry is whether defendant can point
to some facts or circumstances from which a trial court could reasonably infer
that the prosecution has intentionally used its peremptory challenges to
eliminate jurors on the basis of their race, rather than for racially neutral
reasons related to the juror’s ability to fairly and impartially hear the case.
Thus, the [prima facie case is made] when defendant shows that his racial group
is substantially underrepresented or eliminated from the jury entirely.
It is met when defendant shows that the case is one that is particularly
susceptible to discrimination and that members of his ethnic group have been
stricken by the state’s use of its peremptory challenges. It is also met when
defendant shows that jurors who are of the same race as defendant have been
eliminated for reasons that are not applied to jurors of another race. In
addition, at least one court has determined that a showing that the state used
eighty percent of its peremptory challenges to strike members of defendant’s
racial group from the jury constitutes a prima facie showing that requires the
state to articulate neutral reasons for the challenge.
Id. at 596, 808 P.2d at 46 (emphasis added).
{24} In
Defendant’s case, the defense made a showing that Ms. Barreiro was the only
African-American venire member who could serve on the jury and that the State
had used a peremptory strike on her. Under our case law, the defense met the
burden of step one of the
Batson claim, because the challenged racial
group was effectively eliminated from the jury entirely.
Step Two: Racially Neutral Reasons
{25} Although the
district judge incorrectly found Defendant had not established a prima facie
case, the judge allowed the parties to make arguments on all three
Batson
steps, enabling us to fully review the constitutionality of the State’s
peremptory strike. Under step two, the State proffered racially neutral reasons
for its use of the peremptory strike: (1) “[Ms. Barreiro] was not happy with
the way A.P.D. handled” her rape case because “they didn’t arrive for a couple
hours” and she didn’t think they “were sufficiently trained” and (2) “the same
circumstances happened to the defendant’s brother . . . in that he was
murdered” and APD failed to identify a suspect suitable for prosecution.
{26} The State met
its burden of providing race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strike. The
State excluded Ms. Barreiro from the jury because of Ms. Barreiro’s potential
bias due to her previous interaction with APD. The State’s rationale has no
apparent relation to race.
See Jones,
1997-NMSC-016, ¶ 5 (“[A] lawyer’s
subjective feeling about a juror may suffice for step two provided that the
reason for the strike is a racially neutral, specific reason for the
challenge.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Step Three: Defense Rebuttal
{27} “A peremptory
challenge that is found to be valid on its face stands unless the defendant
comes forward with a refutation of the stated reason—e.g., by challenging its
factual basis—or proof of purposeful discrimination by the prosecutor.”
State
v. Begay,
1998-NMSC-029, ¶ 14,
125 N.M. 541,
964 P.2d 102. The defense
challenged the factual basis of the State’s reasons by arguing that (1)
although Ms. Barreiro was unhappy with APD’s training, she had “nothing against
an individual officer in the case,” and (2) Ms. Barreiro’s rape had “[no]thing
to do with the death of Lamar Johnson.” We disagree with the defense’s
analysis. An inference could certainly be made that Ms. Barreiro would be
biased against the police because she had found them inadequate in responding
to her rape case in the same way Defendant found the police inadequate in
responding to his mentor’s murder case.
{28} The defense
now argues before this Court that the State’s failure to strike
non-African-American venire members for bias against APD proves purposeful
discrimination. Our review of the transcripts suggests otherwise. The jurors
who were not struck were all jurors with strong ties to police, not jurors with
negative experiences with APD. For instance, Mr. Geiger said that “if it was a
close issue where one witness was not a law enforcement officer and one was, I
would probably tend to give more credibility to the law enforcement officer.”
Mr. Gallegos said that he was affiliated with “a whole bunch” of APD officers
but that he could “reasonably and fairly judge the evidence against this young
man.” The other jurors’ contacts with police officers were even more remote,
but all had positive ties to police. Rather than evincing a racially
discriminatory purpose, Defendant’s evidence shows the State intended to
preclude jurors whose negative experiences with APD might cause bias, while
keeping jurors who might favor officers. The use of peremptory strikes to favor
a certain disposition, so long as it is not racially motivated, is within the
strategic discretion of trial counsel.
{29} Under our de
novo review of the available evidence, we hold that the State proffered a race
neutral reason that the Defendant did not sufficiently rebut. Although the
district court judge was incorrect in his articulation of the law, the
allowance of the State’s peremptory strike against Ms. Barreiro was the correct
result.
{30} There was
ample evidentiary support for the jury to find the “wilful, deliberate, and
premeditated” intent required for first-degree murder, and the State’s
peremptory excusal of one African-American juror was constitutionally
permissible. We therefore affirm Defendant’s convictions and sentences.
CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice
PATRICIO M. SERNA, Justice
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice
RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice
EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice