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STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DANNY STANFIELD,
Defendant-Appellant.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW
MEXICO
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CIBOLA COUNTY, George
P. Eichwald, District Judge
Robert E. Tangora, L.L.C., Robert E.
Tangora, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General,
Elizabeth Ann Ashton, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee
CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice. WE CONCUR:
BARBARA J. VIGIL, Chief Justice, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice, EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ,
Justice
AUTHOR: CHARLES W. DANIELS
{1} A grand jury
indicted Defendant Danny Stanfield on charges of first-degree murder and
attempted first-degree murder. After finding by clear and convincing evidence
that he had committed the crimes, the district court ordered him detained by
the New Mexico Department of Health because he was dangerous but incompetent to
stand trial. He appeals from the order of commitment, arguing that there was
insufficient evidence to support the district court’s determination. We affirm
Defendant’s commitment by nonprecedential decision.
See Rule
12-405(B)(2) (“The appellate court may dispose of a case by nonprecedential
order, decision or memorandum opinion . . . [where] [t]he
presence or absence of substantial evidence disposes of the issue
. . . .”).
{2} On October 23,
2009, Sonny Jim and Fernando Begay were on Wayne Johnson’s property in San
Rafael, New Mexico. They were putting away tools after taking down a
barbed-wire fence when they were confronted by Defendant, who was a tenant on
Johnson’s property. Defendant began shouting at Jim, and then got back in his
truck and drove toward his trailer. When he returned shortly, a gun holster
containing a single-action revolver was attached to his waist.
{3} With the gun out,
Defendant attempted to handcuff Jim. Jim called 911 and told the dispatcher,
“‘He’s got a gun on me.’” Defendant grabbed the phone and threw it, disconnecting
the call, and tried again to place Jim in handcuffs. When Jim resisted,
Defendant began shooting.
{4} Defendant shot at
Jim eight times. Six of the bullets entered Jim’s body, two through his back.
Because Defendant used a single-action revolver, he had to pull back the
hammer, repoint the gun, and pull the trigger with each shot. Jim was unarmed.
Upon shooting all six of the revolver’s rounds, Defendant would have needed to
physically push each shell out of its chamber one by one and reload. Although
Jim had a gun in his truck, it was buried under a pile of his belongings and
was not visible.
{5} After shooting Jim,
Defendant turned to Johnson. Johnson reached for his gun, but Defendant shot
him four times. Johnson was found holding a Derringer gun that contained one
intact bullet and one spent casing, but all ten projectiles and eleven shell
casings found at the scene or recovered by the Office of the Medical
Investigator were from Defendant’s gun. Johnson’s body was found in a fetal
position.
{6} Defendant pointed
his gun at Begay after he shot Jim and Johnson. Begay started running, and
Defendant began firing at him. Begay called 911 and watched as deputies came up
the road. Officer Lister, the first to arrive on the scene, asked Defendant if
he was the shooter. Defendant at first denied shooting Jim and Johnson, but
when asked again stated, “‘You’re damn right I did.’” Defendant said, “‘They
were stealing my property. Damn right. I shot him in self-defense.’”
{7} Defendant was
arrested and indicted on two counts of first-degree murder and one count of
attempt to commit first-degree murder. After finding in February 2011 that
Defendant was not competent to stand trial and was dangerous, the district
court entered an order of commitment for treatment to attain competency.
{8} Three years
later, in February 2014, the district court found that Defendant remained
dangerous, that he was not making substantial progress towards competency, and
that there was not a substantial probability that Defendant would become
competent to stand trial within nine months. Based on those findings and in
accordance with the New Mexico Mental Illness and Competency Code, NMSA 1978,
Sections
31-9-1 to -2 (1988, as amended through 1999), the district court then
held an evidentiary hearing in May 2014 to determine the sufficiency of the
evidence against Defendant.
See § 31-9-1.4 (providing that “any time the
district court determines that there is not a substantial probability that the
defendant will become competent to proceed in a criminal case within a
reasonable period of time not to exceed nine months from the date of the
original finding of incompetency, the district court may . . . hear
the matter pursuant to Section 31-9-1.5 within three months if the defendant is
charged with a felony that involves the infliction of great bodily harm on
another person [or] the use of a firearm . . . .”); §
31-9-1.5 (providing that a hearing to determine the sufficiency of the evidence
relevant to the defendant’s guilt shall be held and that “[i]f the district
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant committed a
felony that involves the infliction of great bodily harm on another person [or]
the use of a firearm . . . and enters a finding that the defendant
remains incompetent to proceed and remains dangerous[,] . . . the
defendant shall be detained by the department of health in a secure, locked
facility [and] shall not be released from that secure facility except pursuant
to an order of the district court which committed him or upon expiration of the
period of time equal to the maximum sentence to which the defendant would have
been subject had the defendant been convicted in a criminal proceeding
. . . .”).
{9} After finding by
clear and convincing evidence that Defendant had, with deliberate intention,
taken the lives of Jim and Johnson and attempted to take the life of Begay, the
district court committed Defendant to the custody of the New Mexico Department
of Health, pursuant to Section 31-9-1.5(D), until further order of the court,
not to exceed two consecutive terms of life imprisonment plus an additional
nine years, the period of time equal to the maximum sentence to which Defendant
would have been subject had he been convicted at trial. Defendant appeals the
commitment order, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to rebut his
claim of self-defense or to establish that he acted with deliberate intent to
kill.
{10} Criminal
commitment requires the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
Defendant committed the acts charged. Section 31-9-1.5(D). When reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence to support an order of commitment, we determine
whether substantial evidence exists so that “a rational fact finder could find
that the State’s evidence ‘instantly tilt[ed] the scales in the affirmative
when weighed against the evidence in opposition.’”
State v. Adonis,
2008-NMSC-059, ¶ 26,
145 N.M. 102,
194 P.3d 717 (alteration in original)
(citation omitted). Evidence is substantial when it is “relevant evidence that
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
State
v. Rojo,
1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 19,
126 N.M. 438,
971 P.2d 829. To prove
first-degree deliberate murder, the State was required to demonstrate that
Defendant killed Jim and Johnson and attempted to kill Begay without lawful
justification or excuse and with the deliberate intention to take away their
lives.
See NMSA 1978, §
30-2-1(A)(1) (1994) (“Murder in the first degree
is the killing of one human being by another without lawful justification or
excuse . . . by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated
killing.”).
{11} Defendant argues
first that the shootings were justified because he was acting in self-defense
and that the State must disprove this theory by clear and convincing evidence.
Self-defense requires that “(1) the defendant was put in fear by an apparent
danger of immediate death or great bodily harm, (2) the killing resulted from
that fear, and (3) the defendant acted reasonably when he or she killed.”
State
v. Rudolfo,
2008-NMSC-036, ¶ 17,
144 N.M. 305,
187 P.3d 170 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The State must prove the absence of
self-defense when a defendant has presented sufficient evidence of each element
to support the theory that a killing was justified.
State v. Parish,
1994-NMSC-073, ¶ 16,
118 N.M. 39,
878 P.2d 988 (“The defendant’s only
obligation is to introduce evidence that will raise in the minds of the jurors
a reasonable doubt about the matter.”).
{12} Defendant confronted
Jim and Begay, left to retrieve his weapon, and returned to reinitiate the
confrontation. As the instigator of the conflict, he cannot justify his actions
by claiming self-defense unless he was using nondeadly force or unless he tried
to stop the fight at which point the victim became the aggressor. UJI
14-5191
NMRA;
State v. Lucero,
1998-NMSC-044, ¶ 7,
126 N.M. 552,
972 P.2d 1143.
The evidence demonstrates that Jim was unarmed. Johnson reached for his gun
only after Defendant had already killed Jim and then turned to begin firing at
Johnson. Begay was running away as Defendant shot at him.
{13} Self-defense is
unavailable here, where Defendant initiated the confrontation, no evidence
suggests that he then tried to stop the fight or that the victims became the
aggressors, and Defendant has not demonstrated that he acted reasonably out of
fear for his personal safety.
See State v. Swick,
2012-NMSC-018,
¶¶ 64-65,
279 P.3d 747 (holding that an instruction on self-defense was not
required when there was no evidence that the defendant had been motivated by
fear or, assuming such fear, had acted reasonably);
Rudolfo,
2008-NMSC-036, ¶ 17 (stating that while the presence of danger and actual fear
are measured subjectively, the killing in reaction to the perceived danger must
be objectively reasonable). Where the evidence does not put self-defense at
issue, its absence is not an essential element that the State must prove.
State
v. Sutphin,
2007-NMSC-045, ¶¶ 21-22,
142 N.M. 191,
164 P.3d 72.
{14} Defendant’s attempt
to handcuff Jim and his statements immediately following the shooting suggest
that he was reacting to a perceived threat to his property, not to his person.
It is well-settled that deadly force may not be used in the defense of property
other than to prevent the commission of a felony in the home.
See State v.
Boyett,
2008-NMSC-030, ¶ 15,
144 N.M. 184,
185 P.3d 355 (“Defense of
habitation has long been recognized in New Mexico. It gives a person the right
to use lethal force against an intruder when such force is necessary to prevent
the commission of a felony in his or her home.” (citation omitted));
State
v. McCracken,
1917-NMSC-029, ¶¶ 8-10,
22 N.M. 588,
166 P. 1174 (“‘While the
law justifies the taking of life when necessary to prevent the commission of a
felony, one cannot defend his property, other than his habitation, to the
extent of killing the aggressor for the mere purpose of preventing a
trespass.’” (citation omitted)). A citizen’s arrest, although allowed under
certain circumstances, must be objectively reasonable and use no more force
than is necessary.
See State v. Johnson,
1996-NMSC-075, ¶ 18,
122
N.M. 696,
930 P.2d 1148.
{15} No evidence supports
Defendant’s argument that he was in fear for his life, and accordingly the
district court did not err in rejecting his claim of self-defense.
{16} Defendant argues
next that, even if the killings and attempted killing were not justified, the
State failed to prove first-degree murder because it presented no evidence that
Defendant deliberated before shooting. Deliberate intention is not a rash
impulse, and, although it may be arrived at quickly, it must involve careful
thought and the weighing of considerations for and against an action. UJI
14-201 NMRA. “A deliberate intention is rarely subject to proof by direct
evidence and often must be inferred from the circumstances.”
State v.
Astorga,
2015-NMSC-007, ¶ 60,
343 P.3d 1245.
{17} In
Adonis, we
reversed an order of commitment for first-degree murder because there was
insufficient evidence of deliberation.
2008-NMSC-059, ¶ 26. The defendant came
out of an apartment and rapidly fired several shots, killing the victim who had
parked in his space.
Id. ¶ 4. The defendant suffered from paranoid
schizophrenia but kept to himself and rarely bothered his neighbors.
Id.
¶ 2. The victim and others regularly parked in his parking spot without
incident.
Id. ¶ 3. After the shooting, he said, “‘[T]hat will teach this
guy a lesson not to park in my place no more.’”
Id. ¶ 4. We concluded
that while this evidence demonstrated an intentional killing, it did not prove
premeditation or deliberation.
Id. ¶¶ 20-26.
{18} In contrast,
Defendant did not shoot Jim on rash impulse when first confronting him. He
initiated the confrontation, left to retrieve his weapon, and returned with the
gun. Evidence that a defendant has taken steps to arm himself supports an
inference of deliberation.
See State v. Begay,
1998-NMSC-029, ¶¶
45-46,
125 N.M. 541,
964 P.2d 102 (recognizing the fact that the defendant had
a knife as evidence to uphold a finding of deliberation). This evidence alone
may not be enough to infer that Defendant deliberated,
see State v.
Taylor,
2000-NMCA-072, ¶ 22,
129 N.M. 376,
8 P.3d 863 (concluding that
although the retrieval of a weapon provided an opportunity to deliberate, alone
it did not prove that the defendant “actually did so”), but the facts of this
case provide additional support.
{19} Defendant started
shooting after Jim resisted the handcuffs, and he shot Jim six times, including
twice in the back, with a single-action revolver that required him to aim and
pull the trigger each time. He individually ejected each shell, reloaded, and
shot Johnson four times, killing him, before shooting at Begay who was running
away. When asked if he had shot the victims, he said, “You’re damn right I
did.” Deliberate intent can be inferred from multiple injuries, prolonged
attacks, unarmed victims, and a defendant’s own statements.
See State v.
Duran,
2006-NMSC-035, ¶¶ 8-11,
140 N.M. 94,
140 P.3d 515 (holding that a
prolonged struggle, a large number of wounds, and the defendant’s statement
after the killing that he had “‘straight up murdered some bitch’” supported a
rational inference of deliberation);
State v. Sosa,
2000-NMSC-036. ¶ 13,
129 N.M. 767,
14 P.3d 32 (holding that pursuit of and repeated shooting at an
unarmed victim who was trying to flee provided evidence of deliberate intent).
These facts provide substantial evidence to support the district court’s
determination that Defendant made the deliberate decision to kill.
{20} Because sufficient
evidence supports Defendant’s criminal commitment for the period of time
prescribed by Section 31-9-1.5, we affirm the commitment order of the district
court.
CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice
BARBARA J. VIGIL, Chief Justice
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice
EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice