STATE V. SKIPPINGS, 2011-NMSC-021,
150 N.M. 216, 258 P.3d 1008
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Petitioner,
v.
CLINTON SKIPPINGS, Defendant-Respondent.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW MEXICO
2011-NMSC-021, 150 N.M. 216, 258 P.3d 1008
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI, Don Maddox, District
Judge.
Released for Publication June 21, 2011.
Gary K. King, Attorney General, Joel
Jacobsen, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.
Susan Roth, Assistant Appellate Defender,
Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent.
EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice. WE CONCUR:
CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M. SERNA, Justice, PETRA JIMENEZ
MAES, Justice, RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice.
AUTHOR: EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ.
{1} In this case, we
consider whether Defendant’s requested involuntary manslaughter instruction was
properly denied by the district court. First, we evaluate the State’s claim
that insufficient evidence was adduced at trial to support giving the
instruction. Second, finding that the evidence was sufficient, we proceed to
analyze whether Defendant’s theory that the killing was accidental precludes
giving the instruction. Because these two theories of the killing implicate
inconsistent mental states, the State contends that it would have been improper
for the district court to furnish the involuntary manslaughter instruction.
{2} We conclude that
where there is sufficient evidence of both criminal negligence and accident, it
is proper to grant an involuntary manslaughter instruction. We also reject the
State’s contention that Defendant failed to preserve the instruction issue at
trial, finding that the district court was abundantly alerted to Defendant’s
desired instruction and his underlying argument. Accordingly, we affirm the
Court of Appeals, which found that the district court improperly denied the
instruction.
State v. Skippings, No. 28,324, slip op. at 2 (N.M. Ct.
App. Nov. 25, 2009).
I. RELEVANT
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{3} Defendant was
convicted in a jury trial of voluntary manslaughter, contrary to NMSA 1978,
Section
30-2-3(A) (1994). Defendant’s conviction arose from a series of
interactions with Christy Rogers (Victim) that ultimately culminated in her
death. We recount only the facts relevant to the issues before us. Additional
facts are incorporated into the body of the Opinion where appropriate.
{4} According to
Defendant’s testimony, Defendant and Victim had been involved in a long-term
romantic relationship that included extended periods of cohabitation prior to
Victim’s death on March 7, 2007. On March 5, 2007, Victim had been released
from jail after being incarcerated for a little more than a month for
drug-related offenses. Defendant testified that upon her release, Victim and
Defendant reunited, spending the night of March 5 together in a Hobbs motel.
The next day, Defendant took Victim shopping to purchase new clothes and
cosmetics, and the two discussed Victim abstaining from future drug use. That
evening, Defendant dropped Victim off at her father’s home to spend the night.
{5} On March 7,
Defendant suspected that Victim was visiting Dunn Street, an area in Hobbs
associated with the illicit drug trade. According to his testimony, he twice
returned to that area that day and found Victim present. On the second
occasion, upon observing Victim, Defendant believed that Victim had been
“getting high.” Defendant confronted Victim and insisted that she return with
him to her father’s residence.
{6} Victim apparently
resisted his overtures and the two engaged in a loud argument that spilled into
the street and quickly escalated into a physical confrontation. One witness
characterized the two as “fighting, hitting each other.” At one point, Victim
and Defendant became entangled, with Victim straddling Defendant. Defendant
sought to extricate himself from Victim and forced her off of him, resulting in
her landing on the asphalt roadway and cracking her skull. Defendant summoned
assistance from a bystander and transported Victim to a hospital, where she
died from her injuries.
{7} At Defendant’s
trial, the jury was instructed regarding second degree murder and voluntary
manslaughter. The district court denied Defendant’s requested involuntary
manslaughter instruction. The jury returned a conviction on the voluntary
manslaughter charge.
{8} On appeal, the
Court of Appeals concluded that the involuntary manslaughter instruction was
improperly denied, prompting reversal of the district court.
Skippings,
No. 28,324, slip op. at 2. The Court found that there was sufficient evidence
adduced at trial for the jury to conclude that Defendant’s deadly altercation
with Victim was the result of a misdemeanor battery.
Id. at 4. The Court
explained that this view of the evidence constitutes “unlawful act” involuntary
manslaughter under Section 30-2-3(B) (“[i]nvoluntary manslaughter consists of
manslaughter committed in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to
felony”).
Skippings, No. 28,324, slip op. at 4. Because a defendant is
entitled to an “instruction on a lesser-included offense, [when] there [is]
evidence tending to establish the lesser offense,” the Court concluded that
Defendant was entitled to the involuntary manslaughter instruction.
Id.
at 3-4 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In addition, the Court
also dispensed with the State’s preservation arguments, concluding that
Defendant had properly “alert[ed] the court’s mind to the argument being made
[to] invoke a ruling.”
Id. at 7.
{9} We granted certiorari
to consider whether Defendant was entitled to the involuntary manslaughter
instruction. We conclude that the instruction should have been granted, and
accordingly affirm the Court of Appeals.
II. THE
INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER INSTRUCTION
{10} The propriety of
jury instructions denied or given involves mixed questions of law and fact that
we review de novo.
State v. Lucero,
2010-NMSC-011, ¶ 11,
147 N.M. 747,
228 P.3d 1167. “When considering a defendant's requested instructions, we view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the giving of the requested
instruction[s].”
State v. Boyett,
2008-NMSC-030, ¶ 12,
144 N.M. 184,
185
P.3d 355 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A defendant is
entitled to an instruction on his or her theory of the case if evidence has
been presented that is sufficient to allow reasonable minds to differ as to all
elements of the offense.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted);
see also State v. Rudolfo,
2008-NMSC-036, ¶ 27,
144 N.M. 305,
187 P.3d 170 (clarifying that an instruction should be given when there is
“evidence sufficient to justify a reasonable jury determination as to whatever
element is under consideration” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)). In addition, to obtain an instruction on a lesser included offense,
“[t]here must be some view of the evidence pursuant to which the lesser offense
is the highest degree of crime committed, and that view must be reasonable.”
State
v. Brown,
1998-NMSC-037, ¶ 12,
126 N.M. 338,
969 P.2d 313 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, if “a jury rationally could
acquit on the greater offense and convict on the lesser,” the defendant is
entitled to the instruction.
State v. Ramirez,
2008-NMCA-165, ¶ 5,
145 N.M.
367,
198 P.3d 866 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
B. Involuntary
Manslaughter in New Mexico
{11} Under New
Mexico law, involuntary manslaughter is an unintentional killing,
State v.
Henley,
2010-NMSC-039, ¶ 14,
148 N.M. 359,
237 P.3d 103, that consists of
an “unlawful killing of a human being without malice . . . committed in the
commission of an unlawful act not amounting to felony, or in the commission of
a lawful act which might produce death in an unlawful manner or without due caution
and circumspection.” Section 30-2-3. We have interpreted this statutory scheme
to encompass unintentional killings that result due to “1) the commission of an
unlawful act not amounting to a felony [that causes death]; 2) the commission
of a lawful act that might produce death, in an unlawful manner; or 3) the
commission of a lawful act that might produce death without due caution and
circumspection.”
Henley,
2010-NMSC-039, ¶ 14 (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
1. Sufficient
evidence was presented at trial to allow reasonable minds to differ regarding
whether Defendant committed misdemeanor battery against Victim, a crime that
constitutes an unlawful act not amounting to a felony under Section 30-2-3(B).
{12} At trial, Defendant
presented an involuntary manslaughter instruction embodying the theory that
Victim’s death resulted from Defendant’s “commission of an unlawful act not
amounting to a felony,”
Henley,
2010-NMSC-039, ¶ 14 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted), namely, that Defendant committed the
non-felonious “unlawful act” of misdemeanor battery during the scuffle with
Victim that immediately preceded her death,
id. ¶ 21. In these
proceedings, the Court of Appeals concluded that the jury could have reasonably
found that Defendant’s actions during the scuffle satisfied the “unlawful act”
category under Section 30-2-3(B).
Skippings, No. 28,324, slip op. at 4.
The State contends that the Court of Appeals erred because the alleged battery
resulted in Victim’s death, and therefore constitutes aggravated battery, a
felony which cannot properly predicate involuntary manslaughter.
{13} Any misdemeanor
requiring a showing of at least criminal negligence, including simple battery,
can serve as the predicate unlawful act for involuntary manslaughter.
See
State v. Yarborough,
1996-NMSC-068, ¶ 20,
122 N.M. 596,
930 P.2d 131;
see
also State v. Holden,
85 N.M. 397, 400,
512 P.2d 970, 973 (Ct. App. 1973)
(“Inflicting a beating is an unlawful act.”). Our Legislature has defined
battery as “the unlawful, intentional touching or application of force to the
person of another, when done in a rude, insolent or angry manner.” NMSA 1978, §
30-3-4 (1963). In contrast, aggravated battery is a felony defined as follows:
A.
Aggravated battery consists of the unlawful touching or application of force to
the person of another with intent to injure that person or another.
B.
Whoever commits aggravated battery, inflicting an injury to the person which is
not likely to cause death or great bodily harm, but does cause painful
temporary disfigurement or temporary loss or impairment of the functions of any
member or organ of the body, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
C.
Whoever commits aggravated battery inflicting great bodily harm or does so with
a deadly weapon or does so in any manner whereby great bodily harm or death can
be inflicted is guilty of a third degree felony.
{14} A key distinction
between the two battery statutes is the mens rea requirement.
State v.
Gammill,
102 N.M. 652, 656,
699 P.2d 125, 129 (Ct. App. 1985). Under the
aggravated battery statute, it must be established that the perpetrator
possessed the specific “intent to injure that person or another.”
See also §
30-3-5(A);
State v. Wynn,
2001-NMCA-020, ¶ 4,
130 N.M. 381,
24 P.3d 816
(“Aggravated battery is a specific intent crime.”). In contrast, the simple
battery statute only requires that the perpetrator possess general criminal
intent to touch or apply force “to the person of another, when done in a rude,
insolent or angry manner.” Section 30-3-4;
State v. Nozie,
2007-NMCA-131, ¶ 12,
142 N.M. 626,
168 P.3d 756,
aff’d,
2009-NMSC-018,
146 N.M. 142,
207 P.3d 1119 (noting that “general criminal intent” is the
mental state necessary to establish battery). Therefore, absent the specific
intent to injure, a defendant cannot be convicted of aggravated battery.
{15} In these
proceedings, reasonable minds can differ regarding whether Defendant’s actions
during the scuffle with Victim constitute simple battery. At trial, witness
testimony was presented supporting the conclusion that Defendant intentionally
applied force to Victim in a “rude, insolent or angry manner.” Defendant
himself conceded that he and Victim engaged in a verbal dispute that escalated
into a physical altercation, he was “mad,” and he ultimately pushed her “real
hard.” However, Defendant also testified that he lacked the intent to injure
Victim, asserting that he “didn’t mean to hurt her in any kind of way” and that
he “wasn’t thinking” when he pushed Victim. Two additional witnesses also
testified to witnessing the scuffle between Defendant and Victim. One contended
that he saw Defendant “lifting [Victim] and throwing her back to the ground.”
The second testified that Defendant was mad, the two were “fighting with each
other, and . . . she was on him . . . [and] he threw her down and fell.” The
second witness also testified that Victim jumped on Defendant and she hit the
ground due to his efforts to “get her off” him.
{16} The testimony of the
two eyewitnesses, coupled with Defendant’s explanation of the fatal
confrontation with Victim, were adequate to enable “reasonable minds to differ”
regarding whether Defendant committed simple battery versus aggravated battery.
In particular, Defendant’s testimony provided evidence that he lacked the
“intent to injure” Victim, a statutory element of aggravated battery. Section
30-3-5(A). Although the State presents a view of the evidence that supports its
theory of an aggravated battery, the testimony of Defendant and the
eyewitnesses lends sufficient evidentiary support to Defendant’s theory of a
simple battery. Such competing strands of evidence are for the jury to consider
and resolve.
State v. Gallegos,
2001-NMCA-021, ¶ 15,
130 N.M. 221,
22
P.3d 689;
State v. Garcia,
2011-NMSC-003, ¶ 5,
149 N.M. 185,
246 P.3d
1057. Only if we were to conclude that Defendant’s actions constituted
aggravated battery as a matter of law could we foreclose Defendant’s theory
that he committed simple battery.
See State v. Allen,
2000-NMSC-002, ¶
88,
128 N.M. 482,
994 P.2d 728. Merely because Defendant engaged in a scuffle
with Victim that possibly escalated into a physical fight of some sort does not
preclude a finding of simple battery.
See State v. Hill,
2001-NMCA-094,
¶¶ 18-19,
131 N.M. 195,
34 P.3d 139 (in applying analogous battery against a
peace officer statute, court concluded that a “possible view[] of the evidence”
was that defendant who struck and kicked officer committed an “intentional
touching or application of force in a rude, insolent, or angry manner”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted));
see also State v. Seal,
76 N.M. 461, 463,
415 P.2d 845, 846 (1966) (court found ample evidence for a
battery conviction where the defendant “grabbed his wife, pushed or slammed her
against a parked car, held her there, then after she broke away, followed her
to [another] car where he proceeded to talk to her for at least an hour, while
she cried and screamed for him to let her go” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Because there is sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s theory,
we conclude that sufficient evidence of an “unlawful act not amounting to [a]
felony” is present to support an involuntary manslaughter instruction. Section
30-2- 3(B).
2. Reasonable
minds could differ regarding whether Defendant (1) acted with willful disregard
for Victim’s safety and (2) was subjectively aware of the danger or risk his
actions posed to Victim, so he thereby acted with criminal negligence.
{17} The State argues
that the evidence adduced at trial “reveals no act ascribed to Defendant that
would allow any rational jury to conclude that the most culpable
mens rea
Defendant possessed was criminal negligence.” According to the State, the
evidence supports only two conclusions regarding Defendant’s mental state: (1)
that Defendant killed Victim intentionally, or (2) that Victim’s death was an
accident. As the State points out, neither of these conclusions comports with a
mind-set of criminal negligence. However, our review indicates that sufficient
evidence was presented to the jury to allow reasonable minds to differ
regarding whether Defendant possessed the required criminal negligence to
support giving an involuntary manslaughter instruction.
{18} In New Mexico, “the
State must show at least criminal negligence to convict a criminal defendant of
involuntary manslaughter.”
Yarborough,
1996-NMSC-068, ¶ 20. Because
involuntary manslaughter is an unintentional killing, we only attach felony
liability where the actor has behaved with the requisite mens rea.
Id.
¶¶ 19-20. This Court has made clear that the criminal negligence standard
applies to all three categories of involuntary manslaughter.
State v.
Salazar,
1997-NMSC-044, ¶ 54,
123 N.M. 778,
945 P.2d 996 (“[I]nvoluntary
manslaughter, whether premised upon a lawful or unlawful act, requires a
showing of criminal negligence.”). Criminal negligence exists where the
defendant “act[s] with willful disregard of the rights or safety of others and
in a manner which endanger[s] any person or property.”
Henley,
2010-NMSC-039, ¶ 16 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); UJI
14-133
NMRA. We also require that the defendant must possess subjective knowledge “of
the danger or risk to others posed by his or her actions.”
Henley,
2010-NMSC-039, ¶ 17.
{19} Reasonable minds
could differ regarding whether Defendant’s scuffle with Victim was a criminally
negligent act. As we have discussed, Defendant and Victim engaged in a verbal
quarrel that escalated into a physical confrontation in which Defendant’s
actions caused Victim’s fall and subsequent death. Ample evidence was provided
to support the view that Defendant engaged in the dispute and behaved in a
fashion that exposed Victim to danger without intending her death. Based on
this evidence, the jury could reasonably have concluded that Defendant
demonstrated a willful disregard of Victim’s safety. In addition, Defendant’s
subjective knowledge of the danger posed by his conduct could be inferred by a
rational jury from the evidence presented.
See State v. McCrary,
100
N.M. 671, 673-74,
675 P.2d 120, 122-23 (1984). Even though Defendant contended
at trial that he was unaware of the danger posed by his actions, a jury could
infer from the circumstances that Defendant possessed the required subjective
knowledge. As the State suggested at trial, a jury could conclude that
Defendant was aware “of the danger or risk to others posed by his . . .
actions” when he caused Victim to fall on the hard asphalt, a commonly
understood peril.
See Henley,
2010-NMSC-039, ¶ 17.
{20} The State’s
contention that “no act ascribed to Defendant” would enable “any rational jury”
to conclude that he committed an act of criminal negligence once again
disregards the standard applicable to the review of denied jury instructions.
The State’s view of the evidence that Defendant “tracked [the Victim] down,
rousted her from her hiding place, knocked her to the ground and, when she
tried to get up, forcefully threw her head-first into the asphalt” is better
suited to argue a sufficiency of the evidence challenge where we view the
evidence in a light most favorable to a conviction.
State v. Romero,
2005-NMCA-060, ¶ 18,
137 N.M. 456,
112 P.3d 1113. However, as we have
explained, when considering the propriety of a denied jury instruction, “we
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the giving of the requested
instruction[s].”
Boyett,
2008-NMSC-030, ¶ 12 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
{21} For the foregoing
reasons, we determine that sufficient evidence has been presented to allow
reasonable minds to differ regarding whether Defendant acted with criminal
negligence during his scuffle with Victim.
Rudolfo,
2008-NMSC-036, ¶ 27.
3. Defendant’s
accident theory does not preclude an involuntary manslaughter instruction
because sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support both theories.
{22} We also reject the
State’s related argument that Defendant’s accident theory precludes giving an
involuntary manslaughter instruction because the two theories denote
inconsistent mental states. The State suggests that our decision in
Henley
supports its view that a theory of accident is incompatible with an involuntary
manslaughter instruction.
2010-NMSC-039, ¶ 19. The State cites
Henley
for the proposition that “the mens rea of accident and involuntary manslaughter
are irreconcilably distinct, and the evidence of one does not support
instructing the jury on the other.” However,
Henley does not address
instances when evidence of the mens rea of
both accident and involuntary
manslaughter is presented to the jury. Under these circumstances, the two
theories of accident and involuntary manslaughter can properly be placed before
the jury.
See id.;
Lucero,
2010-NMSC-011, ¶ 18. In fact, when a
defendant’s theory in a homicide case is an accidental killing, the committee
commentary for the excusable homicide uniform jury instruction envisions that
the “defendant will undoubtedly . . . bring out the absence of the elements of
involuntary manslaughter.” UJI
14-5140 NMRA, Committee Commentary. This
recognition of the potential juxtaposition of the two theories clarifies that
accident and involuntary manslaughter are compatible, although competing,
explanations of the same event.
See Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S.
313, 322-23 (1896) (jury instructions on inconsistent theories are not improper
if supported by the evidence).
{23} In this case,
Defendant testified that Victim’s death was accidental. Additional eyewitness
testimony could also be construed consistent with Defendant’s accident claim.
As a result, because sufficient evidence was adduced in this regard, we leave
it to the jury to decide what version it believes.
{24} Finally, we dispose
of the State’s claim that Defendant failed to preserve the jury instruction
issue because he failed to provide the court with a “correct written
instruction” pursuant to Rule
5-608(D) NMRA. The State asserts that to uphold
the Court of Appeals finding that Defendant preserved the instruction issue would
degrade our “adversarial system of justice” and introduce “a modified
inquisitorial system in which judges litigate against the prosecution.” We
disagree.
{25} Rule 5-608(B)
mandates that “[a]t the close of the defendant’s case, or earlier if ordered by
the court, the parties shall tender requested instructions in writing.” To
preserve an error for “failure to instruct on any issue, a correct written
instruction must be tendered before the jury is instructed.” Rule 5-608(D). The
rule’s purpose is to “alert the trial court to the defendant's argument,”
State
v. Jernigan,
2006-NMSC-003, ¶ 10,
139 N.M. 1,
127 P.3d 537, and enable a
“well-informed ruling” by the court,
State v. Griffin,
2002-NMCA-051, ¶
6,
132 N.M. 195,
46 P.3d 102. Therefore, while it is true that a defendant must
“[
g]
enerally” tender a legally correct instruction to preserve
the issue on appeal, Rule 5-608 is subject to flexible enforcement that is
consistent with its underlying rationale.
See Jernigan,
2006-NMSC-003, ¶
10 (emphasis added);
see also Hill,
2001-NMCA-094, ¶ 7 (“The State
overlooks the purpose of the rule requiring the tender of a correct
instruction, which is to alert the trial court to the defendant's argument.”).
Accordingly, “if the record reflects that the judge clearly understood the type
of instruction the Defendant wanted and understood the tendered instruction
needed to be modified to correctly state the law, then the issue is deemed
preserved for appellate review.”
Jernigan,
2006-NMSC-003, ¶ 10.
{26} In this case, it is
abundantly clear that the district judge was on notice that Defendant wanted an
involuntary manslaughter instruction. Defendant proffered a clearly written
involuntary manslaughter instruction. The proposed instruction begins with the
unmistakable language “[f]or you to find the defendant guilty of involuntary
manslaughter . . . .” The instruction then proceeds to enumerate all five
elements contained in the corresponding uniform jury instruction, UJI
14-231
NMRA. The State contends that the first element, which requires a description
of Defendant’s lawful or unlawful act, provides only a “narrative” of the
scuffle with Victim but fails to identify “any wrongful act.”
Id. The
proffered instruction provided that “[Defendant] and [Victim] were engaged in an
argument that escalated into a physical fight and [Victim] fell to the ground,
struck her head and died as a result of her injuries.” While the first element
may be an imprecise articulation of Defendant’s unlawful act, the use of the
term “physical fight” alerted the district court to Defendant’s theory that the
“unlawful act not amounting to [a] felony” was a battery. Section 30-2-3(B). We
do not demand exact precision in the wording of an instruction to preserve the
issue for appeal.
See Jernigan,
2006-NMSC-003, ¶ 14 (despite failure to
define the elements of “attempted voluntary manslaughter,” court deemed the
failure to instruct preserved because the district court understood which
instruction defendant sought).
{27} In addition to the
written instruction, counsel and the district court engaged in an extensive
colloquy where both sides made arguments regarding the propriety of Defendant’s
proposed instruction, again alerting the court to Defendant’s theory and the
relevant law. This exchange resulted in the district court explicitly
addressing Defendant’s request in which the judge rejected the instruction
because “the involuntary is present, essentially, to the exclusion of [all]
others.” Far from signaling that the district court was unaware of Defendant’s
requested instruction, this testimony suggests that the judge may have actually
believed that such an instruction was appropriate. Finally, when court
reconvened the following morning, defense counsel reiterated its position,
clarifying Defendant’s theory that the evidence supported a finding that
Defendant battered Victim, therefore providing the basis for an unlawful act
involuntary manslaughter instruction. As a result of these interactions, the
district court (1) was aware of Defendant’s request and the underlying
argument, (2) was presented with a written instruction, (3) allowed opposing
counsel to respond, (4) provided an informed ruling on the subject, and (5) was
in a position to correct any misstatements of the law contained in the proffered
instruction. These events satisfy the rationale underlying the preservation
requirement and are consistent with what New Mexico courts have required for
preservation of a failure to instruct claim.
See, e.g., Jernigan,
2006-NMSC-003, ¶¶ 10-15;
Griffin,
2002-NMCA-051, ¶¶ 6-7. Therefore, the
State’s preservation argument fails.
{28} Based on our
foregoing analysis and finding the issue preserved, we conclude that Defendant
was entitled to an involuntary manslaughter instruction. We affirm the Court of
Appeals and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this
Opinion.
EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice
CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice
PATRICIO M. SERNA, Justice
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice
RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice
Topic Index for State v. Skippings, Docket No.
32,137
AE-PA Preservation of
Issues for Appeal
CL-AG Aggravating or
Mitigating Circumstances
CL-CM Criminal Negligence
CL-GV General vs.
Specific Offenses
CL-IV Involuntary Manslaughter
CL-VM Voluntary
Manslaughter
CA-EO Elements of Offense
CA-SE Substantial or
Sufficient Evidence
EV-CR Credibility of
Witnesses
EV-SS Substantial or
Sufficient Evidence
JI-CJ Criminal Jury Instructions
JI-FG Failure to Give or Request