WYLIE CORP. V. MOWRER, 1986-NMSC-075,
104 N.M. 751, 726 P.2d 1381 (S. Ct. 1986)
CASE HISTORY ALERT: see ¶3, ¶6 - affects
1957-NMSC-075
WYLIE CORPORATION and THE TRAVELERS
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Petitioners,
vs.
HON. FREDERICK M. MOWRER, District Judge, Second Judicial
District, Respondent
SUPREME COURT OF NEW MEXICO
1986-NMSC-075, 104 N.M. 751, 726 P.2d 1381
Miller, Stratvert, Torgerson &
Schlenker, Stephen M. Williams and Steven Vidmar, for the petitioners.
Frank P. Dickson, Jr., for the Real Party
in Interest.
Paul Bardacke, Attorney General; Paula G.
Maynes, Ass't. Attorney General; Andrea R. Buzzard, Ass't Attorney General, for
the Amicus Curiae Workmen's Compensation Administration.
William H. Carpenter, for the Amicus
Curiae N.M. Trial Lawyers Association.
John A. Klecan and Carlos G. Martinez,
for the Amicus Curiae N.M. Defense Lawyers Association.
{1} Petitioners Wylie
Corporation and Travelers Insurance Company brought this request for an
extraordinary writ of superintending control to require Respondent to dismiss
the case of
Hall v. Wylie Corporation, et al., No. CV-86-05309 in the
Bernalillo County Court. Petitioner's request is grounded on its contention
that the new Workmen's Compensation Act passed by the legislature in 1986 (1986
N.M. Laws, ch. 22, §§ 1 through 106, now appearing as N.M.S.A. 1978, §§ 52-1-1
through 52-1-68 (Cum. Supp.1986)),
{*752} divested
the district court of jurisdiction, effective May 21, 1986, to hear and
adjudicate any claims filed between May 21 and December 1, 1986. The new Act,
Section 102, provides that the prior section granting district court
jurisdiction is repealed. In the absence of an effective date provision, under
N.M. Const. art IV, Section 23, the repealer took effect on May 21, 1986,
ninety days after the 1986 legislature recessed. Section 101 of 1986 Laws, ch.
22, provides that all claims filed after December 1, 1986, shall be heard and
determined by a hearing officer appointed by the director of the newly created
workmen's compensation administration.
See N.M.S.A. 1978, §§ 52-5-1
through 52-5-18 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
{2} To state the posture in
which the matter comes to us merely hints at the complexity of the issues
raised. In historical context, this court rejected a legislative attempt to
create a workmen's compensation commission thirty years ago when, in
State
ex rel. Hovey Concrete Products Company v. Mechem,
63 N.M. 250,
316 P.2d
1069 (1957), it struck down a similar act as an unconstitutional incursion into
the exclusive decision-making powers of the judiciary. The first issue,
therefore, squarely before us is whether the 1986 Act, in view of
Mechem,
is constitutional. That is a question that cannot be avoided, because before we
can determine whether any provisions of this Act will bear further upon the
rights or remedies of the workman in the suit underlying this immediate matter,
we must recognize that the district judge refused to concede that he had no
jurisdiction specifically upon the ground that, under the precedent of
Mechem,
"the new Workmen's Compensation Law would be unconstitutional." If
Mechem
remains the law in this jurisdiction, the inquiry inherent in this matter is
similarly answered: The Act, being unconstitutional, cannot take jurisdiction
from the district courts and place it in an administrative body.
{3} We are persuaded,
however, that compelling reasons exist to reassess the validity of the
Mechem
decision, not the least of which compulsion is the vigorous and forceful logic
of Justice Sadler's dissent, in which Judge Armijo joined. We would adopt all
that is said in that dissent as convincing reasons why
Mechem should be
overruled.
{4} Additionally, we would
take exception to the characterization in
Mechem's majority opinion of
the commission for hearing workmen's compensation claims as a "clearly...
judicial" rather that a "quasi-judicial" body. 63 N.M. at
252-53, 316 P.2d at 1071-72. The distinction attempted simply does not
withstand examination of the two definitions. In the context of voluminous New
Mexico case law, a workmen's compensation commission is no more "purely
judicial" -- as opposed to "quasi-judicial" -- than is New
Mexico's Public Service Commission, Environmental Improvement Board, Employment
Security Department, Human Rights Commission, Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission,
or many other administrative agencies. All of them operate unhindered under the
same constitutional provision which the
Mechem court found so
constraining when applied to a worker's compensation board.
{5} Secondly, the effort to
classify "judicial" and "quasi-judicial" activities in
Mechem
by looking to the public or private rights sought to be adjudicated ignored the
long-standing and oft-repeated recognition in New Mexico case law of the
public's stake in the worker's remedies: Public policy demands minimum financial
security for the injured worker and his family.
Aranda v. Mississippi
Chemical Corp.,
93 N.M. 412,
600 P.2d 1202 (Ct. App.1979). Workmen's
compensation benefits were enacted to prevent the workman from becoming
dependent upon the public welfare.
Casias v. Zia Co., 93 N.M 78,
596
P.2d 521 (Ct. App.1979);
Codling v. Aztec Well Servicing Co.,
89 N.M.
213,
549 P.2d 628 (Ct. App.1976). Within the policy considerations of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, the interests of the claimant and the public are
paramount.
Codling. The underlying purpose
{*753}
of the Workmen's Compensation Act is to protect the workman from becoming a
public charge upon the welfare rolls.
Spidle v. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp.,
96 N.M. 290,
629 P.2d 1219 (1981);
Lane v. Levi Strauss & Co.,
92
N.M. 504,
590 P.2d 652 (Ct. App.1979). The consuming public, in the final
analysis, bears the expense of workmen's compensation, as a charge included in
the sale price of the service or commodity offered by the industry.
Gonzales
v. Chino Copper Co.,
29 N.M. 228,
222 P. 903 (1924). Moreover, as the
Mechem
dissent observed again and again, administrative boards and agencies have been
upheld as properly created by state and federal legislative bodies for nearly a
hundred years. Justice Sadler felt the
Mechem decision to be fifty years
behind the times when it was decided, and an "anachronism" when
written thirty years ago. It has not gained more favor nor become more
palatable, legally or logically, in the intervening years.
See Larson's
Workmen's Compensation Law, § 80.10, n.1 (1973).
{6} We, therefore, expressly
overrule
Mechem and, in doing so, hold that creation of a workmen's
compensation administration and vesting in it the determination of
controversies thereunder, is a valid exercise of legislative power.
{7} The next question, then,
relates to the claim of Mr. Hall against his employer and its workmen's
compensation insurer, filed in Respondent's court on June 23, 1986. Hall had
been injured in October 1985, and had received benefits until payments were
stopped in May 1986.
{8} Section 102 of the 1986
Law repealed N.M.S.A. 1978, Sections 52-1-32 through -35, of the then-existing
workmen's compensation act. Those sections required filing of claims in the
district court, court approval of pre-trial settlements, application of the
rules of civil procedure in compensation proceedings, and trial of claims in the
district court. By operation of law, as noted above, the repealer became
effective May 21, 1986.
{9} However, Section 101 of
the new Act also provided that those sections of the new Act other than the
definitions and scheduled benefits sections, would apply to injuries and deaths
occurring on or after December 1, 1986, and that such claims filed after that
date were to be filed with the director of the workmen's compensation
administration. Section 103 makes December 1, 1986, the effective date upon which
operation of the new administrative agency will begin.
{10} It is apparent that
claimant, Mr. Hall, in the case triggering this petition, falls into the
crevice between May 21st and December 1st when, if all of Sections 101, 102 and
103 are to be given effect, there exists no forum either for filing or hearing
his claim until after December 1st. Even then it is questionable whether he
would be able to prevail, since his accident did not occur after December 1st,
and it is claims arising after that date over which the director of the
workmen's compensation administration is given jurisdiction.
{11} Such a hiatus, during
which a workman might be without medical care or he and his family entirely
without income, perverts the humanitarian and economic foundation of a
workmen's compensation system, and its philosophy of expeditious resolution. We
refer to the plethora of expressions to such effect in New Mexico case law,
see,
e.g.,
Smith v. Dowell Corp.,
102 N.M. 102,
692 P.2d 27 (1984),
and
Sanchez v. M.M. Sundt Construction Co.,
103 N.M. 294,
706 P.2d 158
(Ct. App.1985), and the numerous cases collected in both opinions.
{12} We therefore resort to
the severability provisions of Section 106 of the new Act wherein it is
stipulated that "[i]f any part or application of this act is held invalid,
the remainder of its application to other situations or persons shall not be
affected."
{13} To the extent, then,
that repeal of N.M.S.A. 1978, §§ 52-1-32 through -35, deprives a claimant of a
forum between May 21 and December 1, 1986, for resolution of
{*754}
a legislatively-created right, we hold that portion of Section 102
unconstitutional, when applied to the very narrow question of jurisdiction over
a claimant in Mr. Hall's position who has filed or will file a claim in
district court prior to December 1, 1986.
See National Council of
Compensation Ins. v. New Mexico State Corporation Comm'n,
103 N.M. 707,
712
P.2d 1369 (1986). We further hold that commencing on December 1, 1986, all
claims, regardless of when the injury or death may have occurred, shall be
filed with the workmen's compensation administration. With the restricted
holdings pertinent only to this case and to other claimants similarly situated,
all parts of the 1986 Act now may be read harmoniously, sensibly and with
respect for the force and effect of the Act.
{14} Consequently, we quash
the alternative writ previously issued. Although the district court denied
dismissal on other grounds, we now affirm that ruling on the basis of this
Opinion and remand the case for further proceedings.
WE CONCUR: RIORDAN, Chief Justice, SOSA, JR., Senior Justice,
FEDERICI, Justice, STOWERS, JR., Justice.
SOSA, JR., Senior Justice