STATE EX REL. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS. V. DAVIS, 1982-NMSC-139, 99 N.M. 138, 654 P.2d
1038 (S. Ct. 1982)
STATE OF NEW MEXICO, et rel. DEPARTMENT
OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
HENRY J. DAVIS, Respondent-Appellee.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW MEXICO
1982-NMSC-139, 99 N.M. 138, 654 P.2d 1038
Appeal from the District court of Lea
county, Donald D. Hallam, District Judge
Jeff Bingaman, Attorney General, Dorsett
C. Bennett, II, Assistant Attorney General, Roswell, New Mexico, for Appellant.
Cox, Imke & Proctor, Max Houston
Proctor, Hobbs, New Mexico, for Appellee.
Sosa, S.J. wrote the opinion. WE CONCUR:
H. VERN PAYNE, Chief Justice, WILLIAM R. FEDERICI, Justice, WILLIAM RIORDAN,
Justice
{*139} SOSA, Senior
Justice.
{1} The State brought this
action pursuant to Section
40-5-7, N.M.S.A. 1978, to have the respondent, Henry
Davis, declared to be the legal father of Adriane Clay and to obtain payment
for prior and future public assistance payments made on the child's behalf by
the Department of Human Services. After a hearing on respondent's motion to
dismiss, the district court dismissed the cause of action with prejudice on the
ground that the common law doctrine of laches applied. The State appeals. We
reverse the district court.
{2} There is no time
limitation on proceedings to enforce the obligations of a father which are
initiated by the State. §
40-5-23, N.M.S.A. 1978. The State has the right to
pursue this matter pursuant to Section 40-5-7 which states that a proceeding to
compel support and establish the parentage of a child may be brought by the
State. The Department of Human Services is the state agency with the duty and
power to seek reimbursement for public assistance payments and to establish the
paternity of a child born out of wedlock. §§ 27-2-27 and
27-2-28, N.M.S.A. 1978
(Repl. Pamp. 1982).
{3} We consider whether the
doctrine of laches may be applied against the State and whether the elements of
laches were met in this case.
{4} The weight of authority
is that when a sovereign institutes a suit to enforce a public right or protect
a public interest, laches cannot be set up as a bar. 30A C.J.S.
Equity §
114 (1965). The case law in New Mexico is in accord. The general rule in New
Mexico is that "[t]he tardiness of public officers in the performance of
duties enjoined upon them by statutes cannot be entertained as a defense to an
action by the state to enforce a public right or to protect public interests."
Ross v. Daniel, 53 N.M. 70, 76,
201 P.2d 993, 996 (1949) (citations
omitted);
see also Village of Cloudcroft v. Pittman, 63 N.M. 168,
315
P.2d 517 (1957). "The doctrines of laches and estoppel are so related that
what has been said with respect to estoppel applies with equal force to the
doctrine of laches."
Ross v. Daniel 53 N.M. at 76, 201 P.2d at 996.
Although estoppel is not usually applicable against a sovereign in the exercise
of governmental functions, it will be applied where right and justice demand
it.
Silver City Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Board of Regents, 75 N.M.
106,
401 P.2d 95 (1965). However, laches is not favored and should be applied
only where a party has been guilty of inexcusable neglect in enforcing his
rights.
Cain v. Cain, 91 N.M. 423,
575 P.2d 607 (1978).
{5} Whether the doctrine of
laches applies depends upon the circumstances in each particular case.
See
Hart v. Northeastern N.M. Fair Ass'n, 58 N.M. 9,
265 P.2d 341 (1953). The
application of laches would be appropriate in the instant case only if all the
elements were met.
See Butcher v. City of Albuquerque, 95 N.M. 242,
620
P.2d 1267 (1980). There are four elements necessary to find laches:
(1) Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under
whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for
which the complainant seeks a remedy, as, for example, an invasion by the
defendant of the complainant's right,...; (2) delay in asserting the
complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the {*140} defendant's conduct and having been
afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on
the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which
he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event
relief is accorded to the complainant or the suit is not held to be barred.
{6} The facts in this case
are not in dispute. Respondent had sexual relations with the child's mother.
The child, Adriane Clay, was born on May 30, 1973. Debra Clay never notified
respondent about his possible paternity. The State sent him a registered letter
about the child on May 8, 1974. Mr. Davis testified that he did not recall
receiving such a letter, although he admitted that the signature on the return
receipt appeared to be his. The State took no further action until it filed a
paternity petition on March 24, 1981.
{7} Respondent contends that
the third and fourth elements of laches have been met. The third element
requires that respondent have
no knowledge or notice that the State
would assert its right.
Id. Mr. Davis did not lack the requisite notice
because he was contacted by the State about the child in 1974. In addition,
respondent would not be prejudiced or suffer injury in the event the suit is
not barred. It would not be an injury to be held responsible for the support of
his child if he is determined to be the father. Because Mr. Davis had notice
and will be injured, the facts in the instant case do not meet the elements of
laches.
{8} It is clear that a
determination of the paternity of this child is in the public interest. The
State is seeking reimbursement for payments it has made in excess of $6,000 as
well as future support payments for so long as the child receives public
assistance. Absent proof of inexcusable neglect, the State will not be barred
from maintaining the action on this set of facts.
{9} The order of the district
court is accordingly reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
WE CONCUR: H. VERN PAYNE, Chief Justice, WILLIAM R. FEDERICI,
Justice, WILLIAM RIORDAN, Justice