WESTON V. CARPER DRILLING CO., 1966-NMSC-235,
77 N.M. 220, 421 P.2d 435 (S. Ct. 1966)
LYNN WESTON, Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
CARPER DRILLING COMPANY and AMERICAN EMPLOYER'S INSURANCE
COMPANY, Defendants-Appellees
SUPREME COURT OF NEW MEXICO
1966-NMSC-235, 77 N.M. 220, 421 P.2d 435
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LEA
COUNTY, NASH, Judge
Motion for Rehearing denied January 3,
1967
WILLIAM J. HECK, Hobbs, New Mexico,
Attorney for Appellant.
GIRAND, COWAN & REESE, Hobbs, New
Mexico, Attorneys for Appellees.
NOBLE, Justice, wrote the opinion.
J. C. COMPTON, J., JOE W. WOOD, J., Ct.
App.
{1} Lynn Weston has appealed
from a judgment dismissing his claim for workmen's compensation benefits.
{2} The trial court's finding
no. 10, that the claimant failed to prove any disability as a result of the
accidental injury, is challenged as lacking substantial support in the
evidence.
{3} Section 59-10-13.3(B),
N.M.S.A. 1953 (§ 7, ch. 67, Laws 1959), reads:
"In all cases where the defendants deny that an alleged
disability is a natural and direct result of the accident, the workman must
establish that causal connection as a medical probability by expert medical
testimony. No award of compensation shall be based on speculation or on expert
testimony that as a medical possibility the causal connection exists."
"The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous in
its requirement that medical testimony be produced to establish causal
connection between an accident and disability. * * * In other words, where
causal connection is denied by an employer, in order to prevail, it is now
incumbent upon a claimant to present one or more qualified medical experts to
testify that in his or their opinion there is a causal connection as a medical
probability as opposed to possibility."
{6} The term "natural
and direct" as used in the statute was interpreted in Stuckey v. Furr Food
Cafeteria,
72 N.M. 15,
380 P.2d 172, to signify "an understandable and
reasonable proximity of cause and effect as distinguished from remote and
{*222} doubtful consequences resulting from a
given occurrence."
{7} The pleadings in this
case put in issue the question of causal connection between the asserted
disability and the accident, and upon authority of our decisions supra, there
may be no recovery unless such causal connection is established by the opinion
of a medical expert as a medical probability.
{8} We have carefully
reviewed the record in this case and find no such medical opinion, nor has any
been called to our attention. The medical testimony asserted by the claimant to
satisfy this statutory requirement concerns only an opinion as to the
claimant's then ability to perform heavy labor. Such testimony does not,
however, establish the causal connection between the disability and the
accident. Claimant's failure to produce such evidence supports the challenged
finding and the conclusion that the claimant failed to prove a compensable
injury arising out of his employment.
{9} Our disposition of this
point makes it unnecessary to discuss other questions briefed and argued.
{10} It follows that the
judgment appealed from should be affirmed.
J. C. COMPTON, J., JOE W. WOOD, J., Ct. App.