PTA SALES, INC. V. RETAIL CLERKS LOCAL 462, 1981-NMSC-089, 96 N.M. 581, 633 P.2d
689 (S. Ct. 1981)
PTA SALES, INC., d/b/a NEW MEXICO FOOD
BASKET, INC., NO. 17
and NEW MEXICO FOOD BASKET, INC., NO. 18,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RETAIL CLERKS LOCAL NO. 462, Defendant-Appellant.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW MEXICO
1981-NMSC-089, 96 N.M. 581, 633 P.2d 689
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF
CHAVES COUNTY, John B. Walker, District Judge.
Kool, Kool, Bloomfield & Hollis, John
L. Hollis, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant.
Poole, Tinnin & Martin, Robert P.
Tinnin, Jr., Robert H. Jacobvitz, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for
Plaintiff-Appellee.
Easley, C.J., wrote the opinion. WE
CONCUR: DAN SOSA, JR., Senior Justice, WILLIAM RIORDAN, Justice.
{*582} EASLEY, Chief
Justice.
{1} Defendant Retail Clerks
Local No. 462 (Union), appealed the trial court's issuance of a permanent
injunction in favor of plaintiff PTA Sales, Inc. (Employer). We affirm the
trial court.
{2} The issues in this labor
dispute are:
I. Whether there is substantial evidence to support the trial
court's finding that Union agents blocked access to doorways and refused to
allow customers out of their cars.
II. Whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction
to issue an injunction.
{*583} III. Whether
the injunctive relief granted by the trial court exceeded the scope of its
jurisdiction.
IV. Whether Section 50-2-2(B), N.M.S.A. 1978, applies only to
acts against other employees.
V. Whether the trial court must comply with the provisions of
Sections 50-3-1 and 50-3-2, N.M.S.A. 1978, to grant injunctive relief under
Section 50-2-2.
{3} Employer operated two
grocery stores in Roswell. Union is certified by the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) as the collective bargaining representative of Employer's
employees at the two stores. In furtherance of a labor dispute, Union commenced
a strike and began picketing at the two stores. Employer brought an action for
temporary, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief claiming that Union: (1)
trespassed upon the Employer's property and refused to leave despite repeated
requests; (2) intentionally blocked the access of customers to the stores and
harassed and intimidated customers; (3) refused to allow customers out of their
vehicles; and (4) falsely represented to customers that the stores were closed.
The trial court granted an ex parte temporary restraining order. Union then
sought to dissolve the temporary restraining order. After an evidentiary
hearing in which both sides participated, the trial court denied Union's motion
to dissolve the temporary restraining order and granted a preliminary
injunction. The trial court subsequently issued a permanent injunction based on
Subsections (B) and (D) of Section 50-2-2 which reads as follows:
B. It shall be unlawful in connection with any labor dispute
for any person individually or in concert with others to hinder or prevent by
mass picketing, violence or threats of violence, force, coercion or
intimidation of any kind, the pursuit of any lawful work or employment, or to
obstruct or interfere with entrance to or egress from any place of employment,
or to obstruct or interfere with free or uninterrupted use of any public roads,
streets, highways, railways, airports or other ways of travel or conveyance.
D. Any person or persons may be restrained by injunction from
doing any of the acts prohibited by this section without regard to the
conditions and restrictions set forth in Sections 50-3-1 and 50-3-2 NMSA 1978.
{4} Significant among the
court's findings of fact are:
No. 11. The Defendant's agents blocked the doorways which
permitted access of customers to Plaintiff's retail stores.
No. 12. Customer's [sic] of Plaintiff's retail stores have
been intimidated by agents of the Defendant by refusing to allow customers out
of their vehicles, contrary to Section 50-2-2B N.M.S.A. (1978 Comp.).
{5} We are bound by the rule
that the evidence must be considered in an aspect most favorable to appellees
and that the facts found by the trial court are binding on appeal if supported
by substantial evidence.
Pentecost v. Hudson,
57 N.M. 7,
252 P.2d 511
(1953). We hold that Findings of Fact Nos. 11 and 12 are supported by
substantial evidence.
{6} Union contends that
federal law preempts the state court's subject matter jurisdiction. Union
relies primarily upon
San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.
Ct. 773, 3 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1959), and
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters,
436 U.S. 180, 98 S. Ct. 1745, 56 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1978).
{7} In
Garmon, the
Court held that federal law preempts state court jurisdiction over labor
practices which are arguably either protected or prohibited under Sections 7 or
8 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 158 (1976).
{8} In
Sears, the
Court held that where the union engaged in trespassory picketing and had a fair
opportunity to invoke the jurisdiction
{*584}
of the NLRB and failed to do so, state court's subject matter jurisdiction
was not preempted.
{9} We do not believe the
Garmon
rule, as modified by
Sears, is controlling in the instant case. In both
of those cases, the Court recognized the continued validity of an exception to
the general rule of federal preemption where the union's conduct "touched
interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility."
Garmon,
supra 359 U.S. at 244, 79 S. Ct. at 779. These local interests are
involved in cases where the union's conduct includes actual or potential
violence,
Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 78 S. Ct. 206, 2 L.
Ed. 2d 151 (1957); threats of violence,
United Workers v. Laburnum Corp.,
347 U.S. 656, 74 S. Ct. 833, 98 L. Ed. 1025 (1954); and obstruction of customer
access without violence,
Kaplan's Fruit, Etc. v. Superior Court, Etc.,
26 Cal.3d 60, 160 Cal. Rptr. 745, 603 P.2d 1341 (1979). This Court has
previously observed that state jurisdiction is not preempted where the union's
conduct is marked by violence, threats of violence or imminent threats to
public order.
Gonzales v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int. U.,
77
N.M. 61,
419 P.2d 257 (1966).
{10} The instant case is
distinguishable from
Sears. In
Sears, the employer's action was
grounded solely in trespass. In this case, Union's conduct included
intimidating customers and obstructing customer access. Union's conduct was
tantamount to a potential breach of the public order. This conduct, therefore, "touched
interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility."
See
Garmon,
supra. We hold that federal law did not preempt subject
matter jurisdiction of the state court.
{11} Union contends that,
even assuming the state court had subject matter jurisdiction, the injunctive
relief granted exceeded the scope of its jurisdiction by interfering with
Union's right to engage in peaceful picketing.
{12} The injunction provided
that Union should be permitted to picket plaintiff's Store No. 17, such
picketing should be confined to no more than four pickets, at any one time, and
such picketing should be confined to the number of two pickets on the northerly
side of the store and two pickets on the westerly side of the store and
confined to the sidewalk area, and the two pickets permitted on the north side
of the store to remain one on each side of the combination entry-exist doorway
and should not approach the entrance-exit any closer than five feet, and should
not in any manner picket these areas in a manner which will impede the flow of
foot traffic to plaintiff's Store No. 17. Union relies heavily upon
Youngdahl
v. Rainfair,
Inc.,
supra. In
Youngdahl, the United
States Supreme Court held that a state court lacked jurisdiction to issue an
injunction prohibiting,
inter alia, all "picketing or
patrolling" of the employer's premises. The Court stated:
Though the state court was within its discretionary power in
enjoining future acts of violence, intimidation and threats of violence by the
strikers and the union, yet it is equally clear that such court entered the
pre-empted domain of the National Labor Relations Board insofar as it enjoined
peaceful picketing by petitioners. The picketing proper, as contrasted with the
activities around the headquarters, was peaceful.... What violence there was
was scattered in time and much of it was unconnected with the picketing.
355 U.S. at 139, 78 S. Ct. at 211-212.
{13} The injunction in the
present case does not go to the extreme measures adopted by the state court in
Youngdahl.
Picketing is allowed under the injunction. The limitation on the number of
pickets and their location is directly related to the objective of preventing
the obstruction of access to the employer's business.
See M. Restaurants v.
San Francisco Local, Etc., 146 Cal. Rptr. 436 (Ct. App. 1978). We therefore
hold that the injunctive relief granted by the trial court did not exceed the
scope of its subject matter jurisdiction.
{14} The Union contends that
Section 50-2-2(B) does not apply to acts against customers and ought to be
limited to acts against employees. The pertinent part of the statute reads:
It shall be unlawful in connection with any labor dispute for
any person individually or in concert with others... to obstruct or interfere
with entrance to or egress from any place of employment....
{15} Union interprets the
statute to apply only where striking workers obstruct the access of other
employees to the place of employment. Thus, obstructing customer's access is
not covered by Section 50-2-2(B).
{16} This interpretation is
too narrow and would be inconsistent with the intent of the Legislature. The
legislative intent is set out in Section
50-2-1, N.M.S.A. 1978. The legislative
purpose is "for the welfare and protection of its citizens" as well
as to "eliminate those practices which are so destructive to good
employee-employer relationships." Limiting Section 50-2-2(B) to cover acts
between employees would lead to absurd results. We therefore conclude that,
consistent with the expressed intent of the Legislature, the state court is
authorized under Section 50-2-2(B) to enjoin obstructions of access of
customers as well as other employees.
{17} Union contends that a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction cannot be issued under
Section 50-2-2 without first complying with the requirements of Sections 50-3-1
and 50-3-2.
{18} This contention is
wholly without merit. Subsection (D) of Section 50-2-2 provides, "[a]ny
person or persons may be restrained by injunction from doing any of the acts
prohibited by this section without regard to the conditions and restrictions
set forth in Sections
50-3-1 and
50-3-2 NMSA 1978." Thus the trial court
is specifically authorized to grant an injunction under Section 50-2-2 without
complying with Sections 50-3-1 and 50-3-2.
{19} Alternatively, Union
contends that the scope of the injunction exceeded that authorized under
Section 50-2-2(D) and thus required compliance with Sections 50-3-1 and 50-3-2.
{20} We have previously noted
that the injunction is narrowly tailored to achieve the objectives of Section
50-2-2 by preventing obstruction of access and that the restrictions upon the
number and location of pickets is directly related to this objective. A statute
should be construed to accomplish what the Legislature intends.
State ex.
rel. Newsome v. Alarid,
90 N.M. 790,
568 P.2d 1236 (1977). We therefore
hold that the injunctive relief granted by the trial court was within the scope
of Section 50-2-2.
{21} The judgment of the
trial court is affirmed.
SOSA, Senior Justice, and RIORDAN, J., concur.