PRUEY V. DEPARTMENT OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL, 1986-NMSC-018, 104 N.M. 10, 715 P.2d
458 (S. Ct. 1986)
MAE W. PRUEY, d/b/a EDD'S PACKAGE STORE,
et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL OF NEW MEXICO and
ABE E. RODRIGUEZ, Director, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW MEXICO
1986-NMSC-018, 104 N.M. 10, 715 P.2d 458
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA
FE COUNTY, Tony Scarborough, District Judge
John G. Jasper, Santa Fe, New Mexico, for
Appellants.
Paul Bardacke, Attorney General, Kenneth
B. Baca, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, New Mexico, for Appellees ABC
and Rodriguez.
Forrest G. Buffington, Gallup, New
Mexico, for Appellee McKinley County.
James Snipes, Lovington, New Mexico, for
Appellee City of Lovington.
Rebecca E. Wardlaw, Lovington, New
Mexico, for Appellee Lea County.
Riordan, C.J., wrote the opinion. WE
CONCUR: William R. Federici, Justice, Harry E. Stowers, Justice
{*11} RIORDAN, Chief
Justice.
{1} Mae W. Pruey and other
appellants (appellants) are the holders of valid and unexpired licenses granted
by the State of New Mexico under NMSA 1978, Sections
60-3A-1 through
60-8A-19
(Repl. Pamp.1981 and Cum. Supp.1985) (Liquor Control Act) authorizing them to
sell and serve alcoholic beverages. They sought declaratory and injunctive
relief against the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, its director, and
some cities and counties statewide that are "local option districts"
(appellees) pursuant to the Liquor Control Act. Appellants asked the trial
court to declare void the local option elections held in local option districts
in which appellants had their respective licensed premises and to enjoin the
enforcement of any statutory or regulatory prohibition against the sales of
alcoholic beverages by appellants on Sunday. The trial court denied relief and
dismissed the action. Appellants appealed. The appeal was transferred from the
Court of Appeals to this Court on motion of the appellees. We affirm the trial
court.
{2} The two issues raised on
appeal are that NMSA 1978, Section
60-7A-1 (Cum. Supp.1985) is unconstitutional
because it violates the appellants' rights:
B. under the prohibitions of the furtherance and
establishment of religion clause of U.S. Const. amend. I and N.M. Const. art.
II, § 11.
{3} Section 60-7A-1 specifies
the hours and days on which "[a]lcoholic beverages shall be sold, served,
delivered or consumed on licensed premises." Hours and days restricted by
this statute include:
1. The voting hours of the primary, general, municipal and
any other election prescribed by the rules and regulations of the director. §
60-7A-1(C).
2. From 2:00 a.m. on Christmas Day until 7:00 a.m. on the day
after Christmas. § 60-7A-1(D).
{*12} 3. From 2:00
a.m. on Sunday until 7:00 a.m. on Monday, § 60-7A-1(A), unless the voters in a
local option district vote to allow Sunday sales by the drink for consumption
on the licensed premises. § 60-7A-1(B) and (E).
{4} Appellants argue that
these restrictions establish certain classifications of sellers of alcoholic
beverages and thus deny them equal protection under the United States and New
Mexico Constitutions. These classifications include: licensees who hold only
licenses authorizing package sales of alcoholic beverages and who are
prohibited from selling at all on Sunday; licensees who hold licenses
authorizing sales of alcoholic beverages by the drink, but who are located in a
local option district that has voted to prohibit Sunday sales and are
prohibited from selling alcoholic beverages by the drink on Sunday; and
licensees who hold licenses authorizing the sale of alcohol by the drink, and
whose premises are in a local option district that allows Sunday sales by the
drink and may then sell alcohol by the drink on Sunday.
{5} We recognized in
Drink,
Inc. v. Babcock, 77 N.M. 277,
421 P.2d 798 (1966), that the legislature has
the power not only to regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages, but to
eliminate it entirely and they may impose more stringent regulations on the
liquor industry than on other businesses. In testing the constitutionality of
statutes, courts must weigh every presumption in favor of the validity of the
legislation.
Id.
{6} Appellants argue that
this scheme of classifications does not pass constitutional muster. However,
"[e]qual protection does not prohibit classification for legislative
purposes, provided that there is a rational and natural basis" for the
statute.
McGeehan v. Bunch, 88 N.M. 308, 310,
540 P.2d 238, 240 (1975)
(quoting
Gruschus v. Bureau of Revenue, 74 N.M. 775, 778,
399 P.2d 105,
107 (1965)). But while classification is proper, there must always be
uniformity or similar treatment within the class.
Burch v. Foy, 62 N.M.
219,
308 P.2d 199 (1957).
{7} According to
McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26, 81 S. Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393
(1961):
[t]he constitutional safeguard is offended only if the
classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the
State's objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their
constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in
some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state
of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it. (Citations omitted).
We must determine then whether the classifications drawn are
reasonable in light of the purpose of the statute. McGeehan v. Bunch.
The classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of
the legislation, so that all persons similarly situated are treated alike. Id.;
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S. Ct. 251, 30 L. Ed. 2d 225 (1971).
{8} McGowan v. Maryland
involved the constitutional validity of a Maryland criminal statute known as a
Sunday closing law or Sunday blue law. The statute prohibited the Sunday sale
of all merchandise except the retail sale of tobacco products, confectionaries,
milk, bread, fruits, gasoline, oils, greases, drugs and medicines, and
newspapers and periodicals.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 422-23, 81
S. Ct. at 1103. On addressing the issue of equal protection and applying the
above-stated standard, the Court found it reasonable that the Sunday sale of
the exempted commodities was necessary either for the health of the populace or
for the enhancement of the recreational atmosphere of the day.
McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. at 426, 81 S. Ct. at 1105.
{9} NMSA 1978, Section
60-3A-2 (Repl. Pamp.1981) states that it is the policy of the New Mexico State
Legislature, through the Liquor Control Act, that "the sale, service and
public consumption of alcoholic
{*13} beverages
in the state shall be licensed, regulated and controlled so as to protect the
public health, safety and morals of every community in the state." Under
N.M. Const. art. IV, Section 1, the legislature is granted power to promulgate
laws that provide "for the preservation of the public peace, health or
safety."
{10} The legislature has
provided a rational basis for the prohibition against the sales of alcoholic
beverages on Sunday, and they have acted within their power.
{11} The election option was
referred to in
McGowan v. Maryland by the United States Supreme Court.
The Court stated that the Equal Protection Clause relates to equality between
persons rather than areas and that territorial uniformity is not a
constitutional prerequisite.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 427, 81 S.
Ct. at 1105. It is a matter for legislative discretion. This Court noted the
authority of the legislature to give communities the option to be dry and
prohibit all liquor licenses in
Chiordi v. Jernigan, 46 N.M. 396,
129
P.2d 640 (1942). Similarly, the local option on Sunday sales of liquor by the
drink is valid and this classification is upheld. It was not raised, nor do we
address at this time, the legality or manner in which the option election was
held.
{12} Appellants argue that
Section 60-7A-1 violates their rights because it furthers the establishment of
religion. The U.S. Supreme Court stated in
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,
Inc., 427 U.S. 703, 105 S. Ct. 2914, 86 L. Ed. 2d 557 (1985), that to meet
constitutional requirements under the establishment clause, a statute must: (1)
have a secular purpose, (2) not advance or inhibit religion, and (3) not foster
excessive entanglement of government with religion.
See also Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S. Ct. 2105, 29 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1971). The
statute must meet all parts of this test to be valid.
Stone v. Graham,
449 U.S. 39, 101 S. Ct. 192, 66 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1980).
{13} Though the laws that
deal with Sunday sales were originally motivated by religion, more recently,
secular purposes have been advanced to make Sunday a day of rest and
recreation.
See McGowan v. Maryland. Further, Christmas is now a state
and federal holiday, which is celebrated by many people of both religious and
non-religious beliefs. It is no longer a strictly religious holiday. The
purpose of Section 60-7A-1 is to protect the public health, safety and morals.
One day a week during which no package liquor could be sold and no liquor could
be sold by the drink in those districts which it was majority supported would
have the secular purpose that is described by our legislature in Section
60-3A-2. It does not advance or inhibit religion.
{14} Lastly, the State
enforces Section 60-7A-1 by issuing licenses. There is no supervisory or
regulatory entanglement with religion. There is no divisive political potential
enhanced by this statute. There is no religious cause used to promote political
action. It cannot be found that this statute fosters excessive entanglement of
government with religion.
{15} We find that based upon
the challenges raised in this case, Section 60-7A-1 does not violate
appellants' constitutional rights under either U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 and
N.M. Const. art. II, § 18 or U.S. Const. amend. I and N.M. Const. art. II, 11.
It is a proper exercise of legislative power. This opinion is limited to a
determination of the issue of constitutionality of Section 60-7A-1. We affirm
the trial court.
WE CONCUR: FEDERICI, Justice, and STOWERS, Justice.