NATIONAL COUNCIL ON COMP. INS. V. NEW MEXICO SCC, 1986-NMSC-005, 103 N.M. 707, 712
P.2d 1369 (S. Ct. 1986)
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON COMPENSATION
INSURANCE, Petitioner,
vs.
NEW MEXICO STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION, and members
thereof purporting to act as the State Insurance
Board, and the SUPERINTENDENT OF INSURANCE,
Vicente Jasso, Respondents
SUPREME COURT OF NEW MEXICO
1986-NMSC-005, 103 N.M. 707, 712 P.2d 1369
ORIGINAL MANDAMUS PROCEEDING AND
CERTIORARI
RODEY, DICKASON, SLOAN, AKIN & ROBB,
VICTOR R. MARSHALL, REX THROCKMORTON, RICHARD MINZNER, Albuquerque, New Mexico
for Petitioner
PAUL BARDACKE, Attorney General,
CHRISTOPHER CARLSEN, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, New Mexico for
Respondents
{1} Objecting to a December
23, 1985, order of the New Mexico State Corporation Commission (purportedly
acting as the insurance board) which canceled increased workmen's compensation
insurance rates pursuant to a filing made by the National Council on
Compensation Insurance on October 17, 1985, the Council petitioned this Court
{*708} on December 30, 1985, for Writs of
Emergency Relief, Mandamus and Certiorari.
{2} The Council protests the
cancellation on the ground that the Commission failed to follow the statutory
procedure established in Article 17 of the Insurance Code, NMSA 1978, ch. 59A
(Orig. Pamp.1984), for disapproving rate changes which otherwise would become
effective 15 days after filing by the insurer, by operation of Section
59A-17-10. The Council concedes that Section 59A-17-35 of the Code provides for
appeals from orders of the insurance board made "under Section 66 of the
Insurance Code * * * to the district court of Santa Fe County in the same
manner as provided for taking of appeals in other civil actions." But it
contends that because the legislature did not enact a "Section 66,"
providing in 1984 N.M. Laws, ch. 127, that Section 66 was "reversed,"
there is no Section 66 order to be appealed by the procedure provided in
Section 59A-17-35; and that in the absence of such an identifiable order, its
only recourse is to this Court.
{3} It is pertinent to our
discussion to note that in the voluminous 420-page Insurance Code contained in
Volume 8 of our New Mexico Statutes, only two references to Section 66 appear,
and they are in Sections 59A-17-34 and -35 relating to hearings and appeals
under Article 17, which deals with Insurance Rates and Rating. It is the
administrative action provided for in Article 17 upon which the Council seeks
review. It is equally critical to note that Section 59A-4-20 of the Code
provides for an appeal to the Santa Fe district court from all orders under the
Code
except those "arising under Article 17 (insurance rates and
rating) of the Insurance Code [this chapter]." The exception of
proceedings under Article 17 alone from the review procedure provided in
Section 59A-4-20 for the other 52 articles of the Code, and the reference to a
"Section 66" appeal in Article 17 only, is some evidence that the
legislature considered Article 17 orders to be "Section 66" orders,
and that its failure to enact Section 66 to so define those orders was an
inadvertent omission.
{4} There is no doubt, from a
reading of Section 59A-17-34, that the procedure for review of the
superintendent's order by the insurance board was intended to be set out in
Section 66 of 1984 N.M. Laws, ch. 127. Following the board's review under
Section 59A-17-34, an appeal from its decision to the Santa Fe district court
is provided in Section 59A-17-35. Thus, the meaning and intent of these two
statutes is not difficult to discern; it is only the procedure of "Section
66" hearings by the insurance board that is missing.
{5} We, therefore, liberally
construe Section 59A-17-35 which gives the right of appeal, as the rules of
statutory construction require us to do. 3 N. Singer,
Sutherland Statutory
Construction § 67.08 (4th ed.1984). As the
Sutherland treatise
points out at Sections 47.36, 47.37, and 47.38, courts may substitute,
disregard or eliminate, or insert or add words to a statute, if it is necessary
to do so to carry out the legislative intent or to express the clearly
manifested meaning of the statute. In the instant case, if "Section 59A-17-34"
were substituted for "Section 66" in Section 59A-17-35, the meaning
of the legislature as gathered from the context of the Insurance Code would
clearly appear. Such a substitution would make Section 59A-17-35's provisions
for appeal sensible, and give the section force and effect.
See New Mexico
Glycerin Co. v. Gallegos,
48 N.M. 65,
145 P.2d 995 (1944). If, on the other
hand, the words "Section 66" were disregarded or eliminated from
Section 59A-17-35, the legislature's intent to allow an appeal from an internal
review likewise would be crystal clear. We are aided in so determining its
meaning by the additional provisions of Section 59A-17-35 which go on to
provide to the appealing party the exact remedies in the district court that
were requested of this Court by extraordinary writ. Those provisions must be
accorded some vitality if, by statutory construction, the legislative intent
may be ascertained.
{6} Consequently, when we
apply the long-standing rule of determining legislative intent by reading not only
isolated parts of the act but all of its parts, provisions,
{*709}
and purposes,
Vaughn v. United Nuclear Corp.,
98 N.M. 481,
650 P.2d
3 (Ct. App.),
cert.
quashed,
98 N.M. 478, 649 P.2d 139 (1982), we
are persuaded that the legislature intended to provide for an appeal from all
determinations made under the Insurance Code, but to provide, not the
discretionary de novo or "on the record" appeal of Section 59A-4-20,
for rates and rating determinations, but one "in the same manner as provided
for taking appeals in other civil actions." § 59A-17-35. Such a
construction not only preserves the salutary provision for appeal to an
aggrieved party; it also gives effect to the interim statutory powers of the
district court pending determination of the appeal, as outlined in subsections
(A), (B), and (C) of Section 59A-17-35. Appeal, therefore, and the preliminary
remedies sought by the Council, are properly addressed to the Santa Fe District
Court.
{7} For the above reasons,
the Petition for Writs of Mandamus and Certiorari are denied.
WE CONCUR: RIORDAN, Chief Justice, SOSA, Senior Justice,
FEDERICI, Justice, STOWERS, Justice.