MOBILE AM., INC. V. SANDOVAL COUNTY COMM'N, 1974-NMSC-007, 85 N.M. 794, 518 P.2d
774 (S. Ct. 1974)
CASE HISTORY ALERT: affected by
1976-NMSC-029
MOBILE AMERICA, INC., a New Mexico
corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
SANDOVAL COUNTY COMMISSION et al., Defendants-Appellees,
and Village of Corrales, a municipality,
Intervenor-Appellee.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW MEXICO
1974-NMSC-007, 85 N.M. 794, 518 P.2d 774
Oliver Burton Cohen, Albuquerque, for
plaintiff-appellant.
R. Russell Rager, Albuquerque, for
defendants-appellees.
MARTINEZ, J., wrote the opinion. OMAN and
MONTOYA, JJ., concur.
{1} Plaintiff (appellant)
filed its petition for peremptory writ of mandamus on April 20, 1972 in the
District Court of Sandoval County. It sought to compel the defendant, Sandoval
County Commission (appellees), pursuant to § 14-19-6, N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repl. Vol.
3, 1968), to approve the subdivision plat of "Jade Park Corrales," an
area within Sandoval County consisting of 137.04 acres. Village of Corrales
(intervenor-appellee) intervened in the suit as an additional party defendant
and claimed that the subdivision plat must also receive its approval, as a
municipality, pursuant to § 14-19-7, N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repl. Vol. 3, 1968). A
hearing was held on the merits and at the conclusion of appellant's case,
intervenor-appellee moved for dismissal, which was granted by the court. After
requested findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed by appellant and
intervenor-appellee, the court entered judgment dismissing appellant's petition
with prejudice. It found that intervenor-appellee was at all times an
incorporated municipality, that appellant's proposed subdivision plat was
within the platting jurisdiction of both appellee and intervenor-appellee, and
{*795} concluded that since appellant had not
submitted its plat to intervenor-appellee, appellant had no standing to bring
this suit. It is from this judgment that appellant makes its appeal.
{2} A preliminary statement
concerning this case is necessary because we disapprove the procedures followed
by the court. These procedures fail to comply with mandamus proceedings as
established in §§ 22-12-6 through 22-12-11, N.M.S.A. 1953. However, we are
considering the appeal only because the parties consented to a trial on the
merits of the issues presented by the allegations of the petition for a writ of
mandamus and a general denial of these allegations by appellees.
{3} Appellant's main point
for review is that the alleged Village of Corrales had no jurisdiction over the
subdivision plat submitted by the appellant to the Sandoval County Commission
because it was not in existence at the time appellant presented its subdivision
plat to the Sandoval County Commission for approval. Therefore, since only the
approval of the Sandoval County Commission was required by statute, and since
that approval was
merely a ministerial act, then a peremptory writ of
mandamus should have been issued by the Court.
{5} Ordinarily, mandamus lies
only to enforce a clear legal right against one having a clear legal duty to
perform an act necessary to the enjoyment of such a right. Laumbach v. Board Of
County Commissioners,
60 N.M. 226,
290 P.2d 1067 (1955). This means that
mandamus lies to compel the performance of a statutory duty only where it is
clear and undisputable. Witt v. Hartman,
82 N.M. 170,
477 P.2d 608 (1970).
Generally, mandamus will not lie to control the discretion or judgment of a
public officer. Conston v. New Mexico St. Bd. Of Probation & Parole,
79
N.M. 385,
444 P.2d 296 (1968); Ross v. State Racing Commission,
64 N.M. 478,
330 P.2d 701 (1958). However, mandamus will lie to require a public officer to
perform a ministerial duty, Wilson v. Gonzales,
44 N.M. 599,
106 P.2d 1093
(1940). A ministerial duty is that which does not require either the exercise
of official discretion or judgment. Kiddy v. Board of County Com'rs. of Eddy
County,
57 N.M. 145,
255 P.2d 678 (1953).
{6} Even assuming, but not
deciding, that Village of Corrales was not in existence as a municipality at
the time appellant's subdivision plat was submitted to appellees, and,
therefore intervenor-appellee's approval was not required, § 14-19-6, supra,
does not create merely a ministerial duty on the part of the appellee. Section
14-19-6, supra, reads as follows:
"Before a plat of any subdivision within the
jurisdiction of a county is filed in the office of the county clerk, the plat
shall be approved by the board of county commissioners of the county wherein
the proposed subdivision lies. The board of county commissioners shall not
approve and sign a plat unless the:
A. Proposed streets conform to adjoining streets;
B. Streets are defined by permanent monuments to the
satisfaction of the board of county commissioners; and
C. Boundary of the subdivision is defined by permanent
monuments." (Emphasis added)
In construing a statute, we must give the words used their
ordinary meaning. Winston v. New Mexico State Police Board, 80 N.M. 310, 454
P.2d 967 (1969). We are unable to discover any legislative intent which
requires appellee to approve any subdivision plat which merely fulfills the
aforementioned three requirements. These are minimum requirements and leave
some discretion and judgment with the county commission. The statute above does
not require appellee to approve the subdivision plat if the three requirements
above are fulfilled, but simply requires their fulfillment prior to any subsequent
approval by the appellee. In addition, § 14-19-2, N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repl. Vol. 3,
1968) states that "* * *. The plat shall refer to permanent monuments and
shall accurately describe each lot, number each lot in progression, {*796} give its dimensions and the dimensions
of all land dedicated for public use or for the use of the owners of lots
fronting or adjacent to the land. * * *" These requirements are clearly
not mentioned in § 14-19-6, supra, as quoted above, and are further embodied in
the New Mexico Subdivision Act, § 70-5-3, N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repl. Vol. 10, Pt. 2,
Supp.1973). The statutory provisions quoted above do contemplate criteria for
consideration by the County Commission other than simply the three criteria
enumerated in § 14-19-6, supra.
{7} We have long recognized
that if a trial court's judgment can be sustained upon correct legal
principles, it will not be reversed merely because the reasoning or conclusion
of law is erroneous. Atma v. Munoz,
48 N.M. 114,
146 P.2d 631 (1944). See also,
Tsosie v. Foundation Reserve Insurance Company,
77 N.M. 671,
427 P.2d 29
(1967); Albuquerque National Bank v. Johnson,
74 N.M. 69,
390 P.2d 657 (1964).
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
OMAN and MONTOYA, JJ., concur.