MAPLES V. STATE, 1990-NMSC-042, 110 N.M.
34, 791 P.2d 788 (S. Ct. 1990)
GEORGIA MAPLES, Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF NEW MEXICO, a Self-Insured, Respondent
SUPREME COURT OF NEW MEXICO
1990-NMSC-042, 110 N.M. 34, 791 P.2d 788
Original Proceeding on Certiorari;
Appeal from Workers' Compensation Division.
Sam A. Westergren, Santa Fe, New Mexico,
for Petitioner.
R. Tracy Sprouls, Roswell, New Mexico,
for Respondent.
{1} This matter is before the
supreme court on a grant of certiorari. We examine the question presented but
leave undisturbed the result reached below.
{2} This case involves an
appeal to the judiciary from a Workers' Compensation Hearing Officer's ruling.
The granting of certiorari was premised upon a possible inequitable barring of
appeal. The final order in this case was filed December 7, 1988. Petitioner
claims that she did not receive notice of the decision until January 11, 1989;
thirty-five days after the filing and five days too late for her to appeal the
decision. Supreme Court Rule 12-601, which controls the time limitation for
appeals from special proceeding to the judiciary, allows appeals only within
thirty
days from the filing of the order, SCRA 1986, 12-601. Petitioner apparently
contends that she was unaware of the final ruling until after the thirty days
had elapsed. If this were the case, it would be inequitable indeed, and for
this reason certiorari
{*35} was
granted. An examination of the record, however, reveals that no inequity
existed. Her attorney was aware of the ruling of the judge by letter before a
written order was actually filed. Several alternatives to protect petitioner's
right to appeal existed. Petitioner next contends that it does not matter that
she missed the deadline for filing her appeal under Rule 12-601, because she
met the deadline for filing an appeal under statutory provisions governing the
Workers' Compensation Division, NMSA 1978, Section
52-5-8(A) (Repl. Pamp.
1987), which allows filing thirty days after the order is mailed. In this
situation, a rule adopted by the supreme court supersedes an inconsistent
statute.
American Auto. Assoc. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 102 N.M. 527,
697
P.2d 946 (1985);
James v. Human Serv. Dep't, Income Support Div., 106
N.M. 318,
742 P.2d 530 (Ct. App.),
cert. quashed, 106 N.M. 353,
742 P.2d
1058 (1987). Petitioner's counsel was aware of this, and a written admission
can be found in the court file (December 8, 1988, letter to David Grove,
exhibit "1"). No confusion existed as to what time limitation
controlled this appeal.
{3} Ms. Maples worked for the
State of New Mexico and was injured on the job on April 21, 1986. The State of
New Mexico paid her temporary disability benefits and medical benefits from the
outset, but did not concede permanent and total disability. Ms. Maples retained
an attorney, who moved for a hearing to determine four issues: 1) whether Ms.
Maples was permanently and totally disabled; 2) whether she should be awarded medical
benefits; 3) whether she should be awarded her disability payments in a lump
sum rather than weekly; and 4) the amount to be awarded. A hearing was set for
October 5, 1988, before Judge Gregory Griego. All issues that dealt directly
with petitioner's claims were decided at that time. No lump sum payment was
granted, but she was determined to be permanently and totally disabled. The
state was to continue to pay her medical bills, and her disability payment was
to remain at $136.33 a week. This ruling was set out in a letter decision and
sent to the parties on October 9, 1988. The parties had notice of the court's
ruling at this early date.
{4} Her attorney then filed a
motion for a hearing on attorney's fees. A hearing was set for October 25,
1988, at which time the attorney's fees were denied.
{5} Counsel again filed a
motion for a hearing on attorney's fees. A second hearing was set for November
25, 1988. After hearing arguments a second time, both parties were informed
that the judge's original denial of the award of attorney's fees would stand,
be incorporated into the letter decision, and filed. The decision was filed
within twelve days, on December 7, 1988.
WAS PETITIONER BARRED FROM APPEAL?
{6} Counsel was not unaware
of the ruling of the court, only of the exact date of the filing of the order.
He had notice of the court's ruling on the merits in October, and notice of the
denial of attorney's fees orally from the bench on October 25, which was
reiterated on November 25. At this point he had several possible courses of
action. He could have filed an appeal immediately, pending the filing of the
decision, under SCRA 1986, 12-201(A) which provides:
A notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision, or return of the verdict, but before filing of the judgment or order
shall be treated as filed after such filing and on the day thereof.
This alternative was reaffirmed in Weiss v. Hanes
Manufacturing Co., 90 N.M. 683, 568 P.2d 209 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (1977). Maples' attorney also could have called the
workers' compensation office weekly to determine if the decision had been
filed; he could have called the office of his opposing counsel, who apparently
received notice of the filing within a few days of the filing date after he
received the late notice. If nothing else, Maples' attorney could have moved
for an extension of time in which to file the appeal under SCRA 1986,
12-201(E)(2), whereupon {*36} the court
could have determined if the circumstances constituted "excusable neglect
or circumstances beyond the control of the appellant."
{7} Petitioner was aware that
the hearing officer had ruled on the merits and that the award of attorney's
fees in this case had been denied before the ruling was filed. On the application
for certiorari it appears petitioner and her counsel had no notice as to the
ruling of the court until the decision was received in the mail, when the time
to appeal had passed. Steps could and should have been taken at that time to
perfect an appeal as outlined above.
CONFLICT BETWEEN SUPREME COURT RULE 12-601 AND NMSA 1978,
SECTION 52-5-8(A).
{8} It is true that Rule
12-601 and Section 52-5-8(A) both deal with the amount of time allowed for
appeal from workers' compensation decisions to the judiciary. Rule 12-601
allows appeal within thirty days from the filing; the statute allows appeal
within thirty days from the mailing. This conflict could lead to confusion.
However, in 1985 this court held in
American Automobile Association v. State
Corporation Commission, 102 N.M. 527,
697 P.2d 946 (1985) that: "the
law is clear that on procedural matters such as time limitations for appeals, a
rule adopted by the Supreme Court governs over an inconsistent statute."
See
also James v. Human Serv. Dep't, Income Support Div., 106 N.M. 318,
742
P.2d 530 (Ct. App.),
cert. quashed, 106 N.M. 353,
742 P.2d 1058 (1987)
(holding that time limitations on the right to appeal are peculiarly within the
power of the judiciary to set).
{9} The language of the rule
itself dictates that it controls over conflicting law. This is especially clear
when one considers that this rule was changed in 1986. The language was
significantly strengthened from: "Except as may be otherwise provided by
law." NMSA 1978, Civ. App. R. 13 (Repl. Pamp. 1984), to the current
language:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law." SCRA
1986, 12-601(A).
{10} Petitioner argues that
the statute should control despite this strong language, based on the precedent
set in
In re Application of Angel Fire Corporation, 96 N.M. 651,
634
P.2d 202 (1981). In that case we found that administrative procedures must be
exhausted before the court gains jurisdiction. In this case, unlike
Angel
Fire, the administrative procedures have been exhausted. A final order was
entered, and nothing was left to be done by the Workers' Compensation Division.
In
Angel Fire, the appeal was taken from a decision of the State
Engineer's office. Jurisdiction was not relinquished to the court because the
administrative process was still continuing, despite the fact that some partial
decisions had been made and were final. The result in this case is final. The
only place to appeal this order was to the judiciary. The courts must gain
jurisdiction at some point. An appeal from a final order to the judiciary is
necessarily the point at which the judicial branch gains jurisdiction. When it
does, it is inherently within the power of the court to set its own time
limitations for appeals. The legislature has no power to fix the time within which
an appeal must be heard by the supreme court in appeals from the district
courts.
Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89 N.M. 307,
551 P.2d
1354 (1976),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978). It follows that the
court should have the power to set the time for all appeals from final orders,
including appeals from final orders of administrative agencies. Supreme Court
Rule 12-601 is the controlling rule in appeals from Workers' Compensation
actions.
IF NO NOTICE HAD BEEN GIVEN
{11} The erroneous premise upon
which we granted certiorari in this case is of great concern to this court: if
parties have no idea as to the outcome of a hearing and then are not mailed
notice until after the appeal time has run, are they without remedy and barred
from appeal? In any hearing before the judiciary, NMSA 1978, Section
39-1-2,
requires notice to be given before a judgment may be entered. In
Montano v.
Encinas, 103 N.M. 515,
709 P.2d 1024 (1985),
{*37}
this court held that a judgment entered without notice was subject to being
vacated. Counsel in that case was notified of the judgment after the time for
filing an appeal had expired. The trial court denied an extension of time to
appeal. This court reversed and vacated the judgment so that a new judgment
could be entered upon notice. Although this case dealt with an appeal from the
district court, the equitable principles informing both Section 39-1-2 and our
opinion in
Montano also may apply in an appropriate case to an appeal
from an administrative hearing.
{12} It is clear from the
facts in this case that petitioner's attorney had notice of the result in this
case before it was filed and had several alternatives to preserve his appeal
before, during, and after the final written order was entered. The fact that
conflicting time limitations for appeal exists within the Workers' Compensation
Act and Rule 12-601 is troubling and could lead to confusion. The language of
12-601 was strengthened for a reason: to keep a tighter control over appeals to
the judiciary. It shall be enforced accordingly. It is the responsibility of
attorneys to be aware of the procedural rules that control their clients'
appeals. Rule 12-601 controls over the statute in this situation, and the
supreme court has exclusive constitutional power to regulate pleadings and
procedure before the judiciary.
Otero v. Zouhar, 102 N.M. 482,
697 P.2d
482 (1985).
RANSOM, Justice (Dissenting).
{15} This Court today holds
that an appeal from the final order of an administrative agency is necessarily
the point at which the judicial branch gains jurisdiction. I agree. At that
point, procedural law becomes vested in this Court by virtue of Article VI,
Section 3 (superintending control), and Article III, Section 1 (separation of
powers), of the New Mexico Constitution. In
Southwest Community Health
Services v. Smith, 107 N.M. 196, 198,
755 P.2d 40, 42 (1988), the 1976 rule
of
Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., with which I remain in strong
accord, was reiterated by us as follows:
Pleading, practice and procedure are of the essence of
judicial power. Functions of the judiciary which are essential to its
constitutional powers cannot be exercised by another branch of the government
in conflict with the judicial branch. While, historically, the judiciary has
shared procedural rule-making with the legislature, any conflict between court
rules and statutes that relate to procedure are today resolved by this Court in
favor of the rules.
{16} This Court, however, has
no superintending control over administrative agencies. That is the essence of
legislative and executive power. Any conflict between court rule and statute
that relates to administrative procedure must be resolved in favor of the
statute. It is clear to me that the judicial branch does not gain jurisdiction
and control until the final order of an administrative agency is appealed as
provided by statute.
{17} Accordingly, I would
hold that the worker's appeal was timely under the statute, that the court of
appeals failed to exercise the jurisdiction given it by the legislature in the
appeal of administrative orders, and that the case be remanded to the court of
appeals to be decided on its merits.
MONTGOMERY, Justice (Dissenting).
{18} I agree with Justice
Ransom that the judicial branch does not gain jurisdiction until an
administrative agency's order is appealed pursuant to a statute conferring the
jurisdiction on an appellate court and that the appeal in this case was timely
because it was taken within the time prescribed by the statute. Unlike Justice
Ransom, however, I am not in "strong accord" with the rule in
Ammerman
v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. In my view,
Ammerman was incorrectly
decided in significant
{*38} part,
1 and its rule of exclusive
jurisdiction in this Court to prescribe matters touching procedures in the
courts should be applied sparingly and only when necessary to protect the power
of the judiciary against an unwarranted intrusion by the legislative or
executive branches. This is not such a case; in fact, this is a case in which
we should defer to the legislative power to prescribe the appellate
jurisdiction of the court of appeals and to regulate procedures in the
administrative proceedings governed by the Workers' Compensation Act. I would
therefore reverse.
{19} Of course, and despite
the statement in the majority opinion, the validity of the statute in this case
is not really challenged as violating the doctrine of
Ammerman, 89 N.M.
at 312, 551 P.2d at 1359, and of
State ex rel. Anaya v. McBride, 88 N.M.
244, 246,
539 P.2d 1006, 1008 (1975), that the legislature lacks the
power
to prescribe rules of procedure by statute. Rather, a corollary of that
doctrine is asserted: "[A]ny conflict between court rules and statutes
that relate to procedure are [sic] today resolved... in favor of the
rules."
Southwest Community Health Services, 107 N.M. at 198, 755
P.2d at 42. Nevertheless, in my view the
Ammerman/McBride doctrine has
in recent years been applied much more broadly than necessary. Its use should
be tailored much more discriminatingly to effectuate its purpose --
preservation of the separation of powers established by Article III, Section 1,
of our Constitution -- and restrained to that purpose in order to avoid
unseemly conflicts with the legislative branch and unnecessary frustrations of
other valid constitutional and legislative objectives.
{20} As noted in Chief
Justice Scarborough's dissent in
Southwest Community Health Services,
107 N.M. at 201-02, 755 P.2d at 45-46,
Ammerman has been extensively
criticized.
The New Mexico Supreme Court has taken what most students of
procedure would consider a high-handed attitude of denigrating legislative
competence in this field. Its position that privileges are strictly procedural
rather than substantive and thus not amenable to legislative action is in the
extreme minority.
2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence
para. 501[07], at 501-95--501-96 (1989) (footnotes omitted). See also
Browde & Occhialino, Separation of Powers and the Judicial Rule-making
Power in New Mexico: The Need for Prudential Constraints, 15 N.M.L. Rev.
407, 443-47 (1985); Note, 1977 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 493; Weinstein, Reform of
Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 905, 925 (1976)
("Despite the untenability of the... position, courts still flex their
muscles occasionally, making extravagant claims of exclusive power over
rules.... [T]he New Mexico Supreme Court has also taken this extreme position
recently.") The doctrine is pernicious, in that it arrogates to the
judiciary a power which is unnecessary to the maintenance of the judiciary's
position as a co-equal branch of government and it derogates from the historic
view of shared and coordinate responsibility for judicial rulemaking. See
generally Browde & Occhialino, supra, passim. The
doctrine also has spawned {*39} confusion
and unnecessary litigation by encouraging disputes over whether a statute,
presumptively valid and applicable to resolution of a controversy, is nullified
by an inconsistent court rule purporting to regulate some aspect of
"procedure."2
{21} As indicated above in
the quotations from Judge Weinstein's article and book, New Mexico is to a
considerable extent out of step with other American jurisdictions in reserving
to the courts exclusive power to regulate matters of procedure in the courts.
See
Browde & Occhialino,
supra, app. at 477-478 (listing only thirteen
states, including New Mexico, in which procedural rule-making is exclusively a
judicial function, based on separation of powers or specific constitutional
rulemaking provisions). At the national level, of course, participation by the
Congress in the rulemaking function has long been in effect,
3 and there is no indication of a
resulting diminution in the strength or vitality or the federal judiciary. At
the state level, according to Judge Weinstein, and
[w]hile it may sound like heresy to the staunch supporters of
unfettered judicial rulemaking, legislative control of procedure works fairly
well where there are broad-based, active, well-financed agencies to prepare the
necessary studies and legislation.
In sum, some sort of role-sharing between courts and
legislatures is both necessary and beneficial. Where courts have insisted on
exclusive control over rulemaking, the practical results have not been useful.
Weinstein, supra, at 926-27 (footnote omitted).
Although, admittedly, agencies of the sort contemplated by Judge Weinstein are
lacking in New Mexico, our legislature has recognized for over fifty years that
rules of pleading, practice and procedure should ordinarily be prescribed by
the Supreme Court. 1933 N.M. Laws, ch. 84, §§ 1 & 2 (now codified as NMSA
1978, §§ 38-1-1 and -2 (Repl. Pamp. 1987). When the legislature now chooses to
prescribe by statute a rule that, in some sense at least, can be described as
"procedural" or "touching upon procedure," the question
whether that rule conflicts with this Court's own authority to prescribe
procedural rules should he decided by referring to the purpose of the
particular statute and the extent of intrusion upon the courts' ability to
discharge their functions, not by categorizing the rule as either
"substantive" or "procedural."
{22} The essence of judicial
power is adjudication -- deciding concrete cases or controversies, resolving
people's disputes when those disputes make their way into the court system
established by Article VI of our Constitution. Despite the provision in Article
III, Section 1, that "no person... charged with the exercise of powers
properly belonging to one of those departments [legislative, executive and
judicial], shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the
others," it is now firmly established that many disputes can be resolved
{*40} by administrative agencies created by
the legislature.
See, e.g.,
Wylie Corp. v. Mowrer, 104 N.M. 751,
726 P.2d 1381 (1986) (overruling
State ex rel. Hovey Concrete Products Co.
v. Mechem, 63 N.M. 250,
316 P.2d 1069 (1957), and upholding
constitutionality of new workmen's compensation administration). Thus, the
judicial power to resolve disputes is shared with the legislative branch, at
least insofar as establishment of tribunals to perform that function is
concerned.
{23} The essence of
legislative power is legislation -- passing laws, enacting rules for the
governance of society. Again, despite the separation-of-powers provision in
Article III, Section 1, it has long been settled that the judiciary possesses
inherent power to promulgate rules governing the conduct and progress of cases
within the judicial system.
See, e.g.,
State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397,
418-423,
60 P.2d 646, 659-62 (1936);
Southwest Underwriters v. Montoya,
80 N.M. 107, 108,
452 P.2d 176, 177 (1969). Thus, the legislative power to
promulgate rules of general application is shared with the judicial branch, at
least insofar as rules governing the conduct of litigation in the courts are
concerned.
{24} To say, as Justice
Ransom does, quoting from his opinion in
Southwest Community Health
Services, that pleading, practice and procedure are of the essence of
judicial power is to state a proposition which is partly true and partly not.
Some rules of pleading, practice and procedure are hardly of the
"essence" of judicial power; some are only housekeeping rules, and it
would not matter greatly whether the legislature or this Court prescribed them.
Fortunately for the sake of uniformity, simplicity, and fair and expeditious
resolution of lawsuits, and out of deference to the courts' presumably greater
understanding about what is workable and what is not in this arena, the
legislature has recognized that the Supreme Court should promulgate most rules
of pleading, practice and procedure.
See Section 38-1-1. Some rules of
procedure, however, transcend in importance mere housekeeping functions; such
rules may relate to matters of the courts' jurisdiction, or may embody policies
deemed important by the legislature for accomplishing goals quite outside the
conduct of litigation, or may relate to the functioning of courts in such
essential ways that their legislative prescription might seriously intrude on
and impair the courts' ability to carry out those functions. In resolving an
issue as to whether a statute or a court rule should prevail, this Court should
focus on the purpose and effect of the statute and whether it does or does not
trench upon the ability of courts to discharge their constitutional duties.
{25} When the statute
implements a legislative policy external to the functioning of the courts -- as
did the statutes at issue in
Ammerman and
Southwest Community
Services -- this Court (or any other court called upon to adjudicate the
issue) should uphold the validity of the statute against a challenge that it
embodies "adjective" or "procedural" law and is therefore
within this Court's exclusive power to adopt or not to adopt, unless it in some
way deprives the court of "sufficient power to protect itself from
indignities and to enable it effectively to administer its judicial
functions."
See State ex rel. Bliss v. Greenwood, 63 N.M. 156, 162,
315 P.2d 223, 227 (1957).
Bliss contains two grounds for judicial modification.
The first is that the court may strike legislation that may undercut its
ability to perform its essential functions. The second is that the court may
negate statutory procedures which interfere with the effective and efficient
operation of the courts.
Browde & Occhialino, supra, at 470 (citing Bliss,
63 N.M. at 161-62, 315 P.2d at 227). See also id. at 435: "[T]he
court [in Southwest Underwriters v. Montoya, 80 N.M. at 109, 452 P.2d at
178] may have authorized limited legislative rule-making so long as the
legislation does not touch upon 'those rules of pleading, practice and
procedure which are essential to the performance of the constitutional duties
imposed upon the courts.'" As Professors Browde and Occhialino suggest,
attempting to resolve the question whether a statute or a conflicting court
rule should prevail by resorting to the dichotomy between substance and {*41} procedure and characterizing the statute
and rule as either "substantive" or "procedural" is doomed
to failure. See Browde & Occhialino, supra, at 444-46 &
n. 227. Ammerman itself recognized (though perhaps only by way of lip
service) that "the line between substance and procedure is often elusive
and that authorities, in endeavoring to follow this dichotomy in the
rule-making process, are not always in accord." 89 N.M. at 310, 551 P.2d
at 1357; see also Southwest Underwriters v. Montoya, 80 N.M. at 109, 452
P.2d at 178. The majority opinion in the present case relies upon this
distinction and characterizes the statute here as "procedural." In my
view, this leads to the incorrect result of unthinking adherence to Rule
12-601(A) and an unwise subordination of the statutory prescription of the time
for taking an appeal from the Workers' Compensation Division.
{26} This case presents a
conflict between a statute prescribing the time for an appeal to the courts in
a workers' compensation proceeding and a court rule providing for a different
time and purporting to supersede the statute. In defense of the statute, it may
be said that, although it does not seek to effectuate a public policy outside
the context of workers' compensation litigation, it does represent part of the
comprehensive scheme established by the legislature for such proceedings.
See
generally NMSA 1978, Sections
52-1-1 to
52-1-70 (Workers' Compensation
Act), 52-3-1 to 52-3-60 (Occupational Disease Disablement Law), 52-5-1 to
52-5-19 (provisions relating to Workers' Compensation Division) (Repl. Pamp.
1987 & Cum. Supp. 1989). In defense of the court rule, one can say that,
while it does not appear to guard against any particularly menacing threats to
the independence of the judiciary, it does provide a single, uniform set of
time periods and procedures for appeals from administrative agencies and thus,
using the word in the majority opinion, protects against "confusion."
(It is easy to imagine, however, the state of mind of the lawyer who
scrupulously observes the statutory requirements for asserting a workers' compensation
claim and then finds that the statute on judicial review has been preempted by
a court rule; the lawyer, not to mention the client, is probably
"confused.")
{27} Thus there appears to be
no great clash of competing interests between the purposes underlying these two
prescriptions, statute and court rule, telling a lawyer how to obtain review of
a workers' compensation decision; and so it is not immediately apparent how the
conflict should be resolved. Surely it is relevant in answering this question
that the legislature has seen fit to provide a right of appeal directly to the
court of appeals and, to that extent, has conferred a "substantive"
right upon a party aggrieved by a decision of a workers' compensation judge.
See
State v. Arnold, 51 N.M. 311, 314,
183 P.2d 845, 846 (1947): "The
creating of a right of appeal is a matter of substantive law and outside the
province of the court's rule making power." And it is generally held that
the timely filing of an appeal, perhaps along with other steps necessary to
perfect it, is "jurisdictional."
See, e.g., State v. Garlick,
80 N.M. 352,
456 P.2d 185 (1969);
In re Application No. 0436-A, 101 N.M.
579, 581,
686 P.2d 269, 271 (Ct. App. 1984) ("where the legislature has
established statutory steps for perfecting an appeal, the steps are
jurisdictional"). Where such "jurisdictional" steps necessarily
affect in such a fundamental way a party's ability to exercise a statutorily
created right, it would seem that compliance with the statute which creates the
right, rather than a court rule which purports to regulate the manner of its
exercise, should be given effect.
{28} It is to me an
unsatisfactory answer to this argument to say, as some of our cases have said,
that "reasonable regulations affecting the time and manner of taking and
perfecting the [appeal] are procedural and within this court's rule making
power."
State v. Arnold, 51 N.M. at 314, 183 P.2d at 846-47;
see
Olguin v. State, 90 N.M. 303, 305,
563 P.2d 97, 99 (1977);
State v.
Garlick, 80 N.M. at 353, 456 P.2d at 186. To distinguish between a statute
{*42} conferring a right of appeal and one
that describes how the appeal may be taken, holding that the latter may be
ruled invalid because this Court has preemptive power to promulgate rules of
procedure, is to me unnecessary and counterproductive hair-splitting.
Especially in this case, it violates what we said in
Olguin "[T]his
court has consistently followed a policy of construing rules liberally, 'to the
end that causes on appeal may be determined on the merits where it can be done
without impeding or confusing administration or perpetrating injustice.'"
90 N.M. at 305, 563 P.2d at 99: (quoting
Jaritas Live Stock Tours Co. v.
Spriggs, 42 N.M. 14, 16,
74 P.2d 722, 722-23 (1937)).
See also In re
Application No. 0436-A, 101 N.M. at 581, 686 P.2d at 271: "Where, as
here, there are two possible interpretations relating to the right to an
appeal, that interpretation which permits a review on the merits rather than
rigidly restricting appellate review should be favored."
4
{29} This Court has already
ruled that "the
Ammerman doctrine does not apply in administrative
cases until the jurisdiction of the courts is properly invoked under the
applicable statute." Browde & Occhialino,
supra, at 447 n. 231
(citing
In re Angel Fire Corp., 96 N.M. 651,
634 P.2d 202 (1981)). In
Angel
Fire, we said:
[T]he statute here establishes an administrative procedure
for taking a case or controversy out of the administrative framework into the
judicial system for review. Jurisdiction of the matters in dispute does not lie
in the courts until the statutorily required administrative procedures are
fully complied with. The courts have no authority to alter the statutory
scheme, cumbersome as it may be.
96 N.M. at 652, 634 P.2d at 203. As Professors Browde and
Occhialino also note, administrative cases like workers' compensation
proceedings are by definition special statutory proceedings to which judicial
rulemaking authority does not extend. Browde & Occhialino, supra, at
447 n. 231, and 408-09 n. 4.
{30} The majority's attempt
to distinguish
Angel Fire is unpersuasive. What difference does it make,
in deciding whether a statute is preempted by a court rule, that in one case
the administrative process is completed and in another it is on-going? In both
cases the statute spells out how to obtain judicial review of an administrative
decision; in both cases the statute should be deemed controlling.
{31} Finally, I find it
significant that our Constitution confers on the legislature the power to
prescribe the appellate jurisdiction of both this Court and the court of
appeals.
See N.M. Const. art. VI, §§ 2, 29. In the present case the
legislature has said that the court of appeals is "invested with
jurisdiction" when a notice of appeal is filed with the court of appeals
within thirty days of mailing of the final order of the workers' compensation
judge.
Cf. In re Application No. 0436-A, 101 N.M. at 582, 686 P.2d at
272 (in appeal from decision of State Engineer, where statute so requires,
"It is the act of obtaining service of process upon a party which
satisfies due process requirements and invests the court with
jurisdiction....").
{32} I would hold that the
court of appeals had jurisdiction in this case because a
{*43}
notice of appeal was filed with it within thirty days after the hearing
officer's decision was mailed, in compliance with Section 52-5-8(A). It was
therefore error for the court of appeals to dismiss the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. The majority holding otherwise, I respectfully dissent.
1
There were two issues in Ammerman. The first was whether the so-called
newsmen's-privilege statute in NMSA 1953, Repl. Vol. 4 (1970), Section
20-1-12.1(A) (Supp. 1975), was invalid as an unconstitutional attempt by the
legislature to prescribe a rule of evidence; this Court held that it was. 89
N.M. at 309-12, 551 P.2d at 1356-59. The second was whether the provisions of
subdivision (C) of the statute, relating to an "appeal" of an order
of disclosure and requiring that such an appeal be heard de novo and
within 20 days from its docketing, were unconstitutional as an attempt to
require the Court to determine factual matters anew (in effect, to enlarge the
Court's original jurisdiction) and to regulate the appellate process within the
Court; again we held that they were. Id. at 312-13, 551 P.2d at 1359-60.
The first holding, in my view, improperly subordinates, to an assertion of
judicial exclusivity in prescribing rules of evidence, a legislative policy
that journalists should not be required to reveal their sources "[u]nless
disclosure be essential to prevent injustice...." The second holding
correctly disposes of what was a good example of legislatively mandated
procedures that would unduly burden the Court and interfere with its ability to
carry out its constitutional duties in deciding cases and manage its workload.
2
See, e.g., Southwest Community Health Services v. Smith, 107 N.M.
196, 755 P.2d 40 (1988) (statute regarding confidentiality of medical peer review
organization records); American Auto. Ass'n v. State Corp. Comm'n, 102
N.M. 527, 697 P.2d 946 (1985) (statute giving parties sixty days to appeal from
district court decision in motor carrier permit case); Otero v. Zouhar,
102 N.M. 482, 697 P.2d 482 (1985) (statute requiring claims against health care
providers to be submitted to Medical Review Commission before filing suit); State
ex rel. Gesswein v. Galvan, 100 N.M. 769, 676 P.2d 1334 (1984) (statute
providing method for disqualification of district judge); In re Motion for
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 94 N.M. 1, 606 P.2d 539 (1980) (statute limiting
records of Organized Crime Commission to subpoena); James v. New Mexico
Human Services Dep't, 106 N.M. 318, 742 P.2d 530 (Ct. App. 1987) (statute
regulating appeals from Human Services Department); State v. Herrera, 92
N.M. 7, 582 P.2d 384 (Ct. App. 1978) (statute regulating admission of evidence
of victim's past sexual conduct in criminal trial); State v. Doe, 90
N.M. 536, 565 P.2d 1053 (Ct. App. 1977) (statute providing that defense of
double jeopardy may not be waived).
3
See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2071, 2072, 2073 & 2074 (West Supp. 1989) for the
1988 revisions in the federal approach to rulemaking power and procedure. See
also Browde & Occhialino, supra, at 429 n. 140.
4
See also Martinez v. Wooten Constr. Co., 109 N.M. 16, 780 P.2d 1163 (Ct.
App. 1989) (notice of appeal filed with Workers' Compensation Division instead
of court of appeals sufficient to give court jurisdiction over appeal). In Wooten,
the court of appeals relied on In re Application No. 0436-A and its
policy of permitting review on the merits to uphold the court's jurisdiction;
it distinguished the earlier case of Tzortzis v. County of Los Alamos,
108 N.M. 418, 773 P.2d 363 (Ct. App. 1989), which dealt with the same issue as
the present case and disposed of it in the same way as did the court of appeals
below, as [involving the timeliness of the notice of appeal, not whether the
notice was filed with the proper court. I would overrule Tzortzis. I
would also overrule James v. New Mexico Human Services Dep't, supra note
2, which held that an appeal from an order of the HSD denying benefits had to
be dismissed because the notice of appeal, filed within thirty days after the
appellant's receipt of the order as provided by statute, was not filed within
thirty days of its entry as provided by Rule 12-601(A).]