BURLINGTON N.R.R. V. CORPORATION COMM'N, 1988-NMSC-076, 107 N.M. 582, 761
P.2d 855 (S. Ct. 1988)
IN RE APPLICATION OF THE BURLINGTON
NORTHERN RAILROAD
COMPANY TO CLOSE THE AGENCY STATION AT DES MOINES,
NEW MEXICO, BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD
COMPANY, Appellant
vs.
CORPORATION COMMISSION, Appellee
SUPREME COURT OF NEW MEXICO
1988-NMSC-076, 107 N.M. 582, 761 P.2d 855
September 15, 1988, Filed. As
Amended November 18, 1988
REMOVAL FROM THE CORPORATION
COMMISSION, Corporation Commission Docket No. 86-136-TR
Oman, Gentry & Yntema, P.A., Nicholas
R. Gentry, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Appellant
Hal Stratton, Attorney General, Joseph
van R. Clarke, D. L. Sanders, Assistant Attorneys General, Santa Fe, New
Mexico, for Appellee
{1} The New Mexico State
Corporation Commission (Commission) denied the application of Burlington
Northern Railroad Company (Burlington) to close its agency station located at
Des Moines, New Mexico. Burlington has removed the cause for review by this
Court pursuant to
Article XI, Section 7 of the New Mexico Constitution.
1 {*583}
We hold that the Commission's order was reasonable and just and will be
enforced.
{2} Following an application
from Burlington seeking permission to close its agency station at Des Moines,
the Commission held a public hearing in Raton, New Mexico, on September 5,
1986. At that hearing, Burlington presented its evidence in support of
discontinuing a base agency service at Des Moines. No formal intervenor
protested against the application. However, members of the public, including a
state senator, the mayor of Des Moines, and a representative of Twin Mountain
Rock, a major Burlington customer, expressed opposition to the closing. In
addition, the Commission received and incorporated into the record letters of
protest offered by Twin Mountain and members of the Eastern Plains Council of
Governments.
{3} The Burlington agency
station at Des Moines is currently staffed by one local agent, Ted Kirkendall,
who is on duty forty hours per week. Kirkendall's duties include communicating
with customers, collecting revenue, preparing inbound waybills and furnishing
the Denver office with information for the outbound waybills, monitoring the
station grounds, and correctly spotting railroad cars. Burlington proposes to
eliminate Kirkendall's position and handle all his duties from its Denver
office. The Denver agency is staffed with approximately sixty-five employees,
is open twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, and maintains a system-wide
computer facility. Burlington's customers in Union County who wish to order
cars, release loaded cars, or obtain information on shipping rates, schedules,
freight charges, etc., may choose either to call Denver toll free or to deal
with Kirkendall in Des Moines, who must then relay the matter to the Denver
facility where it is handled by computer.
{4} Additionally, Kirkendall
performs certain safety functions. He visually inspects trains as they roll by
to detect equipment malfunctions or other unsafe conditions. In the event of a
derailment or other railroad emergency, Kirkendall serves as a relay point for
information between local firefighters, Burlington's wrecking and safety crews,
and the Amarillo, Texas, company under contract to Burlington to handle major
derailments and the cleanup of hazardous spillage.
{5} Burlington's three major
customers are Twin Mountain, Big Chief Stone, and Kaiser Coal. The revenues for
the years 1983 through the first half of 1986 attributable to Des Moines and
its assigned blind sidings, where no agent is present, were as follows:
$465,000 in 1983; $510,711 in 1984; $478,695 in 1985; and $301,621 for the
first half of 1986. A station in the Burlington system must have approximately
$400,000 in annual revenue to break even for the year. The total expense for
the Des Moines station, which included a percentage of the entire system's
operating costs, the wages and benefits of Kirkendall and two relief workers,
and station maintenance costs, was as follows: $42,708 in 1983; $44,988 in
1984; $44,864 in 1985; and $56,906 in the first half of 1986. Over ninety-five
percent of the total annual expense is attributable to wages and fringe
benefits.
{6} Under Article XI, Section
7 of our constitution, this Court is mandated to decide a case such as this one
on its merits. Our scrutiny, therefore, is more exacting than that normally
accorded administrative decision-making.
2
In reviewing a Commission
{*584} order
on its merits, instead of examining evidence to substantiate the Commission's
findings, we make an independent determination that it is more likely than not
that the Commission's order is just and reasonable.
Missouri Pac. R.R. v.
State Corp. Comm'n, 93 N.M. 753, 754,
605 P.2d 1152, 1153 (1980). The
Commission's order may be affirmed only "if supported by 'satisfactory and
substantial evidence.' The term 'satisfactory' implies a weighing procedure."
Atchison, T & S. F. Ry. v. Corporation Comm'n, 99 N.M. 205, 207,
656
P.2d 868, 870 (1982) (quoting
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Corporation Comm'n, 99 N.M. 1, 6,
653 P.2d 501, 506 (1982)). This is not,
however, a de novo review of the record where we substitute our judgment for
that of the Commission.
Seward v. Denver & Rio Grande R.R., 17 N.M.
557, 578-80,
131 P. 980, 987-88 (1913);
but see Village and Citizens of
Grenville v. State Corp. Comm'n, 53 N.M. 259, 260,
206 P.2d 259, 260 (1949)
("[T]he cause has been removed for trial de novo provided by Sec. 7 of
Art. II of this state's Constitution"). It is simply that we do not
indulge in any presumptions in favor of the agency decision,
Mountain States
Tel. & Tel. Co., 99 N.M. at 6, 653 P.2d at 506; but while the
Commission's findings are not binding upon this Court,
State v. Mountain
States Tel. & Tel. Co., 54 N.M. 315, 323,
224 P.2d 155, 161 (1950), it
is an overstatement to imply that such findings are ignored in the weighing
process. We recognize the expertise of the Commission in public utility
management.
{7} In determining the
reasonableness of an order concerning the removal of local station agents, this
Court engages in a cost-benefit analysis, balancing the convenience to the
shipper and the benefit to the public in maintaining the agent, compared to the
potential economic waste to the railroad of having to maintain an agent.
Missouri
P. R.R., 93 N.M. at 755, 605 P.2d at 1154. Factors to be considered in this
analysis are the expense of maintaining the station, the revenue derived by the
railroad from the operation of the station, the number of people to be
benefited, the demand for services, the proximity and accessibility of other
stations, any inconvenience to the public, the nature of the service remaining
or to be substituted, and all other facts and circumstances.
Id.; Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry., 99 N.M. at 208, 656 P.2d at 871.
{8} As a preliminary matter,
we note that before utilizing this balancing test previous courts first would make
clear whether safety was in issue.
Seward, 17 N.M. at 594, 131 P. at 993
(where safety is questioned, there is involved a different proposition than the
interests of the public and the expense entailed upon the railroad company);
Randall
v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 34 N.M. 391, 392,
281 P. 479, 480
(1929) ("No question of the need of an agent * * * for public safety is
involved....");
Denton Bros. v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry., 34
N.M. 53, 54,
277 P. 34, 35 (1929) ("The public safety is not involved. It
is a matter of public convenience only.");
Southern P. Co. v. State
Corp. Comm'n, 76 N.M. 257, 259,
414 P.2d 489, 490 (1966) ("It is not
contended that an agent at the station is required for public safety.");
Missouri
P. R.R. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 93 N.M. 753,
605 P.2d 1152 (1980) (no issue
of public safety to consider in setting aside Commission's order denying
discontinuation of mobile agent at Hobbs, N.M.).
{9} Having made this
observation, we do not submit that where safety is at issue we should depart
entirely from a balancing of the respective interests of the public and the
railroad, provided the activity at issue is not unreasonably dangerous. When
legitimate public safety concerns are implicated, however, evidence that the
railroad will experience some economic detriment in maintaining an agent will
be insufficient to weigh against the reasonableness of an order denying the
elimination of that agent.
See Railroad Comm'n v. Eastern Texas R.R.,
264 U.S. 79, 85, 44 S. Ct. 247, 249, 68 L. Ed. 569 (1924) ("[T]he State
has power to regulate [a railroad's] operations in the interest of the public,
and to that end may require it to provide reasonably safe and adequate
facilities for servicing the
{*585} public,
even though compliance be attended by some pecuniary disadvantage.").
{10} During the hearing,
three safety concerns were raised: right-of-way fires, hazardous materials
spillages, and the elimination of Kirkendall's performance of roll-by
inspections. Burlington argues that Kirkendall simply is not involved in either
extinguishing right-of-way fires or dealing with hazardous spillages. Further,
Burlington maintains that the absence of Kirkendall's visual inspection of
passing trains will have no adverse safety ramifications. This function is
performed by nearly all of Burlington's employees, as required by its safety
rules. Also, Burlington has installed warning devices on the track that
mechanically detect problems on moving trains.
{11} Admittedly, Kirkendall
has no role in the actual extinguishment of a fire or in the actual clean-up of
a hazardous spillage. Kirkendall, however, would be instrumental in assembling
the initial response team, the volunteer fire department, and would be involved
in coordinating the various entities responding to an emergency. Furthermore,
we would be reluctant to discount the importance of Kirkendall's roll-by
inspections.
See Atchison, 99 N.M. at 208, 656 P.2d at 871.
{12} In weighing the order's
impact upon the railroad's interest, Burlington concedes that because of
present contractual obligations it will not be able to reduce significantly
current expenditures if it were to close the Des Moines agency. Nor do the
expenses represent significant economic waste. Burlington's inability to
discontinue personal customer service at Des Moines, however, impedes it from
centralizing operations at its system-wide computerized facility at Denver. In
addition to the Des Moines station, at the time of the hearing, Burlington was
also seeking to close stations in Texline, Texas, and Trinidad, Colorado, leaving
the 450 mile stretch between Denver and Amarillo without local agencies.
Burlington needs to streamline and to eliminate duplicative services to remain
competitive in the marketplace.
{13} Furthermore, elimination
of a local agent would not result in any appreciable degradation in the quality
of customer service. Burlington's witness testified that in other sections of
its system customers relying on regional computerized centers experienced no
problems with Burlington's delivery of service. Those opposing the agency
closing opined that the quality of service might suffer if the local agent was
removed. There was nothing to substantiate these speculative apprehensions. In
fact, Burlington attempted to assuage the fears of Twin Mountain by arranging
for Twin Mountain's computer to interface directly with Burlington's in Denver.
Moreover, Kirkendall is available only forty hours a week whereas Denver is
accessible toll free, seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day. The evidence
was abundant to demonstrate the public would benefit, rather than be
inconvenienced, by the elimination of customer services at Des Moines.
{14} Notwithstanding the
absence of significant short-term savings to Burlington in closing the Des
Moines agency, if the only issue were the convenience of the public, we would
have to conclude that the evidence weighs against the reasonableness of
requiring the agency to remain open. However, legitimate public safety concerns
have been raised.
See Atchison, 99 N.M. at 208, 656 P.2d at 871 (placing
into the balance the safety of the traveling public). Burlington's plan to
supplant Kirkendall with direct communications with Denver does not address the
loss of the safety functions currently executed by him. Burlington contends
that Kirkendall's place in the communications loop during an emergency can be
fulfilled by either calling Denver or Ft. Worth. Burlington's trainmaster, who
resides in Trinidad, Colorado, stated that he could be in Des Moines in an hour
to an hour and one half to relay information to entities responding to an
emergency.
{15} In an emergency, time is
of the essence. Because of Kirkendall's ties to the community, he has the
ability to contact
{*586} quickly
members of the Des Moines volunteer fire department. The evidence preponderates
that, under the present system, the removal of Kirkendall could compromise
public safety. Burlington did not produce sufficient evidence to allay the
legitimate safety concerns of the community and the Commission. We find the
Commission's denial of Burlington's application to close its agency station at
Des Moines reasonable and just. The order will be enforced.
Richard E. Ransom, Justice, Tony Scarborough, Chief Justice,
Mary C. Walters, Justice, Concur.
The commission shall have power * * * to require railway
companies to provide and maintain... agents and facilities * * * for receiving
and delivering freight and express * * * whenever in the judgment of the
commission the public interests demand, and as may be reasonable and just. * *
* The commission shall have power * * * upon a hearing, to determine and decide
any question given to it herein * * *. Any company, corporation or common
carrier which does not comply with the order of the commission within the time
limited therefor, may file with the commission a petition to remove such cause
to the supreme court * * *.
[T]he said court shall have the power and it shall be its
duty to decide such cases on their merits....
2.
Traditionally, the court reviewed administrative action to determine whether it
was supported by substantial evidence. See Duke City Lumber v. New Mexico
Envtl. Improvement Bd., 101 N.M. 291, 681 P.2d 717 (1984). The deference
afforded agency action was such that the court would consider only evidence
favorable to the agency and would ignore evidence to the contrary. Id.
at 293, 681 P.2d at 719. This minimal judicial intrusion represented by a
substantial evidence standard of review has been supplanted now by whole record
review in the normal appeal of administrative decision-making. See id.;
National Council on Compensation Ins. v. New Mexico State Corp. Comm'n, 107
N.M. 278, 756 P.2d 558 (1988). Under whole record review, to conclude that an
administrative decision is supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing
court needs to find evidence that is credible in light of the whole record.
"No part of the evidence may be exclusively relied upon if it would be
unreasonable to do so." National Council of Compensation Ins., 107
N.M. at 282, 756 P.2d at 562.