Court of Appeals of New Mexico

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-41214

BOYAPATI C. REDDY

Plaintiff-Appellant,

and

B. LOURDAMMA REDDY,

Plaintiff,

v.

NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF

TRANSPORTATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DOÑA ANA COUNTY
Casey Fitch, District Court Judge

Boyapati C. Reddy

El Paso, TX

Pro Se Appellant

Raul A. Carrillo, Jr.

Las Cruces, NM

for Appellee

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MEDINA, Judge.

{1}       Plaintiff appealed following the denial of his request for an award of litigation expenses. We previously issued a notice of proposed summary disposition, proposing to affirm. Plaintiff has filed a memorandum in opposition. After due consideration, we remain unpersuaded. We therefore affirm.

{2}       The relevant background information and legal principles have previously been set forth. We will avoid undue reiteration here, and focus instead on the content of the memorandum in opposition.

{3}       Plaintiff continues to assert that he is entitled to an award under the plain language of NMSA 1978, Section 42A-1-25 (1981). [MIO 1-3] His argument narrowly focuses on the cited subsections, without duly recognizing or applying the broader statutory framework. “Statutory provisions must be interpreted in context, [and] as a whole.” Moongate Water Co. v. City of Las Cruces, 2014-NMCA-075, ¶ 13, 329 P.3d 727. As we explained in Moongate, the relevant statutory provisions make clear that litigation expenses are awarded to condemnees when condemnation actions conclude adversely to the condemnor. Id. That did not transpire in this case. Accordingly, Plaintiff was not entitled to an award.

{4}       Plaintiff continues to argue that the case of Landavazo v. Sanchez, 1990-NMSC-114, 111 N.M. 137, 802 P.2d 1283, supports his position. [MIO 2, 3] However, as we previously observed, Landavazo reflects our Supreme Court’s determination that Section 42A-1-25 permits awards of attorney fees to successful inverse condemnation plaintiffs. See Moongate, 2014-NMCA-075, ¶ 17 (citing Landavazo, 1990-NMSC-114, ¶ 26-30). Again, that is not the situation presented in this case.

{5}       The memorandum in opposition entirely fails to acknowledge or address Moongate. We therefore adhere to our initial assessment of this matter, and reject Plaintiff’s assertion of error.

{6}       Finally, we understand Plaintiff to contend that a different result should be reached because his underlying claim was meritorious. [MIO 2] However, that claim was dismissed as a consequence of Plaintiff’s own litigation misconduct, and that disposition was subsequently affirmed on appeal. We will not entertain Plaintiff’s arguments relative to the merits under the circumstances. See generally State ex rel. King v. UU Bar Ranch Ltd. Partnership, 2009-NMSC-010, ¶¶ 19, 145 N.M. 769, 205 P.3d 816 (“We have long held that a decision by an appeals court on an issue of law made in one stage of a lawsuit becomes binding on subsequent trial courts as well as subsequent appeals courts during the course of that litigation.”).

{7}       Accordingly, for the reasons stated in our notice of proposed disposition and herein, we affirm.

{8}       IT IS SO ORDERED.

JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge

WE CONCUR:

KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge

KATHERINE A. WRAY, Judge