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COUNTY OF QUAY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
LEE STONE,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
DUSTY STONE,
Defendant.
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW MEXICO
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF QUAY COUNTY, David P.
Reeb Jr., District Judge
Law Office of Jonlyn M. Martinez, LLC,
Jonlyn M. Martinez, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee
Lee Stone, San Jon, NM, Pro Se Appellant
LINDA M. VANZI, Judge. WE CONCUR: JENNIFER
L. ATTREP, Judge, KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge
{1} Defendant Lee
Stone, a self-represented litigant, appeals following the district court order
filed on March 5, 2018, denying Defendants’ motions under Rule
1-060 NMRA and
Rule
1-059 NMRA, and entering an injunction against further pro se filings,
incorporating the district court’s February 2, 2018 decision letter. [8 RP
2024; 8 RP 2016-23] This Court issued a calendar notice proposing to affirm.
Defendant filed a memorandum in opposition, which we have duly considered. We
remain unpersuaded that Defendant has established error.
{2} We construed
Defendant’s docketing statement to have raised three issues, largely related to
the process afforded him. Defendant’s response does not track the analysis of
our notice and instead focuses on certain details in the testimony, alleging
various inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s evidence. Defendant does not provide us
with context for these details, the arguments Plaintiff made in response, the
grounds for the district court’s rulings on these details, or controlling legal
authority that would warrant the reversal of the denial of motion for relief
from judgment under Rule 1-060(B) or Rule 1-059. Under these circumstances, we
have no obligation to search the record to develop our own independent
understanding of the case and find factual and legal support for Defendant’s
allegations of error.
See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock,
2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 70,
309 P.3d 53 (“We will not review unclear arguments,
or guess at what a party’s arguments might be.” (alteration, internal quotation
marks, and citation omitted)). “To rule on an inadequately [developed] issue,
this Court would have to develop the arguments itself, effectively performing
the parties’ work for them.”
Id. “This creates a strain on judicial
resources and a substantial risk of error. It is of no benefit either to the
parties or to future litigants for [the appellate courts] to promulgate case
law based on our own speculation rather than the parties’ carefully considered
arguments.”
Id. “Our courts have repeatedly held that, in summary
calendar cases, the burden is on the party opposing the proposed disposition to
clearly point out errors in fact or law.”
Hennessy v. Duryea,
1998-NMCA-036, ¶ 24,
124 N.M. 754,
955 P.2d 683.
{3} We review the
issues raised in Defendant’s appeal as we did in our notice and attempt to
address the various alleged discrepancies in the evidence in this context.
First, Defendant argues that the district court erred by not holding a hearing
on Defendant’s post-judgment motion(s). [CN 4; MIO 22-24] We explained in our
notice that holding a hearing on post-judgment motions is discretionary with
the district court.
See Ulibarri v. N.M. Corr. Acad.,
2006-NMSC-009, ¶
18,
139 N.M. 193,
131 P.3d 43 (finding that the district court was not required
to hold a hearing on a motion properly characterized as a motion for a new
trial);
N.M. Feeding Co. v. Keck,
1981-NMSC-034, ¶ 18,
95 N.M. 615,
624
P.2d 1012 (holding that a hearing on a motion for new trial is not required).
In New Mexico, a district court is not always required to hold an in-person
hearing, and some matters are properly heard based solely on the review of the
papers submitted by the parties.
See N.M. Transp. Dep’t v. Yazzie,
1991-NMCA-098, ¶ 12,
112 N.M. 615,
817 P.2d 1257 (holding that the appellant
received a hearing when the district court made its decision based on a
petition for relief and an administrative record, without in-person argument).
We further explained that a matter is “heard” when the district court makes a
ruling on an issue.
Id. (defining a “hearing” as “as every step where
the judge is called upon to rule for or against any party”). [CN 4] And we
observed that the district court gave Defendant leave to develop an extensive
body of pleadings in this case, and Defendant indeed filed many motions and
responses. [CN 4]
{4} Defendant responds
to our notice with out-of-state authority suggesting that his allegations of
fraud needed to be ferreted out with an evidentiary proceeding. [MIO 22-23]
Defendant’s contention does not persuade us. A decision on whether to hold a
hearing on allegations of fraud and perjury that are raised in a post-judgment
motion falls squarely within the district court’s discretion, as we discussed
in our notice. Further, the district court fully addressed this in the judge’s
letter of decision on the motion(s) to reopen:
Defendants argue Plaintiff committed
fraud in the ordinary sense. I, however, opine a disagreement over a witness’s
testimony or an inconsistency among witnesses’ testimonies or a disliking of a
witness’s testimony does not mean fraud exists in the ordinary sense. At trial,
I was persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that the Defendants improperly used the
county’s property. My opinion has not changed. The fact that Defendants dislike
my decision and argue the Plaintiff’s witnesses and attorney lied is
unpersuasive.
{5} It appears to us
that Defendant’s argument is that the district court weighed the evidence
presented at trial incorrectly. This does not give rise to reversible error on
appeal. “We will not reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that
of the fact finder.”
Clark v. Clark,
2014-NMCA-030, ¶ 26,
320 P.3d
991 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted);
see also
Skeen v. Boyles,
2009-NMCA-080, ¶ 37,
146 N.M. 627,
213 P.3d 531
(stating that, when the district court hears conflicting evidence, “we defer to
its determinations of ultimate fact, given that we lack opportunity to observe
demeanor, and we cannot weigh the credibility of live witnesses”). “It is for
the trier of fact to weigh the evidence, determine the credibility of
witnesses, reconcile inconsistent statements of the witnesses, and determine
where the truth lies.”
Jaynes v. Wal-Mart Store No. 824,
1988-NMCA-076,
¶ 8,
107 N.M. 648,
763 P.2d 82.
{6} Second, in this
Court’s calendar notice, we proposed that there was no error where the district
court did not take judicial notice of two laws. [CN 5] Defendant does not seem
challenge that proposal. In his response, Defendant continues to use the phrase
“judicial notice”; however, it appears Defendant redirects its use to
testimony, suggesting that the district court and this Court is required to
take judicial notice of certain evidence and ascribe it the weight and meaning
Defendant desires. [MIO 2-22] Generally, testimony about disputed matters is
not the appropriate subject of judicial notice. Adjudicative facts subject to
judicial notice are those “not subject to reasonable dispute.”
State v.
Erickson K.,
2002-NMCA-058, ¶ 24,
132 N.M. 258,
46 P.3d 1258 (quoting Rule
11-201(B) NMRA). “Such facts must be matters of common and general knowledge
which are well established and authoritatively settled.”
Erickson K.,
2002-NMCA-058, ¶ 24 (omissions, alteration, internal quotation marks, and
citation omitted). Again, this Court does not reweigh evidence on appeal.
Jaynes,
1988-NMCA-076, ¶ 8.
{7} Third, in this
Court’s calendar notice, we proposed to hold that the district court was within
its discretion to enjoin further pro se filings by Defendant. [CN 5-6] In
response to our notice, Defendant addresses this matter only to assert that the
injunction will lead to future wrongful death suits and to state that we are
not bound by the district court’s rulings. [MIO 25] Even if this Court is not
bound by district court rulings, we will defer to a district court ruling that
is made within its authority and discretion. Defendant has not persuaded us
that the district court acted outside of its authority and discretion in this
case.
{8} For the reasons stated
in our notice and in this opinion, we affirm the district court’s order.
JENNIFER L. ATTREP, Judge