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STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JAMES CRAWLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW MEXICO
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY,
Brett Loveless, District Judge
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General,
Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender,
Aja Oishi, Assistant Public Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant
M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge. WE CONCUR: DANIEL
J. GALLEGOS, Judge, JENNIFER L. ATTREP, Judge
{1} Defendant James
Crawley appeals the sentence imposed following the revocation of his probation.
[MIO 5] In his docketing statement, Defendant asserted that the district court
abused its discretion during sentencing by allowing the State to discuss a
charge that did not result in a conviction. [DS 6] This Court issued a calendar
notice proposing to affirm the revocation order and Defendant has filed a
memorandum in opposition to that disposition as well as a motion to amend the
docketing statement to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
[MIO 3, 8] Having duly considered Defendant’s arguments with regard to both
issues raised, we remain unpersuaded and affirm.
{2} With regard to the
State’s attempted reliance upon a prior charge that did not result in a
conviction, our calendar notice pointed out that the district court agreed with
Defendant that such material was not relevant in the sentencing proceedings.
[CN 2-3] Defendant’s memorandum now asserts that, the district court “could not
have ignored the district attorney’s statements.” [MIO 9] Nonetheless, this
Court operates pursuant to “a presumption of correctness in the rulings or
decisions of the trial court and the party claiming error must clearly show
error.”
State v. Carlos A.,
1996-NMCA-082, ¶ 8,
122 N.M. 241,
923 P.2d
608. Further, even if the State’s comments had been received as evidence
instead of being rejected by the district court, we would note that “[i]n a
bench trial, the trial court is presumed to have disregarded improper evidence,
and erroneous admission of evidence is not reversible error unless it appears
the trial court must have relied on it in reaching its decision.”
State v.
Gutierrez,
1996-NMCA-001, ¶ 4,
121 N.M. 191,
909 P.2d 751 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). In this case, Defendant’s sole basis for
asserting that the district court relied upon improper considerations in this
specific case is his assertion that the term of incarceration resulting from
the revocation of his probation was excessive. [MIO 10]
{3} The sentence
imposed in this case, however, was well within the statutorily approved range
under the circumstances. Indeed, Defendant’s potential exposure based upon his
prior convictions was just over twice the term of incarceration actually
imposed by the district court. [MIO 5, 6] We, therefore, cannot agree with
Defendant that the term of incarceration in this case establishes an abuse of
discretion. And, similarly, the fact that the sentence was statutorily authorized
precludes Defendant’s attempt to assert an unpreserved claim that his sentence
violated constitutional proscriptions against cruel and unusual punishment.
[MIO 10]
See State v. Trujillo,
2002-NMSC-005, ¶ 64,
131 N.M. 709,
42
P.3d 814 (holding that a defendant cannot raise the issue of cruel and unusual
punishment for the first time on appeal where the sentence is statutorily
authorized).
{4} In his motion to
amend his docketing statement, Defendant asserts that trial counsel “did not
keep the inflammatory information from coming in at the sentencing hearing[.]”
[MIO 5] From the record before us, however, it is not at all clear that trial
counsel’s performance fell below that of a reasonably competent attorney.
See
State v. Baca,
1997-NMSC-059, ¶ 24,
124 N.M. 333,
950 P.2d 776 (explaining
that an ineffective assistance claim requires a showing that the “attorney’s
conduct fell below that of a reasonably competent attorney”). Instead, it
appears that when the State first began discussing a case in which Defendant
was not ultimately convicted, trial counsel objected promptly, ultimately
obtaining a favorable ruling from the district court, which noted that the
prior criminal charge was a matter of public record, but that, absent a
conviction, no weight could be afforded that charge because of the presumption
of innocence. [Tr. 5/2/2017, 4:11-5:17]
{5} To the extent that
Defendant believes he could establish his claim of ineffective assistance if
allowed to rely upon matters not appearing in the present record, we note that
the general preference in New Mexico is that such claims be adjudicated in
habeas corpus proceedings, rather than on direct appeal.
State v. Grogan,
2007-NMSC-039, ¶ 9,
142 N.M. 107,
163 P.3d 494;
Duncan v. Kerby,
1993-NMSC-011, ¶ 4,
115 N.M. 344,
851 P.2d 466. “This preference stems from a
concern that the record before the [district] court may not adequately document
the sort of evidence essential to a determination of trial counsel’s
effectiveness.”
State v. Schoonmaker,
2008-NMSC-010, ¶ 31,
143 N.M. 373,
176 P.3d 1105 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted),
overruled on
other grounds by State v. Consaul,
2014-NMSC-030, ¶ 38,
332 P.3d 850.
{6} Thus, for the
foregoing reasons, as well as the reasons provided in our calendar notice, we
affirm the district court’s revocation order without prejudice to Defendant’s
opportunity to pursue a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in
post-conviction proceedings.
DANIEL J. GALLEGOS, Judge
JENNIFER L. ATTREP, Judge