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STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
TABITHA LYNN WOLF,
Defendant-Appellant.
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW MEXICO
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LEA COUNTY, Gary L.
Clingman, District Judge
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General,
Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee
Tabitha Lynn Wolf, Elida, NM, Pro Se
Appellant
J. MILES HANSIEE, Judge. WE CONCUR: LINDA
M. VANZI,Chief Judge, M. MONICA ZAMORA,, Judge
{1} Defendant Tabitha
Lynn Wolf appeals from the district court’s judgment affirming the magistrate
court’s judgment finding her guilty of speeding, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section
66-7-301 (2015), and deferring sentence [RP 102]. This Court’s calendar notice
proposed to affirm. Defendant filed a memorandum in opposition to the proposed
disposition. We are not persuaded by Defendant’s arguments and affirm.
{2} Defendant continues
to argue that the New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department (the Department)
is the only department vested with the authority over chapter 66 of the New
Mexico statutes. [Unpaginated MIO 2] However, Defendant misapprehends NMSA
1978, Section
66-2-3 (2007). Subsection A states: “The department is vested
with the power and is charged with the duty of observing, administering and
enforcing the Motor Vehicle Code . . . in cooperation with
state and local agencies as provided by law and the provisions of law now
existing or hereinafter enacted[,]” (emphasis added), and clearly contemplates
the cooperation of state courts as provided by law. Similarly, Defendant’s
reliance on NMSA 1978, Section
66-2-5 (1978) is misguided. Section 66-2-5 vests
with the Department director the authority for prescribing the proper forms
necessary to carry out the Motor Vehicle Code, and makes no provision for the
enforcement of the Motor Vehicle Code.
See id. (“The director shall
prescribe and provide suitable forms of applications, certificates of title,
evidences of registration, drivers’ licenses and all other forms requisite or
deemed necessary to carry out the provisions of the Motor Vehicle
Code, . . . and any other laws, the enforcement and
administration of which are vested in the division.”). Lastly, NMSA 1978,
Section
66-1-4.4 (2016) merely defines the terms used in the Motor Vehicle Code.
None of these provisions are in contravention with the statutes relied upon in
this court’s calendar notice that confer jurisdiction to the magistrate and
district courts over the prosecution of misdemeanors. [CN 2-3]
See NMSA
1978, §
66-1-4.17(N) (2007) (“trial court” means “the magistrate, municipal or
district court that tries the case concerning an alleged violation of a
provision of the Motor Vehicle Code”); NMSA 1978, §
35-3-4(A) (1985)
(“Magistrates have jurisdiction in all cases of misdemeanors and petty
misdemeanors[.]”).
{3} Defendant also
continues to argue that the United States Constitution guarantees the right to
counsel of choice, and that representing someone upon their request does not
constitute the practice of law if they are not doing it as a business.
[Unpaginated MIO 3-4] To the contrary, “[t]he practice of law is usually
interpreted to entail the representation of others.”
United States v.
Martinez,
1984-NMSC-072, ¶ 2,
101 N.M. 423,
684 P.2d 509. In addition,
Defendant does not dispute the law relied upon in this Court’s calendar notice.
[CN 3]
See NMSA 1978, §
36-2-27 (1999) (proscribing who may practice law
on behalf of another);
Chisholm v. Rueckhaus,
1997-NMCA-112, ¶ 8,
124
N.M. 255,
948 P.2d 707 (“Representing one’s self in a legal proceeding does not
constitute the practice of law. Representing another, however, does.”)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We are not persuaded by
Defendant’s arguments.
See State v. Mondragon,
1988-NMCA-027, ¶ 10,
107 N.M. 421,
759 P.2d 1003 (stating that “[a] party responding to a summary
calendar notice must come forward and specifically point out errors of law and
fact[,]” and the repetition of earlier arguments does not fulfill this
requirement),
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v.
Harris,
2013-NMCA-031, ¶ 3,
297 P.3d 374.
{4} For these reasons,
and those stated in this Court’s notice of proposed disposition, we affirm.
LINDA M. VANZI,Chief Judge