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STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JACOB PUENTE,
Defendant-Appellant.
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW MEXICO
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LEA COUNTY, William G.
Shoobridge, District Judge
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General,
Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee
Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender,
Mary Barket, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant
JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge. WE CONCUR:
TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge, M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge
AUTHOR: JONATHAN B. SUTIN
{1} Defendant appeals
from the district court’s judgment and sentence entered pursuant to a jury
trial, convicting him of battery upon a peace officer contrary to NMSA 1978,
Section
30-22-24 (1971). Unpersuaded by Defendant’s docketing statement, we
entered a notice of proposed summary disposition, proposing to affirm. In
response to our notice, Defendant has filed a memorandum in opposition and a
motion to amend. We remain unpersuaded and therefore affirm. Additionally, the
motion to amend the docketing statement is DENIED.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
{2} Defendant
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for
battery on a peace officer. [MIO 6-19] In response to our notice, Defendant
argues that in order to convict him of battery upon a police officer, his
conduct must have actually interfered with the officer’s ability to carry out
his duties or control or command the situation. [MIO 6] In making this
assertion, Defendant is attempting to define what it means to meaningfully
challenge an officer’s authority—something we have declined to do.
State v.
Martinez,
2002-NMCA-036, ¶ 38,
131 N.M. 746,
42 P.3d 851 (“We specifically
decline[] to define what types of behavior will be sufficient to constitute a
meaningful challenge to authority and what will not. Instead, we stress[] that
whether or not a defendant’s conduct constitute[s] a meaningful challenge
[will] depend on the context in which the battery occurred.” (citation
omitted));
State v. Jones,
2000-NMCA-047, ¶ 14,
129 N.M. 165,
3 P.3d 142
(“While the parties urge us to define the legal boundaries of a ‘meaningful
challenge’ to authority, we decline to do so. Because its definition demands
knowledge of the context in which the battery arose, this question is best left
to juries to decide using their collective common sense and wisdom as a
guide.”).
{3} Further, while
Defendant continues to argue that his conduct could not have constituted a
meaningful challenge to authority, we are unpersuaded. In
Jones, this
Court examined two defendants’ conduct to determine whether a rational jury
could find that each had meaningfully challenged an officer’s authority when
they spit at law enforcement officers. The first defendant spit on an officer
from the back seat of a patrol car after he had been arrested and was being
transported to the police station.
Jones,
2000-NMCA-047, ¶ 2. The second
defendant spit on a detention center officer when the officer was performing a
welfare check on the defendant through a food-tray slot in the cell door.
Id.
¶ 4. With respect to the first defendant, this Court concluded that “
a rational, properly instructed jury could find beyond a
reasonable doubt that [the defendant’s] spitting upon an officer from the rear
seat of the officer’s car constituted a “meaningful challenge” to the authority
the officer was lawfully exercising over him pursuant to his arrest for DWI.” Id.
¶ 15. Similarly, we concluded that the second defendant’s conduct could
constitute a meaningful challenge to authority. Id. ¶ 18. In this case,
as we explained in our notice, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence
based on evidence that Defendant was ordered to the ground by police officers,
and while the officer was attempting to place Defendant in handcuffs, Defendant
resisted to some extent and spit in the officer’s face. [CN 3-4; MIO 2; RP 25] While
Defendant, again, points out that the officer did not personally feel that
Defendant’s conduct impacted or impeded his authority, we continue to believe
that it was the jury’s role to make that determination.
See Martinez,
2002-NMCA-036, ¶¶ 40-41
(emphasizing that
whether there was a meaningful challenge to authority is a question of fact for
the jury to decide);
Jones,
2000-NMCA-047,
¶ 14;
see also
Charles v. Regents of N.M. State Univ.,
2011-NMCA-057, ¶ 15,
150 N.M.
17,
256 P.3d 29 (“In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, this Court
views the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party and
disregards any inferences and evidence to the contrary. We defer to the jury’s
determination regarding the credibility of witnesses and the reconciliation of
inconsistent or contradictory evidence. We simply review the evidence to
determine whether there is evidence that a reasonable mind would find adequate
to support a conclusion.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation
omitted)).
Accordingly, for the reasons set
forth in this Opinion and in our calendar notice, we reject Defendant’s
argument with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence.
{4} Defendant has also
filed a motion to amend his docketing statement to include the issue of whether
a definitional instruction regarding what constitutes a meaningful challenge to
authority should have been supplied to the jury. [MTA 1] As Defendant
recognizes, because he failed to preserve this issue, we will only reverse upon
a finding of fundamental error. [MIO 19-23 (arguing that failure to provide a
definitional instruction resulted in fundamental error)]
State v. Benally,
2001-NMSC-033, ¶ 12,
131 N.M. 258,
34 P.3d 1134 (providing that the appellate
courts review issues relevant to jury instructions for fundamental error when
the issue has not been preserved). Because we conclude that this issue is not
viable, we deny Defendant’s motion to amend.
See State v. Moore,
1989-NMCA-073, ¶¶ 44-45,
109 N.M. 119,
782 P.2d 91 (providing that this
Court will deny motions to amend that raise issues that are not viable, even if
they allege fundamental or jurisdictional error),
superseded by rule
on other grounds as recognized in State v. Salgado,
1991-NMCA-044,
¶ 2,
112 N.M. 537,
817 P.2d 730.
{5} As we explained
earlier, in the past we have specifically declined to define what constitutes a
meaningful challenge to authority.
Martinez,
2002-NMCA-036, ¶ 38;
Jones,
2000-NMCA-047, ¶ 14. Secondly, even if we were to agree with Defendant that a
definitional instruction should have been supplied to the jury, our case law
indicates that the failure to include a definition in jury instructions
typically does not rise to the level of fundamental error.
State v. Barber,
2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 20,
135 N.M. 621,
92 P.3d 633 (agreeing that the “failure
to instruct on a definition . . . , even when called for in an official UJI Use
Note, does not rise to the level of fundamental error” in most cases). This
case does not present a situation that meets the exacting standard requiring
reversal due to fundamental error.
See id. ¶ 17 (providing that
fundamental error only occurs in “cases with defendants who are indisputably innocent,
and cases in which a mistake in the process makes a conviction fundamentally
unfair notwithstanding the apparent guilt of the accused”). In considering the
foregoing, we conclude that Defendant has not presented a viable issue in his
motion to amend, and we therefore deny his motion.
{6} For reasons set
forth in our notice and in this Opinion, the district court is affirmed, and
Defendant’s motion to amend is denied.