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STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
KYLE PETERS,
Defendant-Appellant.
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW MEXICO
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY,
William C. Birdsall, District Judge
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General,
Santa Fe, NM, Walter Hart, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for
Appellee
L. Helen Bennett, P.C., L. Helen Bennett,
Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant
J. MILES HANISEE, Judge. WE CONCUR: LINDA
M. VANZI, Judge, M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge
{1} Defendant entered a
conditional guilty plea to unlawful taking of a motor vehicle, contrary to NMSA
1978, Section
30-16D-1(A) (2009), reserving his right to appeal the district
court’s denial of his motion to dismiss.
See Rule
5-304(A)(2) NMRA
(governing conditional pleas). The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether
Defendant was the owner of the vehicle such that he could not be convicted of
taking the vehicle without the owner’s consent.
{2} Both the State and
Defendant stipulated to the facts as alleged in the arrest warrant. The arrest
warrant recites that Defendant purchased a vehicle from E-Z Credit Auto Sales
(E-Z Credit). E-Z Credit repossessed the vehicle after Defendant failed to make
payments for several months. Later that day, Defendant went to E-Z Credit’s
unsecured lot where the vehicle was parked and drove the vehicle off the lot
using his spare set of keys. Defendant was subsequently charged with unlawful
taking of a motor vehicle based on this conduct.
{3} Defendant filed a
motion to dismiss arguing that an essential element of the offense was that the
taking of the vehicle be without the consent of the owner, and he was the owner
of the vehicle, therefore he could not violate the statute as a matter of law.
The district court denied the motion, and this appeal follows.
{4} Defendant contends
that a person who has purchased a vehicle pursuant to a conditional sales or
lease agreement, but who has defaulted on payments, cannot be convicted of
unlawful taking of a motor vehicle for retaking possession of the vehicle
following the lienholder’s lawful repossession of the vehicle.
{5} “Interpretation of
a statute is a matter of law, which we review de novo.”
State v. Rivera,
2004-NMSC-001, ¶ 9,
134 N.M. 768,
82 P.3d 939 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). “Our ultimate goal in statutory construction is to ascertain
and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.”
State v. Smith,
2004-NMSC-032, ¶ 8,
136 N.M. 372,
98 P.3d 1022 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). In doing so, we look to “the plain language used in the
statute, as well as the purpose of the underlying statute.”
State v. Parrish,
2013-NMCA-066, ¶ 6,
304 P.3d 730.
{6} Section 30-16D-1(A)
provides in relevant part that “[u]nlawful taking of a vehicle or motor vehicle
consists of a person taking any vehicle or motor vehicle as defined by the
Motor Vehicle Code [NMSA 1978, §§
66-1-1 to -5 (1978, as amended through 2016)]
intentionally and without consent of the owner.”
See State v. McGruder,
1997-NMSC-023, ¶ 27,
123 N.M. 302,
940 P.2d 150 (“[U]nlawful taking of a motor
vehicle consists of: taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent and with
criminal intent.”),
abrogated on other grounds by State v. Chavez,
2009-NMSC-035,
146 N.M. 434,
211 P.3d 891. “Unlawful taking of a vehicle
primarily protects an owner’s right to immediate possession of an automobile.”
McGruder,
1997-NMSC-023, ¶ 30;
see State v. Bernard,
2015-NMCA-089,
¶ 30,
355 P.3d 831 (stating that the “Legislature crafted provisions of
the Criminal Code that operate in tandem with the Motor Vehicle Code to punish
criminal conduct that infringes on personal property interests in vehicles”),
cert.
denied, 2015-NMCERT-008, 369 P.3d 368. Thus, by the terms of the statute,
if Defendant was the owner of the vehicle when he removed it from E-Z Credit’s
lot, he could not be convicted of taking the vehicle without the owner’s
consent.
See generally State v. Earp,
2014-NMCA-059,
326 P.3d 491
(recognizing that the defendant could not be convicted of causing criminal
damage to property in which he had an ownership interest where the statute
required that the damage be without the consent of the owner).
{7} Our initial inquiry
is whether Defendant had an ownership interest in the lawfully repossessed
vehicle. Both Defendant and the State agree that the question whether Defendant
was an “owner” within the meaning of Section 30-16D-1(A) is determined by the
statutory definition of “owner” contained in the Motor Vehicle Code, and so do
we. In 2009, the Legislature recompiled and amended the unlawful taking of a
motor vehicle statute. Previously, it had been part of the Motor Vehicle Code
in substantially the same format.
See NMSA 1978, §
66-3-504 (1998)
(stating that “[a]ny person who takes any vehicle or motor vehicle
intentionally and without consent of the owner is
guilty . . .”). The recompilation did not change elements of the
offense or significantly alter the penalty.
Compare Section 30-16D-1,
with Section 66-3-504. Based on the language and history of the statute, it
seems to us that the Legislature intended the meaning of “owner” to remain in
the context of Section 30-16D-1(A), as that term is defined in the Motor
Vehicle Code.
See Bernard,
2015-NMCA-089, ¶ 18 (determining that the
recompilation of Section 30-16D-4 from the Motor Vehicle Code into the criminal
code was not intended by the Legislature to make substantive changes and the
Legislature intended the definition of “vehicle” from the Motor Vehicle Code to
apply to the crime of receiving or transferring stolen vehicles). The Motor
Vehicle Code defines “owner” as:
a person who holds the legal title
of a vehicle and may include a conservator, guardian, personal representative,
executor or similar fiduciary, or, in the event that a vehicle is the
subject of an agreement for conditional sale or lease with the right of
purchase upon performance of the conditions stated in the agreement and with an
immediate right of possession vested in the conditional vendee or lessee, or,
in the event that a mortgagor of a vehicle is entitled to possession, then such
conditional vendee or lessee or mortgagor.
NMSA 1978, § 66-1-4.13(F) (1990) (emphasis added).
{8} New Mexico thus
recognizes different categories of ownership interests relating to motor
vehicles.
See Hale v. Basin Motor Co.,
1990-NMSC-068, ¶ 9,
110 N.M. 314,
795 P.2d 1006 (“As a rule of construction, the word ‘or’ should be given its
normal disjunctive meaning unless the context of a statute demands
otherwise.”). The statute first recognizes the holder of legal title (and that
person’s fiduciaries) as an owner. The statute further contemplates that, when
a vehicle is the subject of a conditional sales agreement or a lease agreement,
then the conditional vendee or lessee is an owner, when there is an “immediate
right of possession vested” in the conditional vendee or lessee. Section
66-1-4.13(F). Lastly, when the vehicle is subject to a mortgage and the
mortgagor is entitled to possession of the vehicle, then the mortgagor of the
vehicle is as well considered an owner.
{9} Defendant did not
allege in his motion to dismiss that he was the owner of the vehicle as the
holder of legal title, as a conditional vendee or lessee, or as a mortgagor.
However, the affidavit in support of the warrant for Defendant’s arrest, to
which the parties stipulated, recites that the vehicle was repossessed from
Defendant due to delinquent payments. In other words, Defendant was not in
current with the payments he agreed to make to E-Z Credit in order to pay for
the vehicle he sought to purchase and own. Moreover, at the hearing on the
motion to dismiss, the State and Defendant agreed that Defendant purchased the
vehicle from E-Z Credit, and it was then repossessed. Despite the foregoing
facts, on appeal Defendant argues that he was an owner by virtue of the
equitable interest he acquired through the purchase contract with E-Z Credit,
and that E-Z Credit was a lienholder with the right to repossess the vehicle
upon default. But these circumstances essentially describe a conditional sales
agreement.
See NMSA 1978, §
58-19-2(F) (2001) (defining a conditional
sales contract as an “agreement . . . pursuant to which the title to or a
lien upon the motor vehicle that is the subject matter of a retail installment
transaction is retained or taken by a retail seller from a retail buyer as
security for the buyer’s obligation”). In such a scenario, Defendant’s
obligation pursuant to the contract must be met in order to maintain
possession, and any ownership interest that may have accrued pursuant to the
contract with E-Z Credit of the vehicle at issue.
{10} The State does not
dispute that Defendant was a conditional vendee of the vehicle. The State
maintains, however, that a conditional vendee is considered the owner of the
vehicle
only as long as he or she is vested with an “immediate right of
possession.” The State argues that once the vehicle was lawfully repossessed by
E-Z Credit, Defendant was no longer vested with an immediate right to
possession, and was therefore no longer an owner within the meaning of Section
66-1-4.13(F).
{11} In this case,
Defendant has not established that he was vested with an immediate right of
possession at the time he removed the vehicle from E-Z Credit’s lot. At most,
the undisputed facts establish that Defendant was a conditional vendee.
However, a conditional vendee is not automatically an owner within the meaning
of the Motor Vehicle Code.
See Riggs v. Gardikas,
1967-NMSC-120, ¶¶ 3-5,
78 N.M. 5,
427 P.2d 890 (recognizing that there are two operative elements for
a conditional purchaser to be an owner under the definition in the Motor
Vehicle Code: the vehicle must be subject to a conditional sales or lease
contract and the vendee must have the right to immediate possession). Defendant
therefore could not establish that he was vested with an immediate right of
possession solely by virtue of being a conditional vendee. To adopt such an
interpretation of Section 66-1-4.13(F) would render the language “with an
immediate right of possession vested” superfluous.
See Baker v. Hedstrom,
2013-NMSC-043, ¶ 24,
309 P.3d 1047 (“This Court must interpret a statute so as
to avoid rendering the Legislature’s language superfluous.”).
{12} We understand Defendant
to allege on appeal that the purchase contract between himself and E-Z Credit
provided him with a right to possession of the vehicle in some unspecified
form. However, neither the State nor Defendant introduced the contract below,
and accordingly, its terms were not before the district court. Therefore, to
the extent that Defendant asserts that he was vested with a immediate right of
possession based on the contract, there was no basis from which the district
court could make this determination below.
See State v. Hughey,
2007-NMSC-036, ¶ 11,
142 N.M. 83,
163 P.3d 470 (stating that “where a motion
involves factual matters that are not capable of resolution without a trial on
the merits, the [district] court lacks the authority to grant the motion prior
to trial”). Therefore, the undisputed facts do not show that Defendant was
entitled to dismissal as a matter of law, and the district court properly
denied the motion to dismiss. We therefore affirm the district court.