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STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
PAUL MEEKS,
Defendant-Appellant.
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW MEXICO
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LEA COUNTY, Gary L.
Clingman, District Judge
Gary K. King, Attorney General, Margaret
E. McLean, Assistant Attorney General, Joel Jacobsen, Assistant Attorney
General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee
Bennett J. Baur, Acting Chief Public
Defender, Kimberly Chavez Cook, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for
Appellant
LINDA M. VANZI, Judge. WE CONCUR: CYNTHIA
A. FRY, Judge, TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge
{1} Defendant’s motion
for partial rehearing on second memorandum opinion is granted. The memorandum
opinion filed in this case on April 2, 2013, is hereby withdrawn, and this
opinion is substituted in its place.
{2} Defendant Paul
Meeks appeals a district court order denying his motion to suppress. In this
Court’s notice of proposed summary disposition, we proposed to affirm
Defendant’s conviction for criminal sexual contact of a minor. Defendant filed
a memorandum in opposition, which we considered. Because we were not persuaded
by his arguments, we affirmed Defendant’s conviction in a Memorandum Opinion,
filed January 26, 2012. Subsequently, Defendant filed a motion for rehearing.
We granted the motion, withdrew the Opinion, and assigned the case to the
Court’s general calendar. After reviewing the parties’ briefs and the record on
appeal, we remain unpersuaded by Defendant’s arguments and affirm.
{3} Because this is a
memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural
background, we discuss the pertinent facts within the context of Defendant’s
arguments.
{4} “In reviewing a
district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we observe the distinction
between factual determinations which are subject to a substantial evidence
standard of review and application of law to the facts, which is subject to de
novo review.”
State v. Bravo,
2006-NMCA-019, ¶ 5,
139 N.M. 93,
128 P.3d
1070 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). “Determining
whether or not a police interview constitutes a custodial interrogation
requires the application of law to the facts.”
State v. Nieto,
2000-NMSC-031, ¶ 19,
129 N.M. 688,
12 P.3d 442.
{5} We first address
Defendant’s argument that he was not free to leave and then consider
Defendant’s remaining arguments that, under the totality of the circumstances,
he was under custodial arrest.
{6} Law enforcement
officers must advise a suspect of his rights pursuant to
Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966), when he is the subject of a “custodial
interrogation.”
Nieto,
2000-NMSC-031, ¶ 20. The sole issue in this case
is whether Defendant was “in custody” at the time he gave his statement to the
police and, as a result, whether
Miranda warnings were required. In
order to establish that an individual is in custody for
Miranda
purposes, “the court must apply an objective test to resolve the ultimate
inquiry: was there a formal arrest or restraint of freedom of movement of the
degree associated with a formal arrest.”
State v. Wilson,
2007-NMCA-111,
¶ 23,
142 N.M. 737,
169 P.3d 1184 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). In this case, Defendant was not formally arrested at the police
department in Lynchburg, Virginia. Therefore, we must “engage in a
fact-specific analysis of the totality of the circumstances under which the
questioning took place in order to decide whether the custody requirement is
met.”
State v. Olivas,
2011-NMCA-030, ¶ 10,
149 N.M. 498,
252 P.3d 722.
{7} We have previously
identified several factors to consider when determining whether a reasonable
person would believe he is free to leave, including “the purpose, place, and
length of interrogation[,] . . . the extent to which the defendant is
confronted with evidence of guilt, the physical surroundings of the
interrogation, the duration of the detention, and the degree of pressure
applied to the defendant.”
Bravo,
2006-NMCA-019, ¶ 9 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Applying these factors, for the reasons that
follow, we conclude that Defendant was free to leave the interview room.
{8} As a preliminary
matter, this Court granted Defendant’s motion for rehearing based on the
factual representations and issues raised in his motion for rehearing,
specifically those issues related to whether Defendant was free to leave.
See
Wilson,
2007-NMCA-111, ¶ 22 (determining that freedom to leave is a factor
relevant to the inquiry of whether a person is in custody for
Miranda
purposes). Defendant argued that the limited record on summary calendar did not
make it clear whether he could have exited the two locked doors without
assistance. Defendant also asserted that the door to the interrogation room
“was closed and blocked by an armed officer[,]” and that “no witness testified
affirmatively that the door was
not locked.” In addition, he contended
that while the officer “blocked” the door or was “posted” at the door, the
“interrogating agent” used “aggressive and accusatory techniques.” Defendant’s
choice of words was clearly intended to conjure up a mental image of “custodial
interrogation” that successfully resulted in this case being placed on the
general calendar.
{9} Contrary to the
representation that the door was “blocked,” however, our review of the video
recording of Defendant’s interview shows Defendant, Agent James Butterfield of
the New Mexico State Police, and the Lynchburg police officer enter the room
from the
left of the camera. Throughout the interview, the Lynchburg
officer is then intermittently visible in the video sitting to the
right
of the camera. It is clear from the video that the door was never “blocked” as
Defendant contends on appeal. It is noteworthy that during the suppression
hearing, defense counsel never argued that the door was blocked but said only
that the Lynchburg officer was “by the door.”
{10} Further, Defendant’s
own actions belie his assertion that he did not believe he was free to leave.
Within seconds of the start of the interview, Defendant engaged Agent
Butterfield in casual conversation. And within the first three minutes after
sitting down, when Agent Butterfield asked Defendant if he knew why he was at
the police station, Defendant replied, “My daughters being touched. . . . I
thought I had confessed and told enough people.” Defendant was relaxed and
forthcoming throughout the interview with little prompting or input from the
officers, describing how sexually arousing he found it to touch his daughters
and how he would “transfer that touch” afterward when masturbating to online
pornography. Indeed, the officers had to interrupt Defendant to ask their
questions. The video clearly demonstrates that Defendant was never “pressed to
confess.”
{11} The evidence also
establishes that the physical location of the interview room did not prevent
Defendant from leaving. There is no dispute that Defendant had to go through
three doors to get inside the interview room. The first door leading into the
lobby was locked because it was after regular business hours. A person with a
key unlocked the exterior door, allowed Defendant into the lobby, and locked
the door. Defendant was escorted from the lobby into the back part of the
building through a second door, which was locked from the lobby side. However,
the door passing from the other direction, from the back into the lobby, was
not locked. Further, the third door, the door to the interview room, did not
have a lock and was not capable of being locked. Accordingly, Defendant could
have exited the interview room and walked into the lobby without needing
assistance from anyone. We acknowledge that, because it was after 5:00 p.m.,
Defendant as well as the officers needed to ask someone with a key to open the
outside door. Nevertheless, even though the building was locked, the interior
doors were not. We conclude that Defendant was free to leave the interview room
at any time.
Totality of the Circumstances
{12} Defendant raises a
myriad of issues and asserts that the totality of the circumstances establish
that he was subject to the equivalent of a custodial arrest. We have considered
the objective issues and disagree. We address Defendant’s remaining arguments
below.
{13} Defendant claims
that he was in custody because he was not advised that he was free to end the
interview at any time or that he could refuse to answer the officers’
questions. This argument lacks merit. The district court found that Defendant
was fully advised that he was not under arrest and he was free to leave. To the
extent that Defendant argues that there was no testimony at the suppression
hearing that he was advised that he was free to leave, we note that, to the
contrary, Agent Butterfield testified at the preliminary hearing that he
advised Defendant that he was free to leave. More importantly, Defendant’s
written motion to suppress itself clearly states, “The New Mexico State Police
Investigator advised Defendant that he was not under arrest and was free to
leave[.]”
{14} Defendant further
contends that the interrogation room was small and located in “the bowels” of
the police department, there were no windows in the interrogation room, the
door was closed and he believed the door was locked, two police officers
participated in the interview, and the interview was recorded. Again,
Defendant’s assertions are not entirely supported by the evidence. For example,
our review of the record establishes that there was a window in the door of the
interrogation room and that the door was not capable of being locked. When
asked if he knew whether the door was locked, Defendant testified, “I didn’t
know either way.” In any event, even if Defendant had believed that the door
was locked, this belief was not reasonable because the door did not have a
lock.
See State v. Ketelson,
2011-NMSC-023, ¶ 9,
150 N.M. 137,
257 P.3d
957 (stating that it is for the district court to resolve issues of credibility
and the weight of the evidence on a motion to suppress). Morever, we have
already concluded that Defendant was free to leave the interrogation room.
{15} Defendant also
argues that his background rendered him more susceptible to police pressure and
manipulation, and the officers exploited aspects of his religious and moral
background and his history in group counseling sessions in order to elicit
information. We do not consider these subjective factors.
See Nieto,
2000-NMSC-031, ¶ 20 (“Custody is determined objectively, not from the
subjective perception of any of the members to the interview.”).
{16} We are also not
persuaded by Defendant’s assertion that the interview was “lengthy” and lasted
almost two hours with no breaks. We have previously held that a two-hour
interrogation did not constitute a custodial interrogation when the accused drove
to the police station in her own vehicle, was not placed in handcuffs or told
that she was under arrest, did not inform the officers that she was tired
during the two-hour interrogation, and was permitted to drive home after the
interrogation.
Bravo,
2006-NMCA-019, ¶¶ 12-13. Like the facts in
Bravo,
here, Defendant drove himself to the police department in his own vehicle, he
was never placed in handcuffs, he was specifically told that he was not under
arrest and free to leave, there is no indication that Defendant was tired or
requested a break during the interrogation, and he was permitted to drive home
after the interrogation.
{17} Finally, Defendant
argues that he was treated as a suspect. However,
Miranda warnings are
not required simply because the person questioned is a suspect.
See State v.
Munoz,
1998-NMSC-048, ¶ 42,
126 N.M. 535,
972 P.2d 847 (“It is . . . true
that [the d]efendant had become the focus of the police investigation, but this
factor alone is not enough to trigger the need to give warnings.”). Defendant
contends that, because the officer confronted him with the evidence against him
and urged him to confess, the interrogation was necessarily custodial. While we
recognize that such a manner of questioning could weigh in favor of a finding
that Defendant was in custody, we note that the video does not support
Defendant’s characterization of a “confrontation.” Rather, the video is
consistent with Defendant’s own description that the officer “hinted he knew
things” that Defendant had not mentioned.
{18} Based on the
totality of the circumstances in this case, we conclude that Defendant was not
subject to a restraint on his freedom of movement to a degree associated with a
formal arrest. Therefore, Defendant was not entitled to
Miranda
warnings. The fact that Defendant voluntarily drove himself to the police
station for the interview, where he was informed that he was not under arrest
and was free to leave, are significant in determining that he was not in custody
for purposes of
Miranda.
See Nieto,
2000-NMSC-031, ¶ 21 (holding
that a suspect was not in custody when he “was asked and agreed to accompany
police officers to the station, was free to leave or terminate the interview,
and was provided transportation to and from the station,” even though the
interrogation room was small and an officer sat between the suspect and the
door);
Munoz,
1998-NMSC-048, ¶ 43 (holding that a defendant was not in
custody when he willingly went with police to be questioned, was not handcuffed
or searched, was not interviewed in a locked space, and was taken back home
when the interview was completed);
but see Olivas,
2011-NMCA-030, ¶ 12
(holding that a defendant was in custody and finding it significant that the
officers “never informed [the d]efendant that he was not under arrest or that
he was free to terminate the encounter at any time”).
{19} To the extent that
Defendant continues to rely upon
Olivas, we reiterate that
Olivas
is distinguishable. Here, unlike in
Olivas, Defendant drove of his own
accord to the station, he was not handcuffed, and he was informed that he was
not under arrest and was free to leave. Accordingly, for the reasons stated in
this Opinion, we affirm the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to
suppress.