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STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ELIZABETH MARTINEZ,
Defendant-Appellee.
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW MEXICO
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY,
Charles W. Brown, District Judge
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General,
Santa Fe, NM, Laurie Blevins, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for
Appellant
Theresa M. Duncan, Albuquerque, NM, for
Appellee
LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge. WE CONCUR: M.
MONICA ZAMORA, Judge, J. MILES HANISEE, Judge
{1} The State appeals
from the district court’s order granting Defendant a new trial. In this Court’s
notice of proposed disposition, we proposed to summarily affirm. The State
filed a memorandum in opposition, which we have duly considered. Remaining
unpersuaded, we affirm.
District Court’s Jurisdiction to
Rule on Motion to Reconsider
{2} In its
docketing statement, the State argued that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to rule on Defendant’s motion to reconsider that was filed five
months after the district court denied the initial motion and five months after
the New Mexico Supreme Court issued its opinion in
State v. Nichols,
2016-NMSC-001,
363 P.3d 1187. [DS 11] In this Court’s notice of proposed
disposition, we noted that Defendant’s motion to reconsider the order denying
her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, in the alternative, a
motion for a new trial was filed
prior to sentencing. [CN 3] We further
noted that the State did not provide any authority to support its argument that
a motion to reconsider filed
before a final judgment is untimely. [CN
3-4]
{3} Instead of pointing
out errors in fact or law with our proposed disposition as it related to the
argument made in the docketing statement, the State has recharacterized its
argument.
See Hennessy v. Duryea,
1998-NMCA-036, ¶ 24,
124 N.M.
754,
955 P.2d 683 (“Our courts have repeatedly held that, in summary calendar
cases, the burden is on the party opposing the proposed disposition to clearly
point out errors in fact or law.”). In its memorandum in opposition, the State
argues that this Court’s analysis “fails to consider that Defendant’s [m]otion
. . . challenged the sufficiency of the causation evidence.” [MIO 3] According
to the State, “[t]he issue here is not that the subsequent trial court lacked
jurisdiction, but rather that the rules of statutory construction
should
have precluded the grant of a new trial on this ground.” [MIO 3
(emphasis added)] In support of this argument, the State relies on Rule
5-607(E), (K) NMRA (discussing the district court’s role in determining whether
there was sufficient evidence during a trial); Rule
5-701(A) NMRA (providing
that “[t]he judgment and sentence shall be rendered in open court and
thereafter a written judgment and sentence shall be signed by the judge and
filed”); Rule
5-614 NMRA (discussing the rules of criminal procedure for a
motion for new trial). [MIO 3-5]
{4} We are not
persuaded that our proposed disposition was incorrect. Moreover, having looked
at the language of the rules relied on by the State, we are not convinced that
the State has demonstrated error.
See State v. Aragon,
1999-NMCA-060, ¶
10,
127 N.M. 393,
981 P.2d 1211 (stating that there is a presumption of correctness
in the rulings or decisions of the trial court, and the party claiming error
bears the burden of showing such error).
District Court’s Decision to
Grant New Trial
{5} In its docketing
statement, the State argued that the district court erred by misapplying the
required standard for granting a new trial in concluding that a miscarriage of
justice may have occurred in light of the
Nichols opinion. [DS 10-11]
Similarly, the State contended that the district court erred in determining
that
Nichols is applicable to the instant case. [DS 11] Given
Defendant’s concern with causation in the present case and our Supreme Court’s
concern with causation in
Nichols, we stated that we were not persuaded
that the district court abused its discretion in “finding that a miscarriage of
justice may have occurred.” [CN 6 (quoting RP 926)]
{6} In response, the
State argues that there was sufficient evidence of causation to support
Defendant’s conviction for one count of child abuse, with reckless disregard,
resulting in death. [MIO 1, 5-9] However, regardless of whether there was
sufficient evidence of causation, the jury was never asked to make the
determination of causation. To the extent that the State claims that defense
counsel did not err in failing to request a proximate cause jury instruction
[MIO 9-12], we are not convinced.
Cf. Nichols,
2016-NMSC-001,
¶
38 (“For this Court to uphold a conviction of first-degree child abuse on a
theory of endangerment by medical neglect, the statute requires proof of
causation.”);
id. ¶ 39 (“Causation must be proved by substantial
evidence.”);
id. ¶ 48 (“In addition to proving causation, the [s]tate
had to offer substantial evidence that [the defendant’s] conduct, in failing to
provide medical care early enough, amounted to reckless disregard for the
welfare and safety of [the child].”).
{7} Likewise, we are
not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion by granting
Defendant a new trial.
See State v. Chavez,
1982-NMSC-108, ¶ 10,
98 N.M.
682,
652 P.2d 232 (“The trial court has broad discretion in granting or denying
a motion for new trial, and such an order will not be reversed absent clear and
manifest abuse of that discretion.”);
State v. Marquez,
1998-NMCA-010, ¶
13,
124 N.M. 409,
951 P.2d 1070 (“An abuse of discretion will be found only
when the [district] court’s decision is clearly untenable or contrary to logic
and reason.”).
District Court’s Failure to
Review Trial Transcript
{8} In its docketing
statement, the State claimed that the district court erred by not reviewing the
record from the second trial prior to ruling on Defendant’s motion for
reconsideration. [DS 11] In our notice of proposed disposition, we stated that,
“given the nature of the legal issues raised in the motion for reconsideration,
it [was] unclear how a review of the record from the second trial would have
lead to a different result.” [CN 7] Therefore, we proposed to affirm.
{9} In its memorandum
in opposition, the State relies on case law addressing motions for a new trial
based on factual considerations. [MIO 12-13] However, the issue before the
district court pertained to the jury instructions, and the State has not
demonstrated how the district court’s failure to review the transcript before
ruling on this legal issue amounted to reversible error.
See Hennessy,
1998-NMCA-036, ¶ 24;
Aragon,
1999-NMCA-060, ¶ 10.
{10} Accordingly, for the
reasons stated in our notice of proposed disposition and herein, we affirm.
LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge