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STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MARIA LOURDES MARQUEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW MEXICO
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DOÑA ANA COUNTY, Darren
M. Kugler, District Judge
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General,
Santa Fe, NM, Jacqueline R. Medina, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque,
NM, for Appellee
Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender,
David Henderson, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, Sergio Viscoli,
Appellate Defender, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant
RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge. WE CONCUR:
MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge, J. MILES HANISEE, Judge
AUTHOR: RODERICK T. KENNEDY
{1} Maria
Marquez, Defendant in this case, brings this appeal to contest the district
court’s denial of her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Defendant contends
that her plea was not given willingly, knowingly, or intelligently. Further,
Defendant asserts that her counsel was ineffective because he did not
adequately advise her regarding her case or the potential amount of
incarceration to which she was subjecting herself by signing the plea
agreement.
{2} The record
in this case reveals that the district court complied with Rules 5-303 and
5-304 NMRA when accepting Defendant’s guilty plea, and Defendant does not point
to any essential information that the district court omitted. Regarding her
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Defendant does not present any
evidence to corroborate her own self-serving testimony to support her assertion
that she would not have pleaded guilty had defense counsel not provided
ineffective assistance. As such, she has failed to satisfy her burden of
proving prejudice. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea.
{3} On January
23, 2013, Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a controlled
substance and one count of tampering with evidence. The district court orally
sentenced Defendant, and she immediately made an oral motion to withdraw her
plea. The district court denied the oral motion, but allowed counsel to file a
written motion at a later date. Defendant got new counsel who then filed a
written motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
The district court held a hearing on the motion to withdraw,
during which Defendant testified as the only witness. The district court
again denied Defendant’s motion and issued an order reflecting that denial.
Defendant appeals the district court’s order denying her motion to withdraw her
plea.
A. Change of Plea Hearing
1. Terms of the Plea Agreement
{4} According to
the plea agreement, the basic sentence for count one was an eighteen-month
sentence to be followed by one year of parole with a habitual offender
enhancement of one year. The plea agreement also stated that the basic sentence
for count two was eighteen months, to be followed by one year of parole.
The
State agreed not to bring additional habitual offender proceedings during the
initial sentencing in exchange for Defendant’s plea. The plea agreement also
stated that there was no agreement as to sentencing.
2. Plea Colloquy and Sentencing Recommendations
{5} Prior to
Defendant entering her guilty plea, the district court questioned Defendant as
to whether she had the opportunity to consult defense counsel regarding the
plea agreement. Defendant answered in the affirmative. The district court
emphasized that the plea agreement contained no agreement as to sentencing, and
explained to Defendant that although the State agreed not to oppose running
counts one and two concurrently, it was ultimately up to the court to decide
Defendant’s sentence. Defendant stated that she understood. In response to the
court’s questioning, Defendant acknowledged that she understood that she was
subjecting herself to a minimum mandatory sentence of one year, regardless of
what sentence the district court imposed. The district court reviewed each
count and the maximum sentence associated with each count with Defendant, and
Defendant indicated that she understood the charges and associated penalties.
The district court explained to Defendant that she was giving up her right to a
jury trial and the rights associated therewith. In response to the district
court’s further questioning, Defendant confirmed that she was entering her plea
voluntarily. The district court found that Defendant understood the charges as
set forth in the indictment and the maximum possible sentence for the offenses
charged. The district court accepted Defendant’s guilty plea as to counts one
and two, finding Defendant’s plea to be knowingly and voluntarily given.
{6} Despite the
absence of agreement as to sentence in the plea agreement, the State
recommended to the court that Defendant serve the one year and thirty-day
balance remaining for a prior conviction
1
concurrently with a two year sentence for counts one and two in the present
case. The State also asked that counts one and two run consecutively, and that
all but two years of the sentence be suspended. Defense counsel requested the
same.
3. District Court’s Sentence
{7} Contrary to
the parties’ recommended sentence, the district court orally sentenced
Defendant to seven years and thirty days’ incarceration. This, according to the
court, reflected the one year and thirty-day balance of the sentence in the
previous case, plus eighteen months with a one-year habitual offender
enhancement for count one, and eighteen months with a one-year habitual
offender enhancement for count two—all counts and enhancements to run
consecutively.
{8} Defendant,
through defense counsel, immediately made an oral request to withdraw the plea,
acknowledging the district court’s discretion in sentencing but stating that both
counsel and Defendant believed the court would impose a two-year sentence
pursuant to the recommendations of the parties. The district court denied
Defendant’s request, but invited defense counsel to file a written motion to
withdraw or a motion for reconsideration. The written judgment that the
district court issued listed the eighteen months plus one-year enhancement to
be followed by one year on parole for count one and the eighteen months plus
one year enhancement to be followed by one year on parole for count two. Counts
one and two were to run consecutively resulting in a total term of five years
in custody and one year on parole. The district court then required that counts
one and two be served consecutively to the sentence in the previous case.
{9} Defendant
obtained new counsel who then filed a written motion to withdraw Defendant’s
plea. The written motion presented the same arguments that Defendant now makes
on appeal: Defendant’s plea was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, and
Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel.
B. Hearing on Motion to Withdraw Plea
{10} The district
court held a hearing on Defendant’s motion to withdraw the plea in November
2013. Defendant testified as the only witness in that hearing. During her testimony,
Defendant gave short “yes” or “no” answers to counsel’s leading questions,
testifying that she did not discuss the merits of her case with counsel prior
to pleading guilty and claiming that her prior attorney had insisted she take
the plea regardless of her reluctance to do so. She also testified that because
of defense counsel’s representations, she had believed that she would receive
two years’ incarceration. According to Defendant’s testimony, she did not know
what the plea agreement was when she signed it. She also stated that she did
not really understand some of the questions that the district court asked
during the change of plea hearing.
The State did not call any witnesses,
but stated a desire to call Defendant’s prior attorney as a witness at a later
time if doing so would be helpful to the fact finder.
Defendant’s prior
counsel never testified.
{11} Following
Defendant’s testimony, Defense counsel proffered three arguments to the court.
First, defense counsel argued that Defendant’s plea was not voluntary.
Next,
defense counsel asserted that the plea colloquy did not comply with Rules 5-303
and 5-304. Finally, defense counsel suggested that an agreement existed between
Defendant and the State such that Defendant should have been permitted to
withdraw her plea when the district court did not accept that agreement. In
support of the assertion that an agreement existed that Defendant would receive
a two-year sentence, defense counsel pointed to various portions of the change
of plea hearing transcript, and suggested that if Defendant received incorrect
advice from her attorney that led her to believe she would receive two years’
incarceration and that belief was inducement for Defendant’s plea, Defendant’s
plea could not be voluntary.
{12} The State countered
Defendant’s argument by also pointing to the transcript of the change of plea
hearing and arguing that the two-year sentence was a recommendation or request,
and not a binding agreement. While acknowledging that Defendant’s motion to withdraw
was timely, the State asserted that the criteria for withdrawing a plea were
not met.
{13} The district
court found that, according to the transcript of the change of plea hearing,
Defendant’s plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. With regard to
Defendant’s assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel, the district court
found that Defendant was subject to a possible eleven-year total sentence, that
there was an advantage to Defendant taking the plea, and that Defendant
therefore could not demonstrate prejudice. The district court did acknowledge
that its oral sentence incorrectly applied a habitual offender enhancement to
both counts one and two and that, in the interest of justice, Defendant was to
be resentenced in accordance with the plea agreement.
{14} Following the
hearing on the motion, the district court issued an order denying Defendant’s
motion to withdraw her plea. The district court also issued an amended judgment
that resentenced Defendant to four years of incarceration. The four-year
incarceration represented eighteen months followed by one year of parole
followed by a one-year habitual offender enhancement for count one, and
eighteen months followed by one year of parole for count two. Counts one and
two were to be served consecutively to one another as well as consecutively to
the remaining incarceration period for a previous case. Defendant appealed the
district court’s order denying her motion to withdraw her guilty plea.
{15} A motion to
withdraw a guilty plea is a matter within “the sound discretion of the trial
court” and we review the denial of such motion for abuse of discretion.
State
v. Hunter,
2006-NMSC-043, ¶ 11,
140 N.M. 406,
143 P.3d 168 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). A court abuses its discretion when it
acts unfairly, arbitrarily, or commits manifest error.
State v. Garcia,
1996-NMSC-013, ¶ 7,
121 N.M. 544,
915 P.2d 300. “A denial of a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea constitutes manifest error when the undisputed facts
establish that the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily given.”
Id.
{16} Withdrawal of
a plea after sentencing has occurred is permitted when necessary to correct a
manifest injustice. Rule 5-304 comm. cmt.;
Hunter,
2006-NMSC-043,
¶ 11
. “Withdrawal may be necessary to correct a manifest injustice
when the defendant proves, for example, that . . . [she] was denied the
effective assistance of counsel. . . [or] the plea was involuntary, or was
entered without knowledge of the charge or knowledge that the sentence actually
imposed could be imposed[.]” Rule 5-304 comm. cmt.;
see also State v.
Lucero,
1981-NMCA-143, ¶ 21,
97 N.M. 346,
639 P.2d 1200 (acknowledging that
if the defendant did not make voluntary or intelligent plea, because of his
counsel’s ineffective assistance, his guilty plea should be set aside). A
defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea has the burden of demonstrating
that the court’s failure to conduct an adequate plea colloquy prejudiced his or
her ability to knowingly and voluntarily enter the plea.
State v. Moore,
2004-NMCA-035, ¶ 14,
135 N.M. 210,
86 P.3d 635.
{17} It is
undisputed that the State in this case satisfied any agreement reached with
defense counsel to make a sentence recommendation of two years. The question,
therefore, is whether the district court, after rejecting the parties’
sentencing recommendation, was obligated to allow Defendant to withdraw her
plea.
See State v. Pieri,
2009-NMSC-019, ¶ 33,
146 N.M. 155,
207 P.3d
1132 (“[I]f a court rejects a sentencing recommendation . . ., the court need
not afford the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea,
as long as the
defendant as been made aware that such recommendations and requests are not
binding on the court.” (Emphasis added.)).
{18} Defendant
presents two arguments to support her assertion that the district court abused
its discretion in denying her motion to withdraw her plea. First, Defendant
asserts that her plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily given.
Second, Defendant asserts defense counsel was ineffective and her plea was
therefore not voluntary. We address each argument in turn.
A. Defendant’s Plea Was Given Knowingly,
Voluntarily, and Intelligently
{19} According to
Rule 5-303(F), a district court cannot accept a guilty plea without having
first informed the defendant, in open court, of the nature of the charges, the
mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum possible penalty, the right to plead not
guilty, and the effect of pleading guilty, including loss of right to trial and
implications on immigration status.
See Rule 5-304(B);
see also Marquez
v. Hatch,
2009-NMSC-040, ¶ 8,
146 N.M. 556,
212 P.3d 1110 (acknowledging
that the district court has a duty to inform the defendant of the direct
consequences of a plea, such as “those that have a definite, immediate and
largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant’s punishment” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). The district court must also determine
whether the defendant’s plea is given voluntarily by inquiring as to whether
the plea is the result of force, threats, promises other than the plea
agreement, or other discussions. Rule 5-303(G). In accepting a plea, the
district court is not required to adopt a recommended sentence. If the district
court accepts a plea agreement that was not made in exchange for a guaranteed,
specific sentence, the court must inform the defendant “that such
recommendations and requests are not binding on the court.” Rule 5-304(B).
Failure to accurately inform a defendant of his sentencing exposure may render
a plea involuntary.
See Marquez,
2009-NMSC-040, ¶ 6;
Moore,
2004-NMCA-035, ¶ 16 (acknowledging that a failure to advise the defendant of
potential penalties “renders the plea unknowing and involuntary” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).
{20} The district
court satisfied the requirements of Rules 5-303 and 5-304 in this case. Prior
to entering her plea and in response to the district court’s inquiries,
Defendant confirmed that she understood that she was subject to a mandatory
one-year minimum sentence. The district court emphasized that it was not bound
by the State’s recommendation, and Defendant acknowledged that she understood
that. It also questioned whether Defendant understood each charge in the plea
agreement, the maximum penalty for each charge, and the potential habitual
offender enhancement for each charge.
See Marquez,
2009-NMSC-040, ¶ 12
(acknowledging that when the plea will result in immediate sentence enhancement
because of prior convictions, the district court must advise the defendant of
such likelihood before accepting the plea). The district court then informed
Defendant of the rights that she was forfeiting by pleading guilty; it also
informed her that she had a right not to plead guilty. Defendant confirmed that
she had an opportunity to discuss her case with defense counsel and had not
been threatened, forced, or coerced to plead guilty, nor had she been promised
anything in exchange for her plea.
{21} Although “it
is incumbent on the court to clarify the understanding of a defendant
who
demonstrates misunderstanding regarding the charges and sentencing set
forth in a plea agreement[,]”
State v. Ramirez,
2011-NMSC-025, ¶ 19,
149
N.M. 698,
254 P.3d 649 (emphasis added), Defendant has made no such
demonstration so as to require clarification. During the change of plea
hearing, Defendant never demonstrated or even hinted at a misunderstanding of
the plea agreement.
{22} Defendant
testified during the hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea that when she
signed the plea, she did not know why she was in court, what the charges
against her were, or what the plea agreement said. Notably, however, she did
not assert that she did not understand that the district court’s questions to
her regarding its sentencing discretion. Instead, her testimony focused on her
belief, based on defense counsel’s representations, that she would definitely
receive a two-year sentence. We also note that although Defendant testified to
her understanding of what an enhancement was presumably in order to demonstrate
a misunderstanding of that term, her definition of an enhancement was accurate
for her own case. She described her understanding of an enhancement as an
additional year of incarceration for having gone to prison before. Under the
terms of the plea agreement, Defendant was subject to just that: a one-year
enhancement to an eighteen month sentence for count one. Such an understanding
was sufficient. Rather than require defendants to have a comprehensive
technical understanding of all relevant legal terms, we require that a
defendant understand the direct sentencing consequences of the plea.
Marquez,
2009-NMSC-040, ¶ 12 (requiring that the district court ensure a defendant
understands direct sentencing consequences for plea to be voluntary, knowing,
and intelligent).
{23} “[A]bsent a
showing of prejudice to the defendant’s right to understand [her] guilty plea
and its consequences, substantial compliance with Rule 5-303[(F)] is sufficient.”
State v. Garcia,
1996-NMSC-013, ¶ 12,
121 N.M. 544,
915 P.2d 300.
Defendant neither points to any necessary information that the court failed to
mention during its plea colloquy, nor suggests how the district court should
have elicited more convincing evidence of knowledge, intelligence, and
voluntariness. Instead, Defendant’s argument is limited to cursory assertions
that the court failed to adequately ascertain whether Defendant, with a
seventh-grade education, understood the court’s remarks. Defendant has
therefore failed to meet her burden to show that the district court’s plea
colloquy was inadequate to demonstrate her ability to knowingly and voluntarily
enter the plea.
{24} Additionally,
we note that the only evidence that supports Defendant’s assertion that her
plea was not knowingly or voluntarily given was Defendant’s self-serving
testimony regarding her understanding of the plea agreement. It appears from
the record that the district court concluded that Defendant’s self-serving
testimony, claiming that she did not understand her plea, was not credible. We
defer to the district court on matters of witness credibility.
State v.
Salas,
1999-NMCA-099, ¶ 13,
127 N.M. 686,
986 P.2d 482. Given that it is
for the district court to weigh evidence and assess credibility, we cannot
conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying Defendant’s
motion to withdraw her plea.
{25} We dealt with
a similar case in
State v. Ramos, in which both defense counsel and the
prosecution requested a deferred sentence as a part of a plea bargain.
1973-NMCA-103, ¶ 4,
85 N.M. 438,
512 P.2d 1274. The district court did not
follow the recommendation; it gave the defendant a higher sentence than the
parties requested.
Id. ¶ 5. The defendant moved to withdraw his guilty
plea immediately after hearing the sentence “because there had been plea
bargaining and because of the assumption that the trial court would follow the
recommendations for a deferred sentence.”
Id. ¶ 6. This Court held
that it is not “fundamentally unfair to hold [a] defendant to his guilty plea
when the only basis asserted for withdrawal of the plea is that the [district]
court refused to follow the sentencing recommendation of the district attorney[.]”
Id. ¶ 10. Although Defendant in this case based her written motion to
withdraw her guilty plea on a more legally sound basis than surprise and
dissatisfaction, the record indicates that this is little more than “a case of
[D]efendant being fully aware of [her] rights and the consequences of [her]
acts and not getting the desired result.”
Id. ¶ 14 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). We therefore conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw her plea.
See
Pieri,
2009-NMSC-019, ¶ 25 (acknowledging that where the defendant “has
bargained for a sentence recommendation and the prosecution in fact made the
recommendation, [the defendant has] received what was bargained for. Therefore,
the plea agreement was voluntarily made and the opportunity to withdraw it is
no longer required.”).
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
{26} “If, by
reason of ineffective assistance of counsel [Defendant] did not make a
voluntary or intelligent plea, [her] guilty plea should be set aside.”
State
v. Lucero,
1981-NMCA-143, ¶ 21,
97 N.M. 346,
639 P.2d 1200. An otherwise
valid plea can be undermined by ineffective assistance from counsel.
State
v. Tejeiro,
2015-NMCA-029, ¶ 5,
345 P.3d 1074. In fact, when a defendant
enters a plea based on the advice of his attorney, “the voluntariness and
intelligence of the defendant’s plea generally depends on whether the attorney
rendered ineffective assistance in counseling the plea.”
Id. (emphasis,
internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). We apply a de novo standard of
review to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, which are mixed
questions of law and fact.
State v. Barnett,
1998-NMCA-105, ¶ 13,
125
N.M. 739,
965 P.2d 323.
{27} We assess
ineffective assistance of counsel claims using the two-part standard delineated
in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under
Strickland,
a defendant must show that “defense counsel’s performance fell below the
standard of a reasonably competent attorney and, due to the deficient
performance, the defense was prejudiced.”
Patterson v. LeMaster,
2001-NMSC-013, ¶ 17,
130 N.M. 179,
21 P.3d 1032 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Counsel’s performance is deficient where it falls below an
objective standard of reasonableness.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. “We
afford a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance[.]”
Garcia v. State,
2010-NMSC-023, ¶ 30,
148 N.M. 414,
237 P.3d 716 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). According to the transcript of the plea hearing, both
defense counsel and Defendant were aware of the district court’s sentencing
discretion. During her testimony at the motion to withdraw hearing, however,
Defendant made a general assertion that defense counsel did not explain the
plea to her and did not discuss the merits of taking her case to trial. In her
brief, Defendant makes the assertion that defense counsel failed to adequately
advise her regarding her plea.
{28} Had we
decided that defense counsel was ineffective, Defendant’s assertion of
ineffective assistance would still fail because she cannot demonstrate that
counsel’s performance was prejudicial to her defense.
See State v. Allen,
2014-NMCA-047, ¶ 19,
323 P.3d 925 (stating that even if the defendant were
able to demonstrate that trial counsel’s performance was deficient, the
defendant’s failure to demonstrate prejudice was fatal to the defendant’s
ineffective assistance argument),
cert. denied, 2014-NMCERT-002, 322
P.3d 1062. The prejudice prong of the
Strickland test, when applied to a
defendant whose conviction rests on a plea, requires a defendant to establish
that “but for counsel’s error, he would not have pleaded guilty and instead
gone to trial.”
Patterson,
2001-NMSC-013, ¶ 18 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Thus, we must determine whether there exists a “
‘reasonable probability’ that [D]efendant would have gone to trial instead of
pleading guilty . . . had counsel not acted unreasonably.”
Id. (citation
omitted). “A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
{29} “[C]ourts are
reluctant to rely solely on the self-serving statements of defendants, which
are often made after they have been convicted and sentenced[.]”
Id. ¶
29. As such, “a defendant is generally required to adduce additional evidence
to prove that there is a reasonable probability that he or she would have gone
to trial.”
Id.;
Tejeiro,
2015-NMCA-029, ¶ 15 (stating that
generally, a claim of prejudice from ineffective assistance “cannot rest solely
on uncorroborated self-serving statements”). During her testimony, Defendant
asserted that on the day she entered the plea, she did not know why she was in
court, and that defense counsel pressured her to take the plea by representing
to her that she would receive a two-year sentence. Defendant testified that she
did not want to take the plea and that she informed defense counsel that she
did not want to take the plea. According to Defendant, defense counsel spoke
with her boyfriend and that as a result of that conversation, her boyfriend
advised her to take the plea because she would receive a shorter sentence if
she did.
{30} Based on
Defendant’s testimony, corroborating evidence existed to prove that, absent
defense counsel’s representations, she would not have taken the plea. The
corroborating evidence that could have supported Defendant’s assertion of
prejudice includes testimony from her boyfriend, she asserted spoke with
defense counsel and advised her to take the plea. Defendant’s testimony also
could have been corroborated by her former counsel. Defendant did not proffer
any corroborating evidence from either of these individuals who, according to
Defendant’s testimony, had knowledge of her disinclination to plead guilty and
of defense counsel’s advice regarding the plea.
{31} Defendant
points to her surprised reaction upon learning of the sentence imposed by the
district court as corroborating evidence of the fact that she was not aware the
district court could sentence her to more than two years.
See Tejeiro,
2015-NMCA-029, ¶ 15 (acknowledging that a defendant’s behavior after the plea
may corroborate his self-serving statements). Defendant’s surprise at receiving
a higher sentence than expected does not corroborate her assertion that she did
not knowingly enter into her plea agreement. Even a defendant who fully understands
that a court has sentencing discretion can be surprised by a higher sentence
than he or she was expecting. The evidence that Defendant points to is not
sufficient to undermine our confidence in the validity of her guilty plea. This
is particularly true in light of the completeness of the plea colloquy in which
the district court engaged Defendant. As a result, Defendant has failed to
demonstrate prejudice under
Strickland.
{32} It comes to
our attention, however, that the district court applied the incorrect standard
for determining whether Defendant was prejudiced by defense counsel’s actions.
Rather than determining whether Defendant would have declined the plea and gone
to trial, as it should have, the district court instead looked to the benefit
Defendant received by getting a sentence shorter than the eleven-year sentence
allowed by law to determine that Defendant could not demonstrate prejudice.
While we acknowledge that the district court applied the incorrect standard for
prejudice in ineffective assistance of counsel claims, its result—that
Defendant did not demonstrate prejudice—was correct. As such, “[u]nder the
‘right for any reason’ doctrine, we may affirm the district court’s order on
grounds not relied upon by the district court if those grounds do not require
us to look beyond the factual allegations that were raised and considered
below.”
State v. Vargas,
2008-NMSC-019, ¶ 8,
143 N.M. 692,
181 P.3d 684
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, Defendant is in no
way prejudiced by our application of this doctrine, because all parties had the
opportunity to argue the correct application of the prejudice prong of
ineffective assistance during the district court proceedings.
See State v.
Gallegos,
2007-NMSC-007, ¶ 26,
141 N.M. 185,
152 P.3d 828 (stating that the
appellate court does not affirm the district court under the right for any
reason doctrine if it would result in unfairness to the appellant).
{33} The record in
this case reflects that Defendant entered a knowing and voluntary guilty plea.
Further, there is an absence of any evidence corroborating Defendant’s
self-serving assertion of prejudice resulting from ineffective assistance of
counsel. As such, Defendant has failed to meet her burden of proving that the
district court abused its discretion in denying her motion to withdraw her
guilty plea. We affirm the district court.
RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge
MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge