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STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ARTURO CONTRERAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW MEXICO
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LUNA COUNTY, Daniel
Viramontes, District Judge
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General,
Santa Fe, NM. for Appellee
Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender,
Kathleen T. Baldrige, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant
TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge. WE CONCUR: JAMES
J. WECHSLER, Judge, CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge
AUTHOR: TIMOTHY L. GARCIA
{1} Defendant appeals
his conviction for possession of methamphetamine. We issued a calendar notice
proposing to affirm. Defendant has responded with a timely memorandum in
opposition. We affirm.
{2} Defendant continues
to challenge the validity of the arrest warrant on the ground that it did not
establish the veracity and basis of knowledge of the confidential informant.
See
Rule
5-211(E) NMRA. We hold that both knowledge and veracity were established
by the successful controlled buys that were executed, and the independent
observations of the officer that corroborated the CI'(s) statements.
Specifically, the affidavit [RP 22-24] provides that the information supplied
by the CI was based on first-hand experience, gained by virtue of a direct
interaction with Defendant.
See generally State v. Lujan,
1998-NMCA-032,
¶ 12,
124 N.M. 494,
953 P.2d 29 (observing that when “first-hand knowledge
naturally and logically flows from a common-sense reading of the affidavit,
that will suffice”). The CI conducted two controlled buys involving Defendant.
[RP 23-24] This is sufficient to satisfy the basis of knowledge requirement.
See,
e.g., State v. Whitley,
1999-NMCA-155, ¶ 4,
128 N.M. 403,
993 P.2d 117
(holding that the basis of knowledge requirement was met where, among other
considerations, the informant personally observed the defendant);
Lujan,
1998-NMCA-032, ¶¶ 9, 12 (holding that a controlled buy supplied firsthand
knowledge);
State v. Montoya,
1992-NMCA-067, ¶ 14,
114 N.M. 221,
836 P.2d
667 (holding that the basis of knowledge requirement was satisfied where a
confidential informant had personal knowledge, through observation, of the
defendant’s activities).
{3} With respect to
credibility, the controlled buy supplies strong support for the CI’s
credibility.
See generally Lujan,
1998-NMCA-032, ¶ 10 (observing that a
controlled buy bears upon the credibility of a confidential informant, insofar
as it “reduces the uncertainty and risk of falsehood about the information
provided by [an] informant”);
State v. Steinzig,
1999-NMCA-107, ¶¶
23–24,
127 N.M. 752,
987 P.2d 409 (relying on the fact that police officers
through investigation and observation independently corroborated various
aspects of the information given by the informants as one factor in concluding
that the issuing judge could reasonably find that the veracity of the
informants had been properly established by the search warrant). As such, we
conclude that the district court properly ruled that the afffidavit satisfied
both the veracity and knowledge requirements.
{4} Defendant continues
to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. [MIO 8]
A sufficiency of the evidence review involves a two-step process. Initially,
the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Then the
appellate court must make a legal determination of “whether the evidence viewed
in this manner could justify a finding by any rational trier of fact that each
element of the crime charged has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
State v. Apodaca,
1994-NMSC-121, ¶ 6,
118 N.M. 762,
887 P.2d 756.
{5} In this case, there
was testimony that a confidential informant was searched prior to the
controlled buys involving Defendant, after which the informant came back with
methamphetamine that had been in Defendant’s possession. [MIO 2; RP 23-24] We
hold that this was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction. The jury was
free to reject Defendant’s version of events, including his claim [MIO 11] that
the CI might have fabricated the controlled buys.
See State v.
Sutphin,
1988-NMSC-031, ¶ 21,
107 N.M. 126,
753 P.2d 1314 (noting that the
factfinder is free to reject a defendant’s version of events).
{6} The final issue
involved an argument that trials counsel was ineffective based upon a failure
to perfect the appeal of Defendant’s conviction. Defendant agrees that this
issue now is moot as his appeal was ultimately perfected.
See State v.
Sergio B.,
2002-NMCA-070, ¶ 9,
132 N.M. 375,
48 P.3d 764 (“An appeal is
moot when no actual controversy exists, and an appellate ruling will not grant
the appellant any actual relief.”).
{7} For the reasons set
forth above, we affirm.