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STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
NELSON COLEMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW MEXICO
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY, Karen
Townsend, District Judge
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General,
Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee
Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender,
Nina Lalevic, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant
M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge. WE CONCUR:
MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Chief Judge, TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge
{1} Defendant Nelson
Coleman appeals from the district court’s judgment, entered following a de novo
bench trial, finding him guilty of various traffic-related offenses, including
DWI (impaired to the slightest degree). [RP 106] Unpersuaded by Defendant’s
docketing statement, we issued a notice of proposed summary disposition
proposing to affirm. Defendant has filed a memorandum in opposition to our
notice. We remain unpersuaded and therefore affirm.
{2} Defendant presents
two issues in this appeal. First, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
to support his conviction. [DS 7; MIO 5-6] With respect to that issue, in our
notice, we recounted the evidence presented at trial, and proposed to conclude
that there was sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence to support the
conclusion that Defendant drove while intoxicated. We also explained why we
believed that
State v. Cotton,
2011-NMCA-096, ¶¶ 14-15, 150, N.M. 583,
263 P.3d 925, which Defendant relied on, was distinguishable from the present
case and why it supported our proposed conclusion that there was sufficient
evidence to support Defendant’s conviction.
{3} In response,
Defendant does not explain why our proposed disposition is incorrect. Rather,
he continues to assert that there was insufficient evidence to support his
conviction because according to him, there was no evidence that (1) the
accident was due to his intoxication, (2) he became intoxicated prior to the
accident, or (3) Defendant himself smelled of alcohol. [MIO 6] We are not
persuaded by Defendant’s arguments. These assertions were fully addressed by
this Court’s proposed disposition and Defendant has not presented any authority
or argument that convinces this Court that our proposed disposition was incorrect.
See State v. Ibarra,
1993-NMCA-040, ¶ 11,
116 N.M. 486,
864 P.2d 302 (“A
party opposing summary disposition is required to come forward and specifically
point out errors in fact and/or law.”). Further, we note that even if Defendant
is correct that there was no evidence presented that he smelled of alcohol, the
remaining direct and circumstantial evidence, as set forth in our proposed
disposition, is still sufficient to support his conviction. Accordingly, we
reject Defendant’s sufficiency challenge for the reasons set forth above and in
our proposed disposition.
{4} With respect to
Defendant’s second issue,
i.e., that the district court erred in
allowing certain testimony by the Archers relating to a post-incident
conversation they had with Defendant, we likewise perceive no error. Our
proposed disposition explained that Defendant gave inadequate factual
information and that Defendant failed to indicate whether the issue had been
preserved. In his three-sentence response, Defendant provided the same information
that had already been presented in the docketing statement. [DS 4, 7, 8 ; MIO
7] Accordingly, Defendant has failed to convince this Court that the district
court erred and we decline to address this issue any further.
See State v.
Aragon,
1999-NMCA-060, ¶ 10,
127 N.M. 393,
981 P.2d 1211 (stating that
there is a presumption of correctness in the rulings or decisions of the trial
court, and the party claiming error bears the burden of showing such error);
State
v. Mondragon,
1988-NMCA-027, ¶ 10,
107 N.M. 421,
759 P.2d 1003
(stating that “[a] party responding to a summary calendar notice must come
forward and specifically point out errors of law and fact,” and the repetition
of earlier arguments does not fulfill this requirement),
superseded by statute
on other grounds as stated in State v. Harris,
2013-NMCA-031, ¶ 3,
297
P.3d 374.
{5} Based on the
foregoing, we affirm.
MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Chief Judge