RODGER LORD, INC. V. ARCHULETA REAL ESTATE
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RODGER LORD INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ARCHULETA REAL ESTATE
SOLUTIONS, INC., and ALL
UNKNOWN PERSONS CLAIMING
ANY LIEN INTEREST, OR TITLE
ADVERSE TO PLAINTIFF,
Defendants,
and
ALFONSO ARCHULETA,
Interested Party-Appellant.
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW MEXICO
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DONA ANA COUNTY, James
T. Martin, District Judge
Holt Mynatt Martinez, PC, Blaine T.
Mynatt, Las Cruces, NM, for Appellee
Alfonso Archuleta, Las Cruces, NM, Pro se
Appellant.
TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge. WE CONCUR: LINDA
M. VANZI, Chief Judge, MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge
AUTHOR: TIMOTHY L. GARCIA
{1} Self-represented
Interested Party Alfonso Archuleta (Archuleta) appeals from the district
court’s order quieting title and granting summary judgment in favor of
Plaintiff Roger Lord, Inc. In this Court’s notice of proposed disposition, we
proposed to summarily affirm. Archuleta filed a Memorandum Against Proposed
Summary Disposition (MIO), which we have duly considered. Remaining
unpersuaded, we affirm the district court’s order quieting title and granting
summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff.
{2} In his MIO,
Archuleta continues to argue that there are disputed material facts warranting
a jury trial, identifying various purported facts and issues, and continuing to
raise contract and equitable arguments that are not relevant to the quiet title
action brought by Plaintiff. [
See unpaginated MIO 6] However, Archuleta
fails to actually dispute the material facts as set forth by this Court in our
notice of proposed disposition [
see CN 3–4]—instead focusing on facts
and other arguments not relevant to the quiet title action. [
See generally unpaginated
MIO 1–6]
{3} We therefore
conclude that Archuleta has failed to meet his burden on appeal.
See
Hennessy v. Duryea,
1998-NMCA-036, ¶ 24,
124 N.M. 754,
955 P.2d 683
(“[The appellate] courts have repeatedly held that, in summary calendar cases,
the burden is on the party opposing the proposed disposition to clearly point
out errors in fact or law.”);
State v. Mondragon,
1988-NMCA-027, ¶ 10,
107 N.M. 421,
759 P.2d 1003 (stating that “[a] party responding to a summary
calendar notice must come forward and specifically point out errors of law and
fact[,]” and the repetition of earlier arguments does not fulfill this
requirement),
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v.
Harris,
2013-NMCA-031, ¶ 3,
297 P.3d 374. Although pleadings from
self-represented litigants are viewed with tolerance, “a [self-represented]
litigant, having chosen to represent himself, is held to the same standard of
conduct and compliance with court rules, procedures, and orders as are members
of the bar.”
Newsome v. Farer,
1985-NMSC-096, ¶ 18,
103 N.M. 415,
708
P.2d 327 (internal citation omitted);
Bruce v. Lester,
1999-NMCA-051, ¶
4,
127 N.M. 301,
980 P.2d 84 (indicating that self-represented litigants must
comply with the rules and orders of the court and will not be treated
differently than litigants with counsel).
{4} With regard to
Archuleta’s continued argument that he was entitled to a jury trial, we note
that Archuleta cites to various cases that discuss a party’s right to a jury
trial when cases raise both equitable and legal issues, when the parties agree
to a jury trial and the district court has ordered one, and when a criminal
defendant is charged with a crime. [
See unpaginated MIO 1–2] However,
Archuleta fails to explain why he is entitled to a jury trial in a civil case
when a motion for summary judgment has been filed, when there are no disputes
of material fact, and when the issue can be resolved as a matter of law.
See
State v. Muraida,
2014-NMCA-060, ¶ 12,
326 P.3d 1113 (“Questions of
fact . . . are the unique purview of the jury and, as such, should be
decided by the jury alone.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted));
Farmington
Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Farmington,
2006-NMCA-077, ¶ 23 ,
139
N.M. 750,
137 P.3d 1204 (indicating that, when there are no questions of fact
for the fact-finder to resolve, it is proper for the district court to
determine the question of law); Rule
1-056(C) NMRA (stating that a judgment
from the district court is proper when “there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of
law”);
see also Corona v. Corona,
2014-NMCA-071, ¶ 28,
329 P.3d 701 (“This Court has no duty to review an argument that is not
adequately developed.”). We are aware of no law that requires a jury trial in
such a case and, as Archuleta has provided us with no authority supporting such
a proposition, we assume none exists.
See Curry v. Great Nw. Ins. Co.,
2014-NMCA-031, ¶ 28,
320 P.3d 482 (“Where a party cites no authority to
support an argument, we may assume no such authority exists.”).
{5} As Archuleta has
not shown error in the district court’s conclusion that summary judgment should
be granted in favor of Plaintiff and that title should be quieted in favor of
Plaintiff [
see RP 108;
see also RP 1–4 (complaint to quiet
title)], we conclude that the district court did not err in so concluding.
See
Firstenberg v. Monribot,
2015-NMCA-062, ¶ 57,
350 P.3d 1205 (stating
that “the burden is on the appellant to clearly demonstrate the district
court’s error” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted));
Bank of New
York Mellon v. Lopes,
2014-NMCA-097, ¶ 6,
336 P.3d 443 (“Summary
judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)). Accordingly, for the reasons stated in our notice
of proposed disposition and herein, we affirm.
LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge