QUICKEN LOANS INC. V. SHAW
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QUICKEN LOANS INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
GLENDA D. SHAW, JEFF N. SHAW,
THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT
OF TAXATION AND REVENUE, THE UNKNOWN
SPOUSE OF GLENDA D. SHAW,
IF ANY, AND THE UNKNOWN SPOUSE
OF JEFF N. SHAW, IF ANY,
Defendants-Appellants.
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW MEXICO
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LINCOLN COUNTY, Daniel
A. Bryant, District Judge
Weinstein & Riley, P.S., Jason
Bousliman, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee
Glenda D. Shaw, Jeff N. Shaw, Ruidoso,
NM, Pro Se Appellants
Julia A. Belles, Santa Fe, NM, for
Appellant N.M. Taxation & Revenue Department
MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge. WE CONCUR: LINDA
M. VANZI, Chief Judge, STEPHEN G. FRENCH, Judge
{1} Pro se Defendant Glenda
D. Shaw appeals from the district court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to
set aside the foreclosure judgment and sale, pursuant to Rule
1-060(B)(6) NMRA
[RP 277-78]. Defendant has filed a memorandum in opposition (MIO). After due
consideration, we are unpersuaded and therefore affirm.
{2} We will avoid
repetition here of pertinent background, analytical principles, and analysis
set forth in our calendar notice. In our calendar notice, we explained two
reasons that Defendant’s standing challenge seemed unpersuasive: her attempt to
void the final foreclosure judgment through a challenge grounded in Rule
1-060(B) is contrary to
Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Johnston,
2016-NMSC-013, ¶ 34,
369 P.3d 1046 (holding that completed foreclosure judgments
are not voidable pursuant to Rule 1-060(B) for lack of standing), [CN 3] and,
additionally, the record seemed to demonstrate that Plaintiff met the standing
requirements of our Uniform Commercial Code as articulated in our case law [CN
3-4]. Defendant has not addressed our analyses of these reasons to affirm the
judgment of the district court. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
district court denying Defendant’s motion to set aside the foreclosure judgment
and sale pursuant to Rule
1-060(B)(6) NMRA [RP 277-78].
See Hennessy
v. Duryea,
1998-NMCA-036, ¶ 24,
124 N.M. 754,
955 P.2d 683 (“Our
courts have repeatedly held that, in summary calendar cases, the burden is on
the party opposing the proposed disposition to clearly point out errors in fact
or law.”).
LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge