MABRY CONSTRUCTION, INC. V. LAS CAMPANAS LIMITED P'SHIP
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MABRY CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
FFT LLC, PLACITA DE LA
TIERRA, LLC f/k/a TOWN
CENTER AT LAS CAMPANAS LLC,
and OSO 3 INVESTMENTS LLC,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants-Appellants,
v.
LAS CAMPANAS LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, LAS CAMPANAS
CORPORATION, STEPHEN
MAROTTA and RICHARD
ALTMAN,
Defendants/Counterclaimants,
and
OASIS MANAGEMENT RESOURCES, LLC,
Defendant-Appellee.
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW MEXICO
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY, Sarah
M. Singleton, District Judge
O’Connell Law LLC, Erin B. O’Connell,
Albuquerque, NM, The Zamora Law Firm, LLC, D. Diego Zamora, Santa Fe, NM, for
Appellants
Law & Resource Planning Associates,
P.C., Charles T. DuMars, Tanya L. Scott, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee
MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge. WE CONCUR: JONATHAN
B. SUTIN, Judge, LINDA M. VANZI, Judge
{1} The district court
concluded it does not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant Oasis
Management Resources, LLC (OMR), and filed an order of dismissal. After their
motion to reconsider was denied, Plaintiffs Mabry Construction, Inc.; Placita
de la Tierra, LLC f/k/a Town Center at Las Campanas, LLC; and Oso 3
Investments, LLC (collectively Mabry) appealed. Concluding that the motion to
reconsider was not decided under the applicable rule, we reverse.
{2} The district court
concluded it did not have personal jurisdiction over OMR and filed its order
granting OMR’s motion to dismiss on April 20, 2012. Ten days later, on April
30, 2012, Mabry filed a motion to reconsider supported by newly discovered
evidence, which it argued showed the district court did have personal
jurisdiction over OMR.
{3} Mabry’s motion to
reconsider was denominated as a “Rule 60 Motion,”
and alleged that the
order dismissing OMR was “obtained by fraud and misrepresentations.”
See Rule
1-060(B)(3) NMRA (providing that the district court may relieve a party from a
final judgment or order for “fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party”). At a
hearing on the motion, the district court questioned whether it was limited to
the legal grounds asserted in the motion to reconsider. Specifically, the
district court questioned the parties whether it could consider any of the
other reasons listed under Rule 1-060(B) if it concluded that the new evidence
did not classify as “fraud” under Rule 1-060(B)(3) but, for example, concluded
that the evidence was “newly discovered evidence” under Rule 1-060(B)(2). Not
surprisingly, Mabry contended that the district court could properly consider
any grounds which justified correcting the order, and OMR argued that the court
was limited to considering the motion only under Rule 1-060(B)(3).
{4} The district court
ruled that the new evidence did not amount to fraud under Rule 1-060(B)(3), and
ordered the parties to brief “whether the new information that was attached to
the Rule 1-060(B) motion would qualify as newly discovered evidence [under Rule
1-060(B)(2)] which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to
move for a new trial.” Mabry’s brief argued for a liberal construction of Rule
1-060(B), and contended that the district court was not limited to any specific
ground set forth in Rule 1-060(B) because the district court had authority to
grant relief to ensure justice and fairness. Moreover, Mabry argued, the
evidence was “newly discovered” because it was evidence that was not produced
in response to discovery requests which encompassed the documents.
{5} The district court
ruled that the discovery request was not broad enough to include the new
evidence and therefore, Rule 1-060(B)(2) did not apply, because it was not
newly discovered evidence that OMR should have provided in discovery. Likewise,
the district court rejected any consideration of the evidence under Rule
1-060(B)(6) on grounds that Mabry’s motion was pursuant to 1-060(B)(2) or
(B)(3) and that (B)(6) by its terms, does not include other grounds set forth
in the rule. Rule 1-060(B)(6) (providing that the district court may relieve a
part from a final judgment or order for “any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment”). The district court ultimately denied
Mabry’s motion to reconsider, and Mabry appeals.
{6} We review the
district court’s denial of Mabry’s motion to reconsider for an abuse of
discretion.
See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Guerra,
1978-NMSC-053, ¶ 20,
92
N.M. 47,
582 P.2d 819. However, the scope of a rule “and application of the
rule to the facts involve questions of law which we review de novo.”
Kinder
Morgan CO2 Co. v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep’t,
2009-NMCA-019, ¶ 9,
145 N.M. 579,
203 P.3d 110.
{7} Our discussion
entails a review of Rule
1-059(E) NMRA (2006, amended 2013) and Rule 1-060(B)
(2012, amended 2013). We note that in 2013, technical changes were made to Rule
1-060 and substantive changes were made to Rule 1-059, thus references in this
Opinion to these rules–unless otherwise noted–relate to the version that was in
effect in 2012, when Mabry filed its motion to reconsider.
{8} Although Mabry
filed a “Rule 60B Motion,” the motion was filed ten days after the order
dismissing OMR. Under these circumstances,
Albuquerque Redi-Mix, Inc. v.
Scottsdale Ins. Co.,
2007-NMSC-051, ¶ 10,
142 N.M. 527,
168 P.3d 99
specifically holds “that a motion challenging a judgment, filed within ten days
of the judgment, should be considered a Rule 1-059(E) motion to alter or amend
a judgment. Nomenclature is not controlling.” (Alteration, internal quotation
marks, and citation omitted.)
See also In re Estate of Keeney,
1995-NMCA-102, ¶ 11,
121 N.M. 58,
908 P.2d 751 (treating a motion to reconsider
filed within ten days of an order granting summary judgment as a motion under Rule
1-059(E)). Thus, the timing controls how a court must view a motion to
reconsider such as the motion before us in this case.
{9} Here, it is clear
that the district court was unsure of whether it was restricted to considering
Mabry’s motion to reconsider strictly as a motion under Rule 1-060(B)(3), or
whether it could consider the motion under another rule. In keeping with the
holding of our Supreme Court in
Albuquerque Red-Mix, we conclude that
the district court was required to consider the motion pursuant to Rule
1-059(E). We do not fault the district court for not considering Rule 1-059(E),
because at the time Mabry filed its motion to reconsider, no rule provided for
motions “to reconsider” despite the frequency in which they were filed.
See
Rule 1-059 (2013) comm. cmt. Rule 1-059(E) was amended in 2013 to account for
this anomaly, and the rule now expressly covers motions to reconsider.
See
Rule 1-059(E) (2013) (titled: “Motion to alter, amend, or
reconsider a
final judgment” (emphasis added)).
{10} Whether Rule 1-060
or Rule 1-059(E) applies is significant.
“Although Rule [1-060(B)]
motions require specific grounds, Rule [1-059(E)], which is subject to severe
time limitations, is not so restricted as to the basis for relief. A trial
court has considerable discretion to reconsider summary judgment under Rule
[1-059(E)].”
In re Estate of Keeney,
1995-NMCA-102, ¶ 12 (citation
omitted). Furthermore, as to the new materials presented by Mabry in support of
the motion to reconsider,
In re Estate of Keeney teaches: “There is no
abuse of discretion for the trial court to consider new material as part of a
motion for reconsideration under Rule [1-059] as long as the delay in
presenting the new material is not just for strategic reasons, and its
relevance outweighs any prejudice.”
Id.
{11} In light of the
foregoing, we conclude that the order of the district court denying Mabry’s
motion to reconsider must be reversed and the case remanded to the district
court to decide whether to grant or deny Mabry’s motion to reconsider under
Rule 1-059(E). Accordingly, we do not address the merits of whether the
district court has personal jurisdiction over OMR, as resolution of this
question of necessity depends on the district court’s resolution of the motion
to reconsider.
{12} The order of the
district court denying Mabry’s motion to reconsider is reversed, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.