STATE V. CHAVEZ, 2016-NMCA-016,
365 P.3d 61
Pursuant to 2016-NMSC-037, State v. Chavez, 2016-NMCA-016, is
vacated and shall not be published nor cited as precedent.
STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
PETER CHAVEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW MEXICO
2016-NMCA-016, 365 P.3d 61
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF GRANT COUNTY, H.R.
Quintero, District Judge.
Certiorari Granted, January 19, 2016,
No. S-1-SC-35614. Released for Publication February 16, 2016.
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General,
Santa Fe, NM, Sri Mullis, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for
Appellee.
Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender,
Allison H. Jaramillo, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for
Appellant.
JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge. WE CONCUR:
MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge, CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge.
AUTHOR: JAMES J. WECHSLER.
{1} Defendant Peter
Chavez appeals his convictions for the crimes of aggravated fleeing a law
enforcement officer (aggravated fleeing), contrary to NMSA 1978, §
30-22-1.1
(2003), and resisting, evading, or obstructing an officer, contrary to NMSA
1978, §
30-22-1(B) (1981). Defendant argues that under his interpretation of
the aggravated fleeing statute, § 30-22-1.1, the evidence was insufficient to
prove that he endangered the life of another person. Additionally, Defendant
challenges his conviction for aggravated fleeing on the grounds that the jury
instruction failed to include an essential element of the crime. He further
contends, in the alternative, that his convictions violate the double jeopardy
protection against multiple punishments for the same offense. Because we are
persuaded that a conviction under the aggravated fleeing statute requires a
finding of actual endangerment, and that the direct and circumstantial evidence
at trial was insufficient to support a finding of actual endangerment beyond a
reasonable doubt, we need not address his jury instruction and double jeopardy
challenges. Accordingly, we reverse Defendant’s conviction for aggravated
fleeing.
{2} At approximately
10:00 p.m. on November 6, 2012, Silver City police officer Joseph Arredondo was
patrolling in Grant County when he observed a dirt bike traveling eastbound on
Highway 180 without any lights illuminated. Officer Arredondo caught up with
the dirt bike at an intersection and noticed that the vehicle did not have a
license plate. The officer activated his emergency lights and followed the dirt
bike as it turned into a Wal-Mart parking lot. The driver looked back over his
shoulder at the officer, but instead of pulling over, he accelerated through
the parking lot. Defendant jumped the curb of the Wal-Mart parking lot, drove
onto a dirt path, and entered the parking lot of the Tractor Supply Store.
Officer Arredondo followed the dirt bike in his police cruiser toward the
Tractor Supply Store and activated his emergency siren while pursuing Defendant
through the parking lots. Two cars, one traveling eastbound and one traveling
westbound on Highway 180, were forced to slow down as Defendant and Officer
Arredondo exited the parking lot. No other vehicles were in the area.
{3} As Defendant and
Officer Arredondo traveled along the highway, approximately five cars pulled
over to the side of the highway to avoid the chase. Officer Arredondo testified
that Defendant’s speed on Highway 180 reached approximately sixty-five miles
per hour, which was ten miles over the highway’s posted speed limit. At least three
other police units joined the pursuit before Defendant turned from the highway
onto a side street, slowed down to approximately forty to forty-five miles per
hour, and then proceeded onto another side street where he accelerated back to
speeds of approximately sixty miles per hour. While traveling on these side
streets Defendant ran through three stop signs. Defendant and the pursuing
officers did not encounter any other traffic after leaving Highway 180.
Defendant then turned onto a dirt road, crossed a cattle guard, drove off-road
into an open pasture, and went up a hill. Grant County Sheriff’s Office deputy,
Manuel Galaz, continued the chase over the hill after Officer Arredondo blew a
tire and disengaged from the pursuit. Deputy Galaz was driving approximately
fifteen to twenty miles per hour during the off-road pursuit. As he crested the
hill in his patrol car, Deputy Galaz saw the dirt bike stopped on the other
side. Deputy Galaz hit the brakes to stop his cruiser and slid downhill into
the back of the dirt bike. The impact caused Defendant to fall off the dirt
bike, at which point Defendant attempted to flee on foot. Officer Galaz gave
chase and arrested Defendant shortly thereafter. At trial, Silver City Police
Department officers Arredondo and Rascon testified that no public safety issue
arose during the pursuit and that no person was endangered by Defendant’s
conduct.
AGGRAVATED FLEEING A LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICER
{4} The aggravated
fleeing statute reads, in pertinent part, that a person commits aggravated
fleeing by “willfully and carelessly driving [a] vehicle
in a manner that
endangers the life of another person after being given a visual or audible
signal to stop . . . by a uniformed law enforcement officer in an appropriately
marked law enforcement vehicle[.]” Section 30-22-1.1(A) (emphasis added). A
violation of Section 30-22-1.1(A) is a fourth degree felony. Section
30-22-1.1(B). Endangerment of another person is an essential element of the
aggravated fleeing statute.
See UJI
14-2217 NMRA (“[T]he state must
prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt . . . [that t]he defendant
drove willfully and carelessly in a manner that endangered the life of another
person[.]”).
{5} We view the
aggravated fleeing statute as evincing legislative intent to more severely
punish people who jeopardize the safety of others while fleeing from law
enforcement officers. Historically, conduct intended to thwart the efforts of
an arresting officer constituted the misdemeanor crime of resisting, evading, or
obstructing an officer. Section 30-22-1. As noted by our Supreme Court, “[t]he
legislative decision to create the crime of aggravated fleeing suggests a
hierarchy of criminal liability based on the aggravated nature of a defendant’s
conduct.”
State v. Padilla (
Padilla II),
2008-NMSC-006, ¶ 14,
143
N.M. 310,
176 P.3d 299. This aggravated nature exists specifically “when the
person flees in a manner that endangers the lives of others[.]”
Id.
Importantly, the Legislature chose not to repeal any portion of Section 30-22-1
upon the enactment of Section 30-22-1.1. Instead, the resisting, evading, or
obstructing an officer statute remains in effect and criminalizes conduct
related to vehicular flight from law enforcement.
1
The logical inference to be drawn from the Legislature’s decision not to repeal
any portion of Section 30-22-1 is that an individual may flee from law
enforcement, even in a vehicle, without triggering prosecution under the
aggravated fleeing statute so long as the fleeing individual does not endanger
others in the process.
See generally State v. Smith,
2004-NMSC-032, ¶
10,
136 N.M. 372,
98 P.3d 1022 (“We examine the overall structure of the
statute and its function in the comprehensive legislative scheme.”).
PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
{6} In order to
determine the merits of Defendant’s sufficiency of evidence challenge, we must
first address the contrasting interpretations of the aggravated fleeing statute
presented by the parties. Defendant contends that the statute’s essential
element of endangerment requires that the State prove that a defendant actually
endangered the life of another person while willfully and carelessly driving a
vehicle. In this regard, Defendant argues that the Legislature did not intend
to punish conduct that merely creates the potential for endangerment.
Conversely, the State argues that the statute’s essential element of
endangerment is satisfied when a defendant’s conduct either places an
identifiable person in actual danger or creates the potential for placing any
other person in danger. Insofar as these arguments present a question of
statutory interpretation, we apply de novo review.
See State v. McWhorter,
2005-NMCA-133, ¶ 5,
138 N.M. 580,
124 P.3d 215 (“The meaning of language used
in a statute is a question of law that we review de novo.”).
{7} Our goal when
interpreting statutes is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent.
Baker
v. Hedstrom,
2013-NMSC-043, ¶ 11,
309 P.3d 1047. We first look to the
statute’s plain language, which is “the primary indicator of legislative
intent.”
State v. Young,
2004-NMSC-015, ¶ 5,
135 N.M. 458,
90 P.3d 477
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “If the language of the
statute is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and
refrain from further statutory interpretation.”
State v. Wilson,
2010-NMCA-018, ¶ 9,
147 N.M. 706,
228 P.3d 490 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). “[Appellate courts] will not read into a statute any words
that are not there, particularly when the statute is complete and makes sense
as written.”
State v. Trujillo,
2009-NMSC-012, ¶ 11,
146 N.M. 14,
206
P.3d 125. In the event that our application of the plain meaning rule does not
indicate the true legislative intent, we may look to the history and purpose of
the statute to aid our statutory construction analysis.
See State v. Rivera,
2004-NMSC-001, ¶ 13,
134 N.M. 768,
82 P.3d 939 (“In performing our task of
statutory interpretation, not only do we look to the language of the statute at
hand, we also consider the history and background of the statute.”). When this
expanded review is necessary, we examine the language in the context of the
statutory scheme, legislative objectives, and other statutes
in pari materia
in order to determine legislative intent.
State v. Cleve,
1999-NMSC-017,
¶ 8,
127 N.M. 240,
980 P.2d 23.
The Plain Language of the
Statute
{8} Neither the
aggravated fleeing statute nor the associated uniform jury instruction defines
the term “endangers” as used in the statute. “When a term is not defined in a
statute, we must construe it, giving those words their ordinary meaning absent
clear and express legislative intention to the contrary.”
State v. Tsosie,
2011-NMCA-115, ¶ 19,
150 N.M. 754,
266 P.3d 34 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Our courts often use dictionary definitions to ascertain the
ordinary meaning of words that form the basis of statutory construction
inquiries.
State v. Boyse,
2013-NMSC-024, ¶ 9,
303 P.3d 830.
“Endangerment” is defined as “[t]he act or an instance of putting someone or
something in danger; exposure to peril or harm.”
Black’s Law Dictionary
644 (10th ed. 2014). Non-legal dictionaries offer similar definitions of both
“endanger” and “endangerment.”
See The American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language 588 (5th ed. 2011) (“To expose to harm or danger;
imperil.”); 5
The Oxford English Dictionary 225 (2d ed. 1991) (“The
action of putting in danger; the condition of being in danger.”). Each of these
definitions indicates that the exposure to peril or harm is an actual or
current condition facing the impacted person. None of these definitions
indicates a potential or future condition. Since the plain language of the
statute does not contemplate potential or future harm in its use of the word
“endanger,” and the statute “makes sense”—with respect to who is subject to
prosecution—as written,
Trujillo,
2009-NMSC-012, ¶ 11, we will not read
the statute to include potential harm absent direction from the Legislature.
Clark
v. Lovelace Health Sys., Inc.,
2004-NMCA-119, ¶ 14,
136 N.M. 411,
99 P.3d
232 (“When language in a statute enacted by the [L]egislature is unambiguous,
we apply it as written, and any alteration of that language is a matter for the
[L]egislature, not for this Court.”).
Expansion of the Scope of the
Statute by Judicial Opinion
{9} The State argues
that the word “potential” was effectively added to the statute by our Supreme
Court as part of its holding in
Padilla II. In
Padilla II, our
Supreme Court reinstated a conviction for aggravated fleeing following a
reversal by this Court.
2008-NMSC-006, ¶ 1. The
Padilla II Court was not
asked, and did not offer, an opinion as to the definition of endangerment under
the aggravated fleeing statute. However, a portion of the opinion detailed the
defendant’s conduct as follows:
[The d]efendant drove in a willful
and careless manner that endangered the lives of others—he ran ten stop signs,
he exceeded the speed limit, there was at least one other motorist, apart from
the officer, potentially placed at risk because of [the
d]efendant’s conduct, and the passengers in the car were placed at risk when
[the d]efendant careened around corners causing the door with the faulty lock
to open.
Id. ¶ 17 (emphasis added).
{10} Based upon these
facts, our Supreme Court held that “the defendant’s conduct gives rise to the
imposition [of the aggravated fleeing statute].”
Id. ¶ 14. However, we
do not believe that the Court’s use of the word “potentially” was intended to
indicate that anyone who flees from law enforcement necessarily endangers all
persons in the vicinity during any police pursuit.
{11} A comprehensive
review of the factual background reveals that the defendant “ran a stop sign
while going fifty miles per hour in a twenty-five mile per hour zone [and]
barely missed colliding with another motorist.”
State v. Padilla (Padilla I),
2006-NMCA-107, ¶ 5,
140 N.M. 333,
142 P.3d 921,
rev’d,
Padilla II,
2008-NMSC-006. On review, this Court held, “We think a rational jury could have
found that [the d]efendant endangered another person . . . [including] another
motorist on the road, whom [the d]efendant came close to striking.”
Id.
¶ 23. A near collision—that is, one in which the defendant “barely missed
colliding with another motorist”— constitutes an actual, rather than a
potential risk.
Id. ¶ 5.
{12} Because the facts of
Padilla I support a finding of actual endangerment to the other
motorist, we believe that our Supreme Court’s use of the word “potentially” in
this context was chosen to express that a collision nearly occurred, rather
than to express that another motorist was simply in the vicinity while the
pursuit was taking place. Because, in
Padilla I, other persons,
including passengers and other motorists, were actually endangered, we assume
that the plain language of the statute remains in effect and that only those
who actually endanger others while fleeing from law enforcement are subject to
punishment under the statute.
2
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
{13} Having decided that
the aggravated fleeing statute requires that the State prove actual
endangerment to another person, we now turn to Defendant’s argument that the
evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction.
Defendant advances a sufficiency of evidence claim only as to the essential
element of endangerment inasmuch as he argues that there was insufficient
evidence to prove that he endangered the life of another person.
{14} “The test for
sufficiency of the evidence is whether substantial evidence of either a direct
or circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction.”
State v. Duran,
2006-NMSC-035, ¶ 5,
140 N.M. 94,
140 P.3d 515 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “[W]e must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the guilty verdict, indulging all reasonable inferences
and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the verdict.”
Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Contrary evidence supporting
acquittal does not provide a basis for reversal because the jury is free to
reject Defendant's version of the facts.”
Id. (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). The function of an appellate court with respect to
challenges to the sufficiency of evidence is to “ensure that a rational jury
could
have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential facts required for a
conviction.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We
apply these principles to determine if Defendant’s conviction for aggravated
fleeing is supported by sufficient evidence.
{15} As a threshold
matter, we note that drawing inferences from the previous published opinions of
our courts related to aggravated fleeing is not entirely useful given that, in
those cases, passengers were present in the vehicles while the drivers were
fleeing from law enforcement.
See Padilla II,
2008-NMSC-006, ¶ 4
(“[T]here were two passengers in the car[.]”);
State v. Coleman,
2011-NMCA-087, ¶ 22,
150 N.M. 622,
264 P.3d 523 (“The lives of his passengers .
. . were placed in jeopardy[.]”);
State v. Ross,
2007-NMCA-126, ¶ 2,
142
N.M. 597,
168 P.3d 169 (“There were four passengers still in the vehicle.”). In
the present case, Defendant was operating a dirt bike without a passenger.
Because of this distinction, comparisons between the willful and careless
behavior exhibited by the drivers/defendants in our previous cases
3 and the willful and careless conduct
exhibited by Defendant in the present case are of limited value. Within those
same cases, however, there are descriptions of conduct that demonstrate
endangerment of other motorists who encountered defendants on the roadways.
See
Padilla I,
2006-NMCA-107, ¶ 5 (“[The d]efendant barely missed colliding
with another motorist.”);
Ross,
2007-NMCA-126, ¶ 2 (“Another vehicle had
to abruptly stop in order to avoid colliding with [the d]efendant.”). It is to
this conduct that we look to determine whether Defendant endangered another
person within the meaning of the aggravated fleeing statute.
{16} Even when viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, the State has
not presented sufficient evidence to prove that Defendant endangered another
person as required by the statute. The uncontroverted testimony of two
participating officers was that the pursuit did not create a public safety
concern or place anyone in danger. While other vehicles on the roadway were
required to slow down or pull over in response to the emergency lights and
sirens, no evidence of near collisions was presented at trial. We do not
believe that merely taking simple, evasive maneuvers in response to emergency
lights and sirens constitutes endangerment to motorists on a roadway. As such,
no reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant
endangered another person within the meaning of the aggravated fleeing statute.
{17} This is not to say
that endangerment requires that a fleeing motorist pass within inches of
another vehicle or that an accident is avoided only through extraordinary
evasive maneuvering by another driver. When a jury returns a verdict based on
evidence indicating actual endangerment, that verdict should not be disturbed.
However, when, as here, the record is completely devoid of evidence of actual
endangerment to passengers or other motorists, the verdict cannot stand.
{18} For the foregoing
reasons, we reverse Defendant’s conviction for aggravated fleeing a law
enforcement officer, contrary to Section 30-22-1.1. As a result, we do not
reach Defendant’s alternative double jeopardy claim, which constituted
Defendant’s sole challenge to his conviction for resisting, evading, or obstructing
an officer, contrary to Section 30-22-1(D). That conviction therefore stands.
MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge