STATE V. BROWN, 2010-NMCA-079, 148 N.M.
888, 242 P.3d 455
STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CLARENCE BROWN, Defendant-Appellant.
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW MEXICO
2010-NMCA-079, 148 N.M. 888, 242 P.3d 455
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TORRANCE COUNTY,
Matthew G. Reynolds, District Judge.
Certiorari Denied, July 29, 2010, No.
32,467. Released for Publication September 14, 2010.
Gary K. King, Attorney General, Ann M.
Harvey, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.
Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender,
Corey J. Thompson, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.
CYNTHIA A. FRY, Chief Judge. WE CONCUR:
CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Judge, TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge.
{1} Defendant Clarence
Brown appeals his convictions for the manufacture of methamphetamine,
conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, and possession of a stolen vehicle,
arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions and
that the district court erroneously admitted evidence obtained during a
warrantless search of his home. For the following reasons, we affirm
Defendant’s convictions. We also conclude that exigent circumstances justified
the warrantless search of Defendant’s home.
{2} The State filed a
motion asking that our opinion in this case be made formal. We hereby grant the
motion. The opinion filed on June 8, 2010, is hereby withdrawn, and this
opinion is filed in its place.
{3} On May 11, 2006,
Deputy Erwin Young of the Torrance County Sheriff’s Department was dispatched
to a home in McIntosh, New Mexico, in reference to a possible structure fire.
Upon arriving at the address, Deputy Young saw the remains of a trash fire that
had just been extinguished by the fire department as well as a fire-damaged
white utility trailer. Deputy Young noticed that there were a number of
gallon-sized bottles of acetone and Heat, a carburetor cleaner, in the burnt trash
pile. The deputy also noticed a truck, partially covered with a tarp, that had
numerous parts removed. A VIN check on the vehicle indicated that the truck had
been stolen.
{4} Deputy Young
encountered a woman on the property, April Green, who stated that she was a
friend of the homeowner, Rhonda, that she had thrown a cigarette on the trash
pile, and that it had burst into flames. Following the discovery of the stolen
vehicle, Deputy Young called for backup. Sergeant Heath White responded and,
when he arrived at the house, he “kept smelling a strong odor of . . .
chemicals coming from the house” that was “consistent with meth labs that [he]
previously had been involved with.” The smell was so strong that Sergeant White
asked Deputy Young to move his vehicle away from the house. Sergeant White also
spoke to Green, who was not forthcoming about what she was doing there or
whether she lived on the property.
{5} The officers then
began to check the property for people and observed a man, who was later identified
as Charles Garcia, hiding in a travel trailer and holding a dog’s mouth shut so
that it would not bark. After securing Garcia, Sergeant White noted that “[t]he
danger” was “building up at that point” due to the chemicals that had recently
been burned, Green’s unwillingness to talk about what was happening, and the
fact that Garcia was hiding in the travel trailer. After securing the travel
trailer, the officers approached the residence on the property and heard
someone inside walking. When Sergeant White knocked on the residence, he heard
someone running to the other end of the house. After about fifteen minutes of
commanding the occupant or occupants to exit the house, Sergeant White found
that the back door was unlocked and entered the home. The officers immediately
encountered Genevieve Fay, who stated that she was there to clean the house.
Sergeant White testified that when he asked Fay who else was inside the house,
she said that she did not know because she had only been there a few minutes.
Sergeant White continued to check the house for other occupants and discovered
that there was a padlock on a door in the kitchen area. The officers also
noticed that the chemical odor was especially strong near the door and that it
appeared to be emanating from the room behind the locked door. Because the
officers had “heard numerous footsteps as [they] were walking around the house”
and were not “sure if someone was inside that door itself,” Sergeant White
broke the padlock and entered the room. Sergeant White stated that he could not
have withdrawn from the house without opening the padlocked door due to the
risk that there was someone in the room who could have shot at the deputies,
destroyed evidence, or otherwise turned the scene into a deadly situation.
{6} When Sergeant White
broke the lock, he encountered a strong chemical smell that pushed him back
from the bedroom for a minute. The smell also made one of his deputies so dizzy
that he had to pull back. After he checked the room and determined that no one
was inside, Sergeant White left the house because he was only “in there for a
protective sweep, which was [to] make sure [there were] no kids, . . . no other
adults, no dangers to deputies on the outside.” Based on what he had observed
in the room and the strong chemical smell, Sergeant White determined that the
officers required protective equipment to re-enter the home and called in a
meth lab expert, Chief Deputy Encinias.
{7} When Chief Deputy
Encinias first arrived, she put on protective gear and entered the house to
determine if everything was safe and if there was any danger of a fire or
explosion. After determining that the chemicals did not pose an immediate
danger, Chief Deputy Encinias left the house and obtained a search warrant.
Chief Deputy Encinias then returned to the house and began to bring out the
chemicals and equipment. Most of the chemicals were in the bathroom of the
master bedroom. Chief Deputy Encinias also found a number of containers in the
white cargo trailer behind the house. Chief Deputy Encinias stated that there
were some bi-layer liquids in the home, which indicated that the meth “cook”
had already taken place.
{8} At the time of the
fire and the subsequent search, Defendant was not at the house. However, Deputy
Young discovered a large amount of mail with Defendant’s name on it in the
locked room that contained the majority of the meth lab equipment, and the
individuals arrested at the scene identified Defendant as the owner of the
home. As a result, Defendant was charged with manufacturing methamphetamine and
conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine.
{9} At trial, in
addition to the testimony of the police officers involved, the individuals
found at the scene testified against Defendant. Green testified that the day
before the fire, she and Charles Garcia had moved their camper onto the
property behind the double-wide mobile home where Defendant and Rhonda lived.
She stated that she had seen Defendant at the home the morning of the fire. She
testified that Defendant “was very secretive” and “stayed in his room most of
the time.” Green admitted that she used methamphetamine, and she believed that
her boyfriend got their meth from Defendant. Green also stated that she had
gone to Walgreens with Defendant on May 10 to purchase pseudoephedrine.
{10} Garcia testified
that he and Green were in the process of moving to Albuquerque, but that they
were staying at Defendant’s house prior to the move. Garcia stated that on the
day of the fire, he was burning some trash and the fire got out of control.
Garcia testified that he was burning “acetone cans and stuff like that” that he
and Defendant used for “manufacturing drugs.” Garcia also testified that he had
helped Defendant buy Sudafed from which they would extract ephedrine for use in
the methamphetamine. Garcia stated that on the day before the fire, he and
Green had gone to Albuquerque with Defendant to purchase Sudafed. Finally,
Garcia stated that he got his meth from Defendant and that he had gotten
approximately half a gram from Defendant on May 11.
{11} Defendant called
four witnesses in his defense. The first, his mother, testified that on May 11,
Defendant was at her house because he had “moved back in to help” take care of
his grandson. The second, Defendant’s brother’s fiancée, testified that she saw
Defendant at his mother’s house on May 10 during a birthday party and that he
had “been at his mom’s . . . since around the end of April.” Defendant’s sister
testified that she saw Defendant on May 10 at the birthday party but that she
did not know where Defendant was on May 11. Finally, Defendant’s younger
brother testified that Defendant was living at his mother’s house in late April
and early May and that Defendant was at the birthday party on May 10.
{12} The jury found
Defendant guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine, conspiracy to manufacture
methamphetamine, and possession of a stolen vehicle. Defendant appeals.
Exigent Circumstances Justified
the Warrantless Search of Defendant’s Home
{13} Defendant first argues
that the district court erroneously denied his request to suppress the physical
evidence seized from the locked room in his home. At trial, Defendant contended
that because Sergeant White broke the lock and entered the room without a
warrant, all of the evidence obtained from the room was inadmissible. In
response, the State argued that exigent circumstances required Sergeant White
to enter the room. Specifically, the State noted that the officers had heard
footsteps in the home, smelled a strong chemical smell emanating from the room,
and were concerned that someone might be hiding in the room, or that the
chemicals might present an immediate danger to the officers’ safety. The
district court agreed and denied Defendant’s motion to suppress.
{14} Our review of the
district court’s denial of a motion to suppress is a “mixed question of fact
and law that we review de novo.”
State v. Moore,
2008-NMCA-056, ¶ 10,
144 N.M. 14,
183 P.3d 158 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“[W]e review the district court’s findings of historical fact under a
deferential, substantial evidence standard, and then we determine de novo if
the facts, as so established, support the conclusion of exigent circumstances.”
Id. “Exigent circumstances are defined as those situations where
immediate action is necessary to prevent imminent danger to life or serious
damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or
destruction of evidence.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). We apply an objective standard and determine “whether in a given
situation a prudent, cautious, and trained officer, based on facts known, could
reasonably conclude that swift action was necessary.”
Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
{15} Defendant correctly
notes that suspicion of a meth lab alone is insufficient to justify a
warrantless search under the exigent circumstances exception and that
particularized information regarding the exigent circumstances justifying the
entry into an active math lab is required for the exception to apply.
See
State v. Johnson,
2004-NMCA-064, ¶ 11,
135 N.M. 615,
92 P.3d 61,
aff’d
in part, rev’d in part on other grounds,
2006-NMSC-049,
140 N.M.
653,
146 P.3d 298. In
Johnson, for example, we held that mere suspicion
that there was an active meth lab inside a motel room was insufficient for the
exigent circumstances exception to apply because there was no specific
information that the officer’s safety was at risk, that the defendant might
destroy evidence, or that the lab itself might pose a risk.
Id. ¶ 12.
{16} Similarly, in
State
v. Trudelle,
2007-NMCA-066, ¶¶ 31-32,
142 N.M. 18,
162 P.3d 173, we held
that exigent circumstances did not justify the search of a home where the only
articulable fact used to justify the search was a chemical odor coming from the
home. We noted that a chemical smell and suspicion of a meth lab are
insufficient to create an exigent circumstance where there are no other
articulable facts indicating that there is some type of danger.
Id. ¶
32. Specifically, we noted that there was no indication that an active cook was
taking place, the officers were not concerned about their safety, and the
chemical smell was not as strong near the house as it was in the driveway.
Id.
¶ 31. In addition, while the officers testified that they were concerned about
the safety of people in the house, they waited thirty minutes to gain entry
into the house and allowed one of the homeowners to enter the house
unaccompanied and without protective equipment.
Id.
{17} In
Moore,
2008-NMCA-056, ¶¶ 1, 20, we also held that the search of a house was not
justified by exigent circumstances. In that case, a police officer detected the
odor of anhydrous ammonia emanating from a defendant’s garage and, while
peering into the garage, he was blasted in the face with chemical vapors that
caused his eyes and lungs to burn.
Id. ¶ 2. Following this, the officer
performed a sweep of the defendant’s house, although the officer did not see or
hear anyone inside and had no other indication that there may have been anyone
in the house.
Id. ¶ 3. We noted that the fact that there was a strong
chemical smell coming from the garage did “not . . . create an emergency
situation in [the d]efendant’s home, which was a separate building located some
thirty to forty feet from the garage, and was not the source of the chemical
release.”
Id. ¶ 15. In addition, we noted that there was no indication
that the house created an immediate danger to the neighborhood, there were no
facts suggesting that there might have been incapacitated individuals in the
house, and there was no indication that there might have been someone inside
the house who could destroy evidence or attempt to escape.
Id. ¶¶ 16-19.
{18} Here, unlike in
Trudelle
and
Moore, the State presented evidence of exigent circumstances in
addition to the smell of a meth lab. Specifically, the responding officers
detected a strong chemical smell coming from the house and, after knocking on
the door, heard “numerous footsteps” coming from within the house. Upon
entering the home, the officers encountered Fay, who told the officers that she
did not know if anyone else was in the house because she had only been there a
few minutes. The officers then observed that the door to the master bedroom was
padlocked from the outside and that the chemical odor was especially strong
near the door. Sergeant White testified that he was concerned that Fay might
have locked the door to the room with someone in it and that he needed to open
the door to “make sure [there were] no kids, . . . no other adults, [and] no
dangers to deputies on the outside.” Sergeant White also stated that he could
not have left the home without checking the locked room because there was a
risk that someone could be hiding in the room who could have shot at the
deputies, destroyed evidence, or turned the scene into a deadly situation. When
Sergeant White opened the door, he was confronted with a strong chemical odor
that pushed him back from the door and made one of his deputies dizzy. The
officers then immediately left the premises and called in Chief Deputy
Encinias, the meth lab expert, who entered the house one more time prior to
obtaining a search warrant “to make sure that nothing was amiss, that it [would
not] explode or it [would not] start a fire.”
{19} Thus, rather than
entering the home merely because of a suspicion that there was a meth lab
inside, the officers in this case also had particularized information
suggesting that there might be someone hiding in the house who could pose a
threat or destroy evidence, and a concern that the meth cook was active and
that it might explode or cause a fire. These facts, coupled with the smell of
an active meth lab and the fire on the premises, created sufficient exigent
circumstances to justify the warrantless search of the house for the limited
purpose of a safety and welfare check. We therefore affirm the district court’s
order denying Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
{20} Defendant next
argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support the
jury’s finding that he was guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine, conspiracy,
and possession of a stolen vehicle. We address each of those arguments in turn.
{21} “The test for sufficiency
of the evidence is whether substantial evidence of either a direct or
circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction.”
State v.
Riley,
2010-NMSC-005, ¶ 12,
147 N.M. 557,
226 P.3d 656 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). When applying this standard, we review “the
evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, indulging all
reasonable inferences and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of
the verdict.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We do
not substitute our judgment for that of the jury or reweigh the evidence
“because the jury is free to reject [the d]efendant’s version of the facts.”
Id.
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Manufacturing Methamphetamine
{22} In order to convict
Defendant of manufacturing methamphetamine, the State was required to prove
that Defendant produced, prepared, compounded, converted, or processed
methamphetamine and that he knew that it was methamphetamine. Defendant
contends that the State failed to prove that he was on the premises where the
meth lab was found and that there was no physical evidence showing that he took
any steps in furtherance of the manufacture of methamphetamine. In addition,
Defendant contends that the testimony that he was at his mother’s house on May
11 is inconsistent with the testimony that he was at the meth lab that morning
and that the jury was therefore not entitled to infer that he had any
involvement with the lab.
{23} We note first that
Defendant is essentially asking this Court to reweigh the evidence and conclude
that the testimony Defendant presented was more credible than the testimony
presented by the State. We do not reweigh the evidence on appeal.
Id. We
conclude that sufficient evidence supports his conviction for manufacture of
methamphetamine.
{24} Green and Garcia
testified that they were with Defendant when he purchased Sudafed on May 10, and
Garcia testified that he and Defendant used the Sudafed to make meth. Garcia
further testified that he burned acetone cans that he and Defendant had used to
make meth, that he obtained his meth from Defendant, and that he got a half
gram of meth from Defendant on May 11. As for Defendant’s connection to the
house where the meth lab was found, officers discovered mail with Defendant’s
name on it, both Garcia and Green testified that Defendant lived in the house,
and Green stated that she had seen Defendant there on the morning of May 11,
the day the meth lab was discovered.
{25} Moreover, the
evidence Defendant presented was not inconsistent with the evidence the State
presented. Defendant’s witnesses testified that he was at a birthday party at
his mother’s house in Albuquerque on May 10, the day before the meth lab was
discovered, and that he was at his mother’s house on May 11, the day that the
lab was discovered. However, the jury, as the fact finder, was free to either
reject the testimony of Defendant’s witnesses altogether or make the reasonable
inference that Defendant was capable of being in more than one location on May
10 and 11.
{26} Based on the
evidence presented, the jury could reasonably infer that Defendant manufactured
methamphetamine. We affirm his conviction on this charge.
{27} Defendant also
argues that there was insufficient evidence that he intended to enter into a
conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. We disagree. In order to convict
Defendant of conspiracy, the jury was required to find that Defendant and
another person agreed to commit the crime of manufacturing methamphetamine. At
trial, Garcia testified that on May 10, he and Defendant, along with Green, had
gone to Albuquerque to purchase Sudafed, which they needed for the
methamphetamine. Green confirmed this in her testimony and stated that they
each went into the store separately in order to buy a larger quantity of the
pills. Chief Deputy Encinias testified that the first step in the manufacture
of methamphetamine is the extraction of ephedrine from pseudoephedrine. Based
on this evidence and the inference that Defendant actually manufactured
methamphetamine the day after the trip to purchase Sudafed (as suggested by
Chief Deputy Encinias’s testimony that the cook had recently occurred), the
jury could reasonably conclude that Defendant conspired to manufacture
methamphetamine. We therefore affirm Defendant’s conviction for conspiracy.
Possession of a Stolen Vehicle
{28} Defendant finally
argues that there was insufficient evidence that he knowingly possessed a
stolen vehicle. In order to convict Defendant of possession of a stolen
vehicle, the jury was required to find that Defendant had possession of a 1999
white Ford F-150, that the truck had been stolen, and that Defendant knew or
had reason to know that it had been stolen.
See NMSA 1978, §
66-3-505
(1978) (current version at NMSA 1978, Section
30-16D-4 (2009)).
1 Defendant argues that the State
failed to show how the vehicle arrived at the scene, a direct link between the
vehicle and Defendant, or that he knew or had reason to know that the vehicle
had been stolen or unlawfully taken. In support of this argument, Defendant
contends that the vehicle’s proximity to Defendant’s house alone is
insufficient for the fact finder to determine that Defendant had knowledge of
the vehicle or control of it. We disagree.
{29} Deputy Young
testified that the truck was parked next to Defendant’s home, was partially
covered with a tarp, and had numerous parts removed. In addition, Deputy Young
testified that he was unable to obtain fingerprints from the truck because “it
was dusty.” Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s
verdict, the jury could infer from the dust in the truck and the fact that
numerous parts had been removed that the truck had been at Defendant’s home for
some time. Thus, the fact that Defendant was not at home at the time that the
truck was discovered does not preclude the jury from inferring that Defendant
possessed the truck. The fact that the truck was on Defendant’s property, had
been there for some time, and had been partially disassembled is sufficient to
allow a reasonable juror to infer that Defendant possessed the vehicle.
{30} In addition, “since
knowledge that property was stolen can seldom be proven by direct evidence,
resort must often be made to circumstantial evidence.”
State v. Smith,
100 N.M. 352, 354,
670 P.2d 963, 965 (Ct. App. 1983),
abrogated on other
grounds by,
State v. Watkins,
2008-NMCA-060,
144 N.M. 66,
183 P.3d
951. “Although mere possession of recently stolen property is not alone
sufficient to sustain a conviction for receiving stolen property, possession
not satisfactorily explained is a circumstance which may properly be taken into
consideration with all other facts and circumstances in determining the guilt
or innocence of the accused.”
Smith, 100 N.M. at 355, 670 P.2d at 966.
{31} Here, reviewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and indulging all
inferences in favor of the verdict, we cannot say that there was insufficient
evidence to support the conviction. The stolen truck was on Defendant’s
property and had been there for quite some time, and the truck was covered with
a tarp, suggesting that the truck was being concealed from observation. From
these circumstances, the jury could reasonably infer that Defendant had reason
to know that the truck was stolen. Therefore, we affirm this conviction as
well.
{32} For the foregoing
reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
CYNTHIA A. FRY, Chief Judge
CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Judge
Topic Index for State v. Brown, Docket No. 28,371
CL-CL Controlled
Substances
CA-EC Exigent
Circumstances
CA-SE Substantial or
Sufficient Evidence