STATE V. SANTIAGO, 2008-NMCA-041, 143
N.M. 756, 182 P.3d 137
CASE HISTORY ALERT: affected by
2009-NMSC-045
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LUIS SANTIAGO,
Defendant-Appellee.
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW MEXICO
2008-NMCA-041, 143 N.M. 756, 182 P.3d 137
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY, Ross
C. Sanchez, District Judge
Certiorari Granted, No. 30,953, March
19, 2008. Released for publication April 1, 2008.
Gary K. King, Attorney General, Santa Fe,
NM, James W. Grayson, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for
Appellant
John Bigelow, Chief Public Defender, J.K.
Theodosia Johnson, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee
MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge. I CONCUR:
RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge, JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge (specially concurring).
{1} The State appeals
the district court's order granting Defendant's motion to suppress. Defendant
was searched outside of a shopping mall by private mall security guards after
he was maced, thrown to the ground, and handcuffed, because he had a verbal
confrontation with a peer within the mall. As a result of the search, the mall
security guards discovered a pill bottle in Defendant’s pants pocket containing
cocaine. The district court concluded that the search and seizure conducted by
the mall security guards is governed by the Fourth Amendment. Further, the
district court concluded the search and seizure to be unreasonable under Fourth
Amendment standards, and it ordered that the physical evidence be suppressed,
as well as all other evidence discovered as a result of the search and seizure
under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{2} Defendant testified
he was at the Coronado mall when his girlfriend’s ex-boyfriend came up behind
him, and grabbed his visor. They cussed and yelled at each other, but there was
no actual fight. Defendant grabbed his visor back and started walking up the
escalator at a fast pace to leave the mall. Half-way up the escalator,
Defendant heard a mall security guard yell, “Hey.” Since his car was right
outside, and he was already leaving the mall, he started a “light jog” towards
his car. Two mall security guards were waiting for Defendant outside, and they
told him to get on the ground. When he heard them tell him to get on the
ground, Defendant held his arms straight out, asking them why, and testified,
“I never took an aggressive step or anything toward them.” However, the mall
security guards threw him down face-first onto the pavement, cutting his chin.
Defendant testified, “I was facing down. I was facing down on my stomach. I was
on my stomach. My head was turned to the left, and my hands were behind me, and
there was one [mall] security guard–one [mall] security guard was holding my
hands; the other [mall] security guard had his knee in my neck. . . . And the
other one was searching me.” Defendant further testified that while he was
being searched, “I was yelling at him to stop because, I mean, I thought it
wasn’t legal to search anybody, you know, without any consent, you know. So he
started searching me. I was yelling at him he couldn’t search me. He was
telling me to shut up, and he took everything out of my pockets.” When he was
asked if this was a pat-down search, Defendant replied, “I didn’t feel no
patting down. I felt his hands go straight into my pockets.” Defendant then
heard the mall security guard say, “Look what we have here. Call APD
[Albuquerque Police Department].”
{3} Security Guard Ryan
Martin testified he works for Valor Security, which provides security for the
Coronado Mall. The mall security guards wear a uniform, “which kind of looks
like Albuquerque Police Department’s uniform with the exception of the badge
and the Smokey Bear hats[.]” Security Guard Martin was in the parking lot in
one of the marked mobile patrol vehicles used by the security guards when he
heard a radio dispatch, and he went to the south patio main entrance area of
the mall. He saw Defendant running out of the entrance and Security Guard
Richard Timmons following him while giving Defendant verbal commands to stop
and get down to the ground. Defendant stopped and turned around toward Security
Guard Timmons. Security Guard Martin interpreted his action as taking “an
aggressive stance towards him.” Security Guard Martin also commanded Defendant
to get to the ground, but he did not comply, and Security Guard Timmons sprayed
mace towards Defendant’s face. Defendant then turned back towards Security
Guard Martin to run from the mace and Security Guard Martin grabbed his right
arm to take Defendant to the ground. As they struggled, Security Guard Martin
sprayed mace into Defendant’s face. At this time Valor Security Sergeant George
Rodriguez showed up on the scene and put hand restraints on Defendant. When
asked whether Defendant was arrested Security Guard Martin answered, “We are to
advise anybody that we place in hand restraints that they are under citizen’s arrest
and we did so.” In his report Security Guard Martin noted that Defendant was
told he was under citizen’s arrest “for breach of the peace.” When asked what
his understanding of a citizen’s arrest is, Security Guard Martin answered,
“It’s a citizen detaining an individual, private citizen detaining an
individual for a crime until APD arrives.” The Valor Security mall dispatcher
is just inside the glass doors where the struggle took place and Security Guard
Martin said the Valor dispatcher “called via our radio to the Albuquerque
Police Substation and contacted Officer Newbill on the radio and advised that
we needed back up[.]” The Valor security guards use two-way walkie-talkie
radios at the mall, and the APD has one of these radios in its substation. After
the incident outside the mall door, Security Guard Martin followed the police
officers to the APD substation to exchange information with the APD officers to
complete his report.
{4} The Coronado Mall
furnishes the APD with a police substation. Officer Keith Newbill of the APD
testified that he had been working with mall security for about two years and
that “I am the Coronado Mall officer.” He was working at Coronado Mall and
overheard on the Coronado Mall security radio he had that there was a fight on
the lower level of the mall. He was then asked to assist, “because the fight
had moved out to the south patio and they were struggling with an individual.”
When he first arrived at the scene, he took Defendant to his police car, set
Defendant inside of it, and then went back to find out what was happening. When
he placed Defendant in his police car, Defendant was not free to leave,
“because I needed to identify him and determine whether or not I was mall
security was going to want a criminal trespass notification.” This coincided
with Officer Newbill’s understanding of an arrest. “[M]ost generally what
happens in these type of scenarios is they’re issued criminal trespass
notifications saying they can’t return, and I send them on their way. It
requires a short little report, and it’s a quick process.” However, in this
case, Detective Bruce Arbogast of the APD came to the car holding a pill bottle
he indicated he had picked up along with other property that belonged to
Defendant, opened it up, and said, “Look at this.” Officer Newbill looked
inside and saw five little baggies with white powder, so they decided to go the
APD substation and field test the substance.
{5} Detective Arbogast
testified he was at the Coronado Mall when Officer Newbill received a radio
call from Coronado security requesting the APD to respond to a fight. Each
driving their own police unit, he and Officer Newbill, “drove over there as
fast as we could to help assist in the fight and break it up and sort out the
situation.” Upon arriving, he saw Defendant on the concrete face down and
handcuffed with mall security standing around him. Detective Arbogast
testified, “It happened within a matter of seconds upon our arrival and the
time they had him down on the ground.” A cell phone and pill bottle were laying
next to his body. Detective Arbogast said, “I picked [Defendant] up with mall
security and we transported him over to Officer Newbill’s car. At the same time
I picked up what was his property or he stated was his property off the ground
and took it into my possession.” While he and the mall security guard were
taking Defendant to the police car, Defendant said he found the bottle outside
the mall and he was going to give the contents to some friends he was meeting
later at the mall. Defendant was then transported to the APD mall substation.
At the APD mall substation the contents of the bottle were field tested, and
they were positive for cocaine.
{6} Defendant filed a
motion to suppress the cocaine and statements he made regarding the cocaine
after it was seized. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court entered
findings of facts and conclusions of law and granted the motion to suppress.
The district court applied the factors set forth in
State v. Murillo,
113 N.M. 186,
824 P.2d 326 (Ct. App. 1991) to determine the applicability of
the Fourth Amendment, and concluded that because the search by the security
guards went beyond the scope of protecting their employer’s property rights, it
was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Defendant’s motion to suppress was
therefore granted, and under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine,
Defendant’s inculpatory statements were also suppressed. The State appeals,
arguing that the security guards were not state actors and therefore not
subject to Fourth Amendment restrictions.
{7} “In reviewing the
denial of a motion to suppress, the appropriate standard is whether the law was
correctly applied to the facts, viewing them in a light most favorable to the
court’s ruling.”
State v. Ingram,
1998-NMCA-177, ¶ 5,
126 N.M. 426,
970
P.2d 1151. We view the facts as determined by the district court in the light
most favorable to its ruling,
In re Josue T.,
1999-NMCA-115, ¶ 14,
128
N.M. 56,
989 P.2d 431, we indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the
district court’s ruling, and we disregard all evidence and inferences to the
contrary.
State v. Jason L.,
2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 10,
129 N.M. 119,
2 P.3d
856. “Determining the reasonableness of a search, however, is a matter of law.”
In re Josue T.,
1999-NMCA-115, ¶ 14. We therefore apply a de novo review
to the district court’s determination that the search in this case was
unreasonable.
Id.
{8} The Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: “The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]” U.S.
Const. amend. IV. Had the search of Defendant’s pants pockets and the seizure
of their contents been undertaken by the APD officers, the results would not be
admissible in a criminal trial under established precedent, and the State does
not argue otherwise.
See Ingram,
1998-NMCA-177, ¶ 6,
126 N.M. 426,
970
P.2d 1151 (“It is well-established doctrine that a police officer, in an
encounter with a citizen, may conduct a protective search, known as a
Terry
[
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968)] search, to ensure that the individual
is not armed.”);
State v. Eskridge,
1997-NMCA-106, ¶ 24,
124 N.M. 227,
947
P.2d 502 (stating that a police officer concerned about his personal safety
during an investigatory stop may check for weapons when he reasonably believes
the individual may be armed and dangerous, but the officer is only permitted to
pat down the outer clothing of the individual to feel for weapons);
State v.
Flores,
1996-NMCA-059, ¶ 17,
122 N.M. 84,
920 P.2d 1038 (stating that such
a protective search is allowed for the limited purpose of protecting the
investigating officer and absent probable cause, such a search for weapons may
not be expanded into a search for evidence of a crime). In the case before us,
the district court found the mall security guard did not perform a pat down
search for weapons; he reached into Defendant’s pockets and removed items, none
of which could have been mistaken as weapons.
{9} The issue in this
case is whether the fruits of the search and seizure, undertaken by mall
security guards, rather than police, are admissible in a criminal prosecution
of Defendant. The issue arises because of the doctrine that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to private individuals who act solely for their own
purposes.
See Murillo, 113 N.M. at 188, 824 P.2d at 328 (“The courts of
New Mexico, like other jurisdictions, have accepted the long-standing rule that
the protections of the Fourth Amendment do not apply to private individuals
acting for their own purposes.”). However, for the Fourth Amendment to not
apply, the State may not receive the evidence as the result of any instigation
by state officials or their participation or involvement in the illegal search.
See State v. Ybarra,
111 N.M. 234, 237,
804 P.2d 1053, 1056
(1990) (“The government, of course, cannot avoid constitutional restrictions by
using a private individual as its agent, nor can it claim that only a private
act is involved when government officers, subject to constitutional
limitations, have participated in the act. Under such circumstances the
constitutional restrictions on governmental activity cannot be said to be
inapplicable.” (quoting
People v. Jones, 393 N.E.2d 443, 445 (N.Y.
1979)));
see also Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927) (“We do
not question the right of the federal government to avail itself of evidence
improperly seized by state officers operating entirely upon their own account.
But the rule is otherwise when the federal government itself, through its
agents acting as such, participates in the wrongful search and seizure.”).
Thus, we have held that the Fourth Amendment applies to “searches effected by a
private party who is acting ‘as an instrument or agent of the Government.’”
Murillo,
113 N.M. at 189, 824 P.2d at 329 (quoting
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989)).
{10} We therefore
determine whether the mall security guards in this case were acting “as an
instrument or agent of the Government” when they seized and searched Defendant.
This requires an analysis to determine whether, and to what extent, police
officers of the State were involved with, or connected to, the conduct of the
mall security guards. If that involvement or connection is sufficient to
conclude that the State was involved, then the conduct will be deemed “state
action” with the consequence that its validity will be scrutinized by Fourth
Amendment standards.
A. State Action Under the Murillo Test
{11} Murillo
involved a search conducted by an off-duty investigator employed by the
district attorney’s office while he was on duty as a private security guard.
Murillo,
Id. at 187, 824 P.2d at 327. We recognized that a commissioned police
officer may have incentives to obtain convictions even while he is acting for a
private employer.
Id. at 191, 824 P.2d at 326. Under these
circumstances, we concluded that the burden is on the State to show that the
officer was acting in a truly private capacity, and to make this determination,
we considered the four factors enunciated by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts in
Commonwealth v. Leone, 435 N.E.2d 1036, 1041-42 (Mass.
1982).
Murillo, 113 N.M. at 191, 824 P.2d at 331. Those factors are:
“(1) whether the guard acted under the control of his private employer; (2)
whether the guard’s actions clearly related to his private employer’s private
purposes; (3) whether the search was conducted as a legitimate means of
protecting the employer’s private property; and (4) whether the methods and
manner of the search were reasonable and no more intrusive than necessary.”
Id.
In this case, however, there is no indication in the record that any of the
Coronado Mall security guards were off-duty police officers. In fact, Security
Guard Martin testified he is not a police officer, and he never has been one.
Thus, while the factors to be considered by
Murillo are helpful, they
are not dispositive in answering the question posed in this case. Nevertheless,
we do consider them for guidance in resolving the ultimate issue before us.
{12} The first
Leone
factor is whether the guard acts under the control of his private employer.
Leone,
435 N.E.2d at 1041. If the investigation exceeds the guard’s private duties or
authorization, he may be considered a government actor.
Id. The record
in this case does not reveal what specific duties the Coronado Mall security
guards were authorized to perform. However, most courts reason that “the
primary function and concern of privately employed security officers is
protection of their employers’ property, rather than conviction of wrongdoers.”
Id. at 1039-40. Defendant did not threaten to damage any Coronado Mall property;
Defendant did not damage any Coronado Mall property; Defendant did not shoplift
property from any Coronado Mall store; and Defendant did not otherwise pose a
threat to any Coronado Mall property or patrons. The mall security guards
exceeded their private duties by chasing Defendant, throwing him to the ground,
handcuffing him, and searching him. When they engaged in these activities the
mall security guards were not doing anything to safeguard mall property or
patrons.
{13} Moreover, the
State’s assertion that the mall security guards executed a valid citizen’s
arrest does not withstand scrutiny. Historically, a citizen’s power to arrest
has been limited to felonies.
See State v. Barreras,
64 N.M. 300, 304,
328 P.2d 74, 76 (1958) (stating that “‘any person’ may, without a warrant,
arrest a felon”). There is no claim that Defendant committed a felony that
justified the mall security guards in ordering, then throwing Defendant to the
ground, handcuffing him, and searching him. We have also noted that at common
law a private person could arrest for a breach of the peace committed in his
presence.
Downs v. Garay,
106 N.M. 321, 323,
742 P.2d 533, 535 (Ct. App.
1987). Here, Defendant did not commit a breach of the peace in the presence of
the mall security guards. Even if Defendant had committed a breach of the peace
within their presence, it is questionable whether the mall security guards
could have made a valid citizen’s arrest.
See State v. Emmons,
2007-NMCA-082, ¶ 15,
141 N.M. 875,
161 P.3d 920 (“[T]he Supreme Court [has]
specifically declined to favor citizens’s arrest for breaches of the peace,
stemming from their concern that such an expansion of citizen power might
likely lead to more breaches of the peace and encourage vigilantism.”).
{14} Secondly, we
consider whether the actions of the mall security guards clearly related to the
private employer’s private purposes.
Leone, 435 N.E.2d at 1041. A
private purpose to be served by an arrest and search might be to detain a
shoplifter or to recover merchandise stolen from a store within the Coronado
Mall. However, “[a]n investigation that goes beyond the employer's needs cannot
be justified as an incident of the guard’s private function.”
Id. The
conduct of the mall security guards in this case clearly exceeded any private
legitimate needs of the Coronado Mall. No legitimate private purpose was being
served by chasing Defendant, throwing him to the ground, handcuffing him, and
searching him.
{15} Third, “the
investigation must be a legitimate means of protecting the employer’s property,
and so must be reasonable in light of the circumstances surrounding it.”
Id.
at 1042. In this case, Defendant posed no threat to the Coronado Mall
property, Defendant had not damaged or destroyed any mall property, and the mall
security guards did not suspect him of shoplifting.
{16} Finally, we consider
whether the method and manner of the search performed by the mall security
guards was reasonable and no more intrusive than necessary.
Id. There
was no justification for macing and throwing Defendant to the ground simply
because he did not obey their order to get to the ground. Whether they had
authority to issue such a command under the circumstances is itself
questionable. Furthermore, the search performed by the mall security guards was
clearly more intrusive than necessary. Security Guard Martin testified that it
is customary for the mall security guards to conduct a pat down for weapons
when there is a confrontation or if a felony has been committed. He also
testified: “The only time we’re allowed to move something off someone’s person
is when it poses a threat, like a knife, a gun, something of that nature.” The
search of Defendant’s pockets cannot be characterized as a pat down for
weapons, because the pill bottle was clearly not a weapon, and there was no
legitimate reason for opening the pill bottle.
See People v. Zelinski,
594 P.2d 1000, 1006 (Cal. 1979) (en banc) (concluding that while waiting for
the police to arrive, private store security guards who removed a stolen
blouse, together with a pill vial from the defendant’s purse and opened the
pill vial, thereby discovering a fine, powdery substance, later determined to
be heroin, “went beyond their employer’s private interests”).
{17} The mall security
guards exceeded their private duties or authorization. They were not protecting
their employer’s property, nor did they execute a lawful citizen’s arrest. If
the mall security guards had been off-duty police officers, they would be
deemed to be acting as an instrument or agent of the Government, and their
conduct would be subject to the Fourth Amendment under
Murillo.
B. State Action Under the Public Function and
Government Agent Tests
{18} The conduct of
private security guards who are not off-duty police officers may also be
measured under Fourth Amendment constitutional standards in appropriate cases.
“When they perform a public function or act as agents of a government
investigation, their activities may therefore become state action for
constitutional purposes.”
Murillo, 113 N.M. at 189, 824 P.2d at 329.
Whether the private officers are performing a public function or are acting as
agents of the government is determined as a question of fact.
See id. at
190, 824 P.2d at 330 (“The general rule appears to be that whether a ‘private’
person is acting as an agent of the government is determined as a question of
fact in light of all the circumstances.”).
1. The Mall Security Guards Exercised Public,
Police Functions
{19} We conclude the
evidence supports a finding that the mall security guards were performing
public, police functions in this case. It is evident that “[s]ecurity personnel
hired to protect private business premises are performing traditional police
functions when they arrest, question, and search for evidence against criminal
suspects.”
Murillo, 113 N.M. at 189, 824 P.2d at 329.
{20} We have recognized,
as have other courts, that the use of private security forces is expanding in
the United States.
Id. at 190, 824 P.2d at 330.
See Zelinski, 594
P.2d at 1005 (“We are mindful, however, of the increasing reliance placed upon
private security personnel by local law enforcement authorities for the
prevention of crime and enforcement of the criminal law and the increasing
threat to privacy rights posed thereby.”);
People v. Elliott, 501
N.Y.S.2d 265, 267-68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (noting the increasing number of
businesses, governmental agencies, neighborhoods, and individuals that are
giving private security entities a new role that spills over into public law
enforcement areas). The
Zelinski court notes from a report prepared by
the Private Security Advisory Council to the United States Department of
Justice, that “the private security sector has become the largest single group
in the country engaged in the prevention of crime.”
Zelinski, 594 P.2d
at 1005 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). One study of private
policing has recently concluded that today, “private police participate in much
of the policing work that their public counterparts do.” Elizabeth E. Joh,
The
Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 49, 51
(2004).
{21} It is clear that,
like the public police, private security guards have the potential to violate
citizens’ constitutional rights.
Murillo, 113 N.M. at 189, 824 P.2d at
329. It is also evident that a serious danger to constitutional liberties would
result if private security guards were allowed to perform these traditional
police functions such as arresting, questioning, and searching for evidence,
without applying any constitutional protections.
See 1 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search
and Seizure § 1.8(a), at 260 & n.29 (4th ed. 2004) (“[T]he grave danger
exists that the general admissibility of such evidence may create an atmosphere
encouraging government officials to act in clandestine concert with private
persons; while concerted activity would undoubtedly taint such evidence and
require its exclusion in a criminal action, the problems of proof are obvious.”
(quoting Note, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 168, 174-75 (1963))); David Alan Sklansky,
Private
Police and Democracy, 43 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 89 (2006) (expressing concerns
about privatized policing for American democracy).
{22} These concerns are
very real in this case. The website for Coronado Mall
(http://www.ggp.com/Content/Data/mallfacts/Coronado%2Center_mallfact.pdf)
describes it as New Mexico’s largest enclosed bi-level mall with over 150
retail stores and 5 anchors within 1,153,954 square feet. The mall has 5,489
parking spaces, employs 19,443 people, and more than 12 million people visit
the mall each year. Thus, the mall security guards in this case are responsible
for a very large, public area in which millions of people come and go each
year. The magnitude of the responsibilities performed by the mall security
guards in providing security for the Coronado Mall easily equals or exceeds
that of sworn police officers in many towns, cities, and counties in New
Mexico.
{23} We therefore align
New Mexico with other courts that have expressed realistic concerns about
safeguarding our constitutional rights where private police forces are used. To
determine whether private security guards are performing public, police
functions, we adopt the following test enunciated by
Elliott, 501
N.Y.S.2d at 269:
These few concerned courts have fashioned
a realistic ‘public function or acting in the public interest test’ which
maintains that where organized and structured private security entities or
agents assert the power of the state to investigate or make an arrest, or
detain persons for subsequent transfer of custody to the state, or subsequent
state law enforcement and the state has acquiesced or allowed such use of
public power, such private organized action, in contemplation of state
involvement, is sufficient to enable a court to apply constitutional
restraints[.]
{24} The mall security
guards are structured and organized. They provide security services for
businesses and patrons within Coronado Mall. Maintaining public order and
keeping the public peace are traditional police functions. The mall security
guards wear uniforms which look like APD uniforms; they are called “officers”;
and they have rank designations such as sergeant that are similar to those used
by a police force. In this particular case, the mall security guards responded to
the initial (but erroneous) report of a fight, without APD assistance. The mall
security guards then called the APD for “backup,” and arrested Defendant,
calling the arrest a “citizen’s arrest” for disturbing the peace. They kept
Defendant under arrest until APD arrived, pursuant to their policy.
Simultaneous with the arrest, a mall security guard forcibly searched
Defendant, on his own, and upon seizing the pill bottle from Defendant and
opening it, said, “Look what we have here. Call APD.” We therefore conclude the
totality of the circumstances support a finding that the mall security guards
were performing public, police functions.
2. The Mall Security Guards Acted as Instruments
or Agents of the Police
{25} We also conclude
that the evidence supports the conclusion that the mall security guards were
acting as instruments or agents of the police. The mall security guards
employed by Valor Security and the APD work in conjunction with each other in
providing security for the Coronado Mall. The APD is provided with a substation
in the mall, and the APD assigns police officers to work on the mall premises
to provide security. The police officers working at the mall have radios used
by the private security guards employed by Valor Security, which enables both
forces to communicate directly with each other. In this particular case,
Officer Newbill heard the initial report of a disturbance in the mall, but the
Valor Security guards apparently intended to handle the matter on their own.
When they wanted “backup” the Valor Security dispatch requested APD assistance
over its own radio, which two APD officers heard, and they responded in their
police units immediately.
{26} Defendant was
arrested by the mall security guards with the intent of detaining Defendant until
the APD officers arrived, and when the APD officers did arrive, they continued
Defendant’s arrest by putting him in the APD police unit while still in the
handcuffs placed on Defendant by the mall security guards. Once they took
custody of Defendant, the intent of the APD officers was to determine if the
mall security guards wanted a criminal trespass notification issued to
Defendant. If that was their desire, the APD officers would have issued
Defendant the notification, telling him he could not return to the mall.
{27} In the meantime, an
APD officer picked up the property that the mall security guards had taken from
Defendant, and took it into their own possession. An APD officer then opened
the pill bottle seized from Defendant, and decided to field test its contents.
This action effectively ratified its seizure by the mall security guards. The
mall security guard went to the APD substation in the mall to exchange
information with the APD officers so he could complete his report.
{28} The evidence in this
case demonstrates that the mall security guards and APD were acting
cooperatively in a coordinated, concerted undertaking. The conduct of the mall
security guards is sufficiently interconnected with the conduct of APD to
conclude that they were acting as a team and as an instrument or agent of each
other to an extent that makes it appropriate to measure the conduct of the mall
security guards by constitutional standards.
C. Suppression of the Evidence and Its Fruits
{29} We have determined
that the search of Defendant must be measured by Fourth Amendment standards for
three different reasons, each of which alone is sufficient. Since the search
and seizure did not comply with the Fourth Amendment, all evidence discovered
as a result of the search and seizure is not admissible in a criminal trial
against Defendant.
Ingram,
1998-NMCA-177, ¶ 9 (“Evidence which is
obtained as a result of an unconstitutional search or seizure may be suppressed
under the ‘exclusionary rule.’”).
{30} While the cocaine itself
is clearly the fruit of the unlawful search, the State argues that Defendant’s
statements should not have been suppressed because there was a sufficient break
in the causal chain between the search and Defendant’s statements. “Evidence
which is obtained by exploitation of a ‘primary illegality’ will be the fruit
of that search and will be suppressed, unless an ‘intervening independent act
of a free will’ can purge the taint of the illegally seized evidence.”
Id.
¶ 10. In determining whether the chain was broken, “[t]he temporal proximity of
the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, . . .
and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct are all
relevant.”
State v. Bedolla,
111 N.M. 448, 455,
806 P.2d 588, 595 (Ct.
App. 1991) (quoting
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975)).
{31} The State argues
that the causal chain was broken because the Defendant voluntarily made the
statements to the APD officers, the officers were not present during the
search, and the APD’s discovery and testing of the drugs were in response to
Defendant’s statements rather than the search of the mall security guards. We
disagree. The mall security guards and the APD officers were acting as a team.
The APD officers had a radio monitoring the security guard’s frequency. As a
result, they knew about the incident and request for immediate back up. In
addition, because the APD substation is located in the mall, the police
instantly responded. An officer testified that they “drove as fast as [they]
could.” Furthermore, immediately upon arriving at the scene, an APD officer
took Defendant to the police car. Based on this evidence, it is clear that the
time between the search and the statements was negligible. In addition, when
the mall security guard took the pill bottle from Defendant and opened it, he
said, “Look what we have here. Call APD.” APD arrived immediately. The evidence
supports a finding that Defendant knew that the APD was called because of the
drugs. But for the illegal search by the mall security guards, Defendant would
likely not have made any statements to the APD officers.
{32} Therefore, we
conclude the evidence supports a finding that Defendant’s statements were
obtained by an exploitation of the illegal search, that the causal chain
between the search and his statements was not broken, and that Defendant’s
statements were also properly suppressed.
{33} The order of the
district court is affirmed.
RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge
JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge (specially concurring)
SPECIALLY CONCURRING OPINION
WECHSLER, Judge (specially concurring).
{35} I concur with the
majority in affirming the district court’s order suppressing the evidence
obtained by the mall security guards. I do not, however, concur in much of the
majority’s analysis in reaching the conclusion that the security guards’
activity was subject to the Fourth Amendment.
{36} In analyzing the
issue of whether the activity of the security guards was subject to the Fourth
Amendment, the majority properly determines that the security guards were
acting as instruments or agents of the government when seizing and searching
Defendant. In reaching that conclusion, the majority relies on three
independent grounds: that the security guards exceeded their private duties or
authorization using the test applied in
Murillo; that the security
guards were performing public, police functions under the totality of
circumstances; and that the security guards acted as instruments or agents of
the APD officers.
{37} I would simply rely
on the third ground because it is supported by our analysis in prior opinions
and does not require an unnecessary extension of our case law. We have
recognized in both
Murillo and
State v. Hernandez,
116 N.M. 562,
565,
865 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Ct. App. 1993), a case, in contrast to
Murillo,
involving a private security guard who was not also a commissioned law
enforcement officer, that a private security guard’s actions may constitute
governmental action if the guard is “acting as a government agent or
instrument.” The majority’s third ground correctly decides this case on this
basis. We need say nothing more.
See Gabaldon v. Erisa Mortgage Co.,
1997-NMCA-120, ¶ 3,
124 N.M. 296,
949 P.2d 1193 (stating this Court’s “general
desire to decide cases on narrow rather than broad grounds”),
rev’d in part
on other grounds,
1999-NMSC-039,
128 N.M. 84,
990 P.2d 197.