STATE EX REL CHILDREN, YOUTH &
FAMILIES DEP'T. V. PAUL G., 2006-NMCA-038, 139 N.M. 258, 131 P.3d 108
STATE OF NEW MEXICO, CHILDREN,
YOUTH & FAMILIES DEPARTMENT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PAUL G.,
Child-Appellee.
Docket Nos. 25,090 & 25,321
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW MEXICO
2006-NMCA-038, 139 N.M. 258, 131 P.3d 108
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY,
Marie Baca, District Judge.
Released for Publication April 4, 2006.
Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General,
Arthur W. Pepin, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.
John Bigelow, Chief Public Defender,
Santa Fe, NM, Meg Bailey, Assistant Appellate Defender, Albuquerque, NM, for
Appellee.
MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Chief Judge. WE CONCUR:
JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge, RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge.
AUTHOR: MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE.
{1} This case requires
us to decide whether the Delinquency Act, NMSA 1978, §§
32A-2-1 to -33 (1993,
as amended through 2005) (the Act) authorizes the children's court, pursuant to
a plea agreement, to commit a child who has been adjudicated delinquent to the
legal custody of the Children Youth & Families Department (CYFD) for an
indeterminate period up to the age of eighteen. Because we find no statutory
authority for this disposition, we reverse and remand.
{2} A petition alleging
that Paul G. (Child) committed a delinquent act and was in need of care or
rehabilitation was filed in children's court on April 21, 2003. Child was
charged with willful and deliberate murder and conspiracy to commit murder. At
the time of his arraignment, Child was twelve years old. On November 13, 2003,
Child entered into a plea agreement in which he pled no contest to aggravated
battery and conspiracy to commit second-degree murder. There was no agreement
as to disposition "except that sentence shall not run past Child's 18th
birthday." After a hearing, the children's court accepted the plea and
ordered a pre-disposition report to be prepared.
{3} At the
dispositional hearing on December 16, 2003, the juvenile probation officer
(JPO) recommended on behalf of CYFD that the children's court commit Child to
CYFD until the age of eighteen. The JPO noted that Child lacked interest in
treatment, had refused to apologize to the victim's family, demonstrated
suicidal and homicidal tendencies, and had dropped out of school after a series
of behavioral problems. After stating that Child posed a risk to the community
and himself, the JPO presented commitment to CYFD as a way for Child to receive
24-hour supervision and access to mental health and educational services. Also
concerned about Child's lack of remorse, the children's court attorney
recommended that Child be committed to the age of eighteen in order to protect
the community. Child's attorney argued that Child should receive probation so
that Child could continue treatment he had started a week earlier at an
adolescent treatment facility or in the alternative the dispositional hearing
should be continued. Based on Child's poor upbringing and lack of stability and
supervision at home, the children's court found Child a significant danger to
himself and to others. The children's court stated that it believed in
treatment, but that it did not feel comfortable putting Child on probation. The
children's court entered a disposition committing Child to the custody of CYFD
until the age of eighteen, with a recommendation that CYFD seek treatment for
Child at a secure juvenile treatment facility.
{4} After CYFD was
unable to place Child at the recommended treatment facility, Child filed a
motion seeking reconsideration of the disposition. At the hearing on Child's
motion to reconsider, the JPO requested a hearing on behalf of CYFD regarding
Child's commitment to the age of eighteen, noting for the first time that the
disposition was not specified in the Children's Code, NMSA 1978, '' 32A-1-1 to
-23-8 (1993, as amended through 2005) (Code). After denying Child's motion, the
children's court entered an amended judgment and disposition. In the amended
judgment and disposition, the children's court declared Child a delinquent
child instead of a youthful offender, excluded the recommendation that Child be
placed at the treatment facility, and modified the language of the commitment
from "an indeterminate period not exceeding 18 years of age" to read
"an indeterminate period not exceeding up to the age of 18."
{5} On April 13, 2004,
the children's court heard CYFD's motion to clarify the judgment and
disposition. CYFD argued that the children's court only had statutory authority
to enter a disposition committing Child to CYFD for one year, two years, or
until the age of twenty-one because Child in this case had committed a youthful
offender offense, and that it had no authority to commit Child to CYFD until
age eighteen. In response, the children's court explained that the judgment and
disposition was consistent with the plea agreement, and that under the Code the
children's court only had jurisdiction until age eighteen because Child was not
a youthful offender. After commenting that CYFD's motion was inappropriate, the
children's court denied it. CYFD timely appealed.
{6} On appeal, CYFD
argues that Child's commitment to the age of eighteen is unlawful and that the
Delinquency Act only authorizes a commitment to age twenty-one in these
circumstances. After first challenging CYFD's standing to appeal the judgment
and disposition of the children's court, Child responds that the disposition is
authorized by the Code. Thus, we address two issues: (1) CYFD's right to appeal
a delinquency disposition, and (2) the dispositional authority of the
children's court to commit a delinquent child to the custody of CYFD pursuant
to a plea agreement.
{7} The question
whether the Delinquency Act authorizes Child's commitment to age eighteen is
one of statutory construction which this Court reviews de novo.
See State
v. Jose S.,
2005-NMCA-094, ¶ 6,
138 N.M. 44,
116 P.3d 115,
cert. denied,
2005-NMCERT-007, 138 N.M. 145, 117 P.3d 951. "The language of unambiguous
provisions must be given effect without further interpretation. Only ambiguous
provisions require us to delve into the legislative purpose behind the
statute."
Id. (citation omitted). "Although portions of the
[Act] at issue in [this appeal] were subsequently amended, we review the
version of the [statute] in effect during the course of [Child's]
proceedings."
State v. Steven B.,
2004-NMCA-086, ¶ 11,
136 N.M.
111,
94 P.3d 854 (citations omitted) (
cert. denied, 2004-NMCERT-007, 136
N.M. 452, 99 P.3d 1164).
{8} As a preliminary
matter, we address Child's claim that CYFD does not have standing to bring this
appeal. Child asserts, based on Rule
10-108(A) NMRA, that the parties in a
delinquency proceeding are the child and the State. Because CYFD, and not the
children's court attorney who prosecuted the case below, appealed to this
Court, Child argues that CYFD is not a party to the delinquency proceedings and
otherwise lacks standing to appeal. We disagree.
{9} The Code provides
that "[a]ny party may appeal from a judgment of the court to the court of
appeals in the manner provided by law." Section 32A-1-17(A). Rule
10-108(A) provides that the parties in proceedings on petitions alleging delinquency
"are the child alleged to be delinquent and the state." In Child's
view, the entity referred to in the children's court rule as "the
state" refers to the state as the prosecutor during the delinquency
proceeding. Because CYFD did not file a motion to clarify the disposition until
after the judgment was entered, Child assumes that CYFD was not a party and
cannot appeal. Child further argues that CYFD has not otherwise demonstrated
that it was aggrieved or prejudiced by the children's court decision.
{10} This case does not
require us to determine whether the State, which was a party at the time
judgment was entered, is a party different from CYFD.
See State v.
Doe,
90 N.M. 572, 574,
566 P.2d 121, 123 (Ct. App. 1977) (noting in a
slightly different context that there was no need to determine whether the
State was a party different from the Department of Corrections). Even if we
assume that the State and CYFD are separate parties, the children's court rules
permit intervention, with leave of the court, by the custodian of the child.
See
Rule 10-108(E)(2)(a). CYFD became the custodian of Child after the initial
judgment was entered. As custodian, CYFD filed a motion to clarify the amended
disposition it was responsible for implementing. The children's court agreed to
hear the motion. Even though Child argues that CFYD did not make a formal
application to intervene as custodian, in
Doe we recognized that an
agency acting as custodian became an intervening party by virtue of the
district court's grant of its motion after the entry of judgment. 90 N.M. at
574, 566 P.2d at 123. Here intervention implicitly occurred when the children's
court heard CYFD's motion to clarify the disposition without challenging CYFD's
right to come before the court.
Cf. id. (holding that, after judgments
placed delinquent children in the custody of the department of corrections,
intervention occurred when the children's court granted the department's motion
for an extension of time for filing notices of appeal).
{11} Child points out
that after the hearing on CYFD's motion to clarify the judgment, the children's
court stated that CYFD's motion was inappropriate. This comment, Child argues,
suggests that the children's court did not allow intervention by virtue of
either the motion or the hearing. Child further argues that when the children's
court denied the motion, it could have determined that CFYD lacked standing. We
are not persuaded.
{12} Nothing in the
record indicates that the children's court thought CYFD's motion to clarify the
judgment was inappropriate because CYFD was not a proper party. Rather, at the
hearing the children's court dismissed the motion as inappropriate after
emphasizing that the disposition was consistent with the plea agreement and
that it was the understanding of the parties that a commitment to age
twenty-one would serve no purpose. Even though the children's court denied
CYFD's motion, at no time did the children's court challenge CYFD's authority
as a party to raise the issue. Nor did Child object to CYFD's motion on the
basis that CYFD was not a party. Absent any indication from the hearing or in
the children's court order to the contrary, the court implicitly allowed CYFD
to intervene by filing the motion and hearing the matter. Because CYFD is not required
to formally intervene if it wants to contest the disposition of a child
committed to its custody, we hold that CYFD's motion to clarify the judgment
and disposition should be construed as an implicit motion to intervene.
{13} Moreover, it would
have been inappropriate for the children's court to deny CYFD's motion on the
basis that CYFD lacked standing. Appeals from judgments and dispositions on
petitions alleging delinquency are governed by the rules of appellate
procedure. Rule
10-230(C) NMRA. Generally, a party may appeal if it is an
"aggrieved party," which "means a party whose interests are
adversely affected."
In re Christobal V.,
2002-NMCA-077, ¶ 8,
132
N.M. 474,
50 P.3d 569. In
State v. Doe, this Court recognized that both
"the State" and the agency to which an adjudicated delinquent is
committed are aggrieved by a disposition contrary to law.
95 N.M. 90, 92,
619
P.2d 194, 196 (Ct. App. 1980) (stating that the department of corrections,
having been permitted to intervene, is aggrieved by a disposition contrary to
law),
superseded on other grounds by statute,
NMSA 1978, §
32-1-3(P) (1992) (current version at § 32A-2-3(B)),
as recognized in State
v. Michael R.,
107 N.M. 794, 795,
765 P.2d 767, 768 (Ct. App. 1988).
Because we can see no reason why CYFD should be precluded from raising concerns
about a disposition it is responsible for carrying out, we hold that CYFD is a
proper party to this appeal.
{14} CYFD first
challenged the authority of the children's court to commit Child to the legal
custody of CYFD for an indeterminate period up to age eighteen in its motion to
clarify the initial judgment and amended disposition. Thus, CYFD's appeal from
the order affirming the disposition appears to be properly before this Court.
See
Rule
10-230.1(A) NMRA (providing that the children's court "may correct an
unlawful disposition in a delinquency proceeding at any time").
{15} The authority of the
children's court to impose a commitment is statutory.
State v. Adam M.,
2000-NMCA-049, ¶ 5,
129 N.M. 146,
2 P.3d 883. As a court of limited
jurisdiction, the children's court "is only permitted to do what is
specifically authorized" by the Code.
In re Angela R.,
105 N.M.
133, 137,
729 P.2d 1387, 1391 (Ct. App. 1986). In construing the Code, we
examine it in its entirety, reading "each part to achieve a harmonious
result."
Adam M.,
2000-NMCA-049, ¶ 5 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). "When possible, we give effect to the clear and
unambiguous language of the Code."
Id.
{16} According to Section
32A-2-19(B)(2) of the Act, the children's court has statutory authority to
commit a child found to be delinquent to the custody of CYFD for:
(a) a
short-term commitment of one year;
(b) a
long-term commitment for no more than two years in a long-term facility for the
care and rehabilitation of adjudicated delinquent children;
(c) if
the child is a delinquent offender who committed one of the criminal offenses
set forth in Subsection I of Section 32A-2-3 NMSA 1978, a commitment to age
twenty-one, unless sooner discharged; or
(d) if
the child is a youthful offender, a commitment to age twenty-one, unless sooner
discharged.
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88
(1963); A "delinquent act" is an act by a child that would be a crime
if committed by an adult. Section 32A-2-3(A). A "delinquent offender"
is a "delinquent child" ("a child who has committed a delinquent
act") who "is subject to juvenile sanctions only and who is not a
youthful offender or a serious youthful offender." Section 32A-2-3(B),
(C).
{17} Here, Child pled no
contest to aggravated battery and conspiracy to commit second-degree murder.
Aggravated battery is an act listed under Section 32A-2-3(I).
See §
32A-2-19(B)(2)(c) (providing that if child is a delinquent offender who has
committed one of the offenses enumerated in Section 32A-2-3(I), commitment to
the age of twenty-one is authorized). Although Child was originally found to be
a youthful offender, the judgment and disposition was later amended to find
that Child was a delinquent child. Because Child was twelve years old when he
committed his acts, he does not qualify as a youthful offender or as a serious
youthful offender and thus is subject only to juvenile sanctions as a
delinquent offender.
See § 32A-2-3(H), (I). However, contrary to the
children's court's statement about its jurisdiction extending only until Child
reaches the age of eighteen, the Code allows jurisdiction to extend until age
twenty-one.
See State v. Adam M.,
1998-NMCA-014, ¶ 4,
124 N.M.
505,
953 P.2d 40.
{18} On appeal, CYFD
argues that Section 32A-2-19(B)(2) controls this disposition. Accordingly, CYFD
contends that the only types of commitments available for Child include:
"(a) a short-term commitment of one year; (b) a long-term commitment for
no more than two years;" or (c) "a commitment to age twenty-one,
unless sooner discharged." § 32A-2-19(B)(2)(a)-(c). Thus, the State
maintains that commitment to the age of eighteen is not one of the commitment
options statutorily authorized for an adjudicated delinquent offender such as
Child.
{19} Child objects to the
State's argument, arguing that the disposition was authorized by the Act.
According to the plea agreement, the parties agreed that Child's sentence would
not extend past his eighteenth birthday. Child argues that the disposition,
which was consistent with the plea agreement, was not illegal. The plea
agreement merely limited the court's ability to impose a disposition under
Section 32A-2-19(B)(2)(c), which would otherwise subject Child to CYFD's
custody to age twenty-one. Thus, in Child's view, the agreement was essentially
a sentencing cap.
{20} We reject this
argument. The language in Section 32A-2-19(B)(2) is not ambiguous. The statute
specifies three possible dispositions: a short-term commitment of one year, a
long-term commitment of no more than two years, or a commitment until age
twenty-one, unless sooner discharged.
See § 32A-2-19(B)(2)(a)-(c).
Giving effect to the clear language of the Act, we conclude that the statute
does not authorize the children's court to impose a disposition allowing a
commitment less than to age twenty-one, unless it is a short-term commitment of
one year or a long-term commitment of no more than two years.
See Adam M.,
2000-NMCA-049, ¶ 6 (interpreting the statute as requiring commitment for an
adjudicated delinquent offender to be either one year, two years, or until age
twenty-one);
see also State v. Dennis F.,
104 N.M. 619, 621,
725 P.2d
595, 597 (Ct. App. 1986) (interpreting an earlier version of the Children's
Code, which also provides for indeterminate commitment, and stating that a
court may neither exceed the time authorized by the statute, nor commit a child
"for a specified period less than the time authorized by statute");
Doe, 95 N.M. at 92-93, 619 P.2d at 196-97 (stating that "not more than
one year" language in the previous version of the Code does not authorize
the children's court to transfer custody to an agency for specified terms of
less than one year because the sentencing is indeterminate and the parole
board, not the court, determines the time of release).
{21} Moreover, far from
allowing judicial discretion to fashion commitments of various lengths, the
legislature provided specified mechanisms to allow flexibility in order
"to accomplish the rehabilitative purposes of the Code."
See Adam
M., 2000-NMCA-049, ¶ 9. Those mechanisms provide that a child must be
released before the commitment expires if the purposes of commitment are met.
See
§ 32A-2-23(F) (providing that "[t]he court may terminate a judgment if [a]
child is no longer in need of care, supervision or rehabilitation or [the
court] may [extend or modify] a judgment if . . . necessary to safeguard the
child or the public interest"). In addition, the children's court may
extend a long-term commitment "for additional periods of one year until
the child reaches the age of twenty-one" upon a finding that it "is necessary
to safeguard the welfare of the child or the public interest." Section
32A-2-23(D). As we concluded in
Adam M., "the children's court must
exercise its discretion over a long-term commitment at the end of the
commitment, after reviewing a record of the child's performance while
committed, instead of at the beginning when the court has less information
before it."
2000-NMCA-049, ¶ 10. Because the Act expressly provides
procedures for addressing delinquent children who are not rehabilitated during
a long-term commitment of two years, the children's court was required to use
those procedures. Under the statute, the children's court had no authority to
impose an indeterminate initial commitment greater than two years and less than
to age twenty-one.
{22} Child next argues
that a commitment up to age eighteen is authorized by Section 32A-2-19(B)(1).
At the time of the hearing, Section 32A-2-19(B)(1) provided that the court may
enter a judgment making "any disposition that is authorized for the disposition
of a neglected or abused child, in accordance with the Abuse and Neglect
Act."
See § 32A-2-19(B)(1) (2003) (prior to 2005 amendment).
1 Under the Abuse and Neglect Act,
Sections 32A-4-1 to -33 "[i]f a child is found to be neglected or
abused," the children's court may "place the child under protective
supervision of [CYFD]." Section 32A-4-22(B)(2). Reading this subsection in
conjunction with Section 32A-4-24(F), which provides that all neglect and abuse
orders terminate when a child reaches eighteen years of age, Child urges us to
conclude that the children's court has the authority to place Child under
CYFD's protective supervision until the age of eighteen. Child also relies on
Section 32A-4-22(F) to support his interpretation of the disposition options
under the Abuse and Neglect Act.
See § 32A-4-22(F) (providing that
"[u]nless a child found to be neglected or abused is also found to be
delinquent, the child shall not be confined in an institution established for
the long-term care and rehabilitation of delinquent children"). Thus,
Child argues that the Abuse and Neglect Act explicitly authorizes a disposition
transferring custody of a delinquent child to CYFD until the age of eighteen
for commitment to an institution for long-term care and rehabilitation.
{23} While we note that
the children's court did not expressly find Child to be neglected or abused, we
reject Child's argument that the disposition of the children's court is
consistent with putting child under protective supervision until the age of
eighteen. A possible disposition under the Abuse and Neglect Act allows
transferring legal custody of a child found to be delinquent and abused or
neglected to an agency such as CYFD.
See § 32A-4-22(B)(3)(b). While this
disposition appears most relevant to Child's circumstances, it does not help
Child. The Abuse and Neglect Act limits dispositional judgments "vesting
legal custody of a child in an agency" to "an indeterminate period
not exceeding two years from the date entered." Section 32A-4-24(A). Thus,
even if we construe the proceedings as consistent with finding Child abused or
neglected, the Abuse and Neglect Act provides no authority for committing Child
for an indeterminate period beyond two years.
{24} Because we conclude
the children's court was not authorized to commit Child for an indeterminate
period of time up to the age of eighteen, we reverse the disposition of the
children's court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
See
Dennis F., 104 N.M. at 621-22, 725 P.2d at 597-98 (stating that "an
invalid sentence may be corrected by the imposition of a proper sentence"
without violating the guarantee against double jeopardy). While we recognize
that the parties agreed that Child's sentence would not extend beyond his
eighteenth birthday, the children's court has no authority to enter a
disposition not authorized by statute.
Seeid. at 621, 725 P.2d at 597.
Accordingly, Child may withdraw his plea and is entitled to a full adjudication
on the merits.
See Adam M.,
1998-NMCA-014, ¶ 9 (noting that the right to
adjudication cannot be given up without knowledge of the potential penalties).
Alternatively, the district court may hold a hearing to determine whether the
plea agreement can be reasonably interpreted to support a legal commitment
under Section 32A-2-19(B)(2)(a) or (b), and whether the parties should be bound
by such an interpretation.
{25} For the reasons
stated above, the judgment and disposition of the children's court is reversed.
We remand to the children's court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Chief Judge
RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge