SANTA FE CNTY. BD. CNTY. COMM'RS V. TOWN
OF EDGEWOOD, 2004-NMCA-111, 136 N.M. 301, 97 P.3d 633
SANTA FE COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
TOWN OF EDGEWOOD,
Respondent-Appellee,
and
CAMPBELL FARMING CORPORATION,
Intervenor.
COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
2004-NMCA-111,
136 N.M. 301, 97 P.3d 633
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF
SANTA FE COUNTY, James A. Hall, District Judge.
Monica M. Ontiveros, Assistant County
Attorney, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant
David Henderson, Downing & Henderson,
P.C., Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee
Randall L. Thompson, Thompson &
Kushner LLP, Albuquerque, NM, for Intervenor
JAMES J. WECHSLER, Chief Judge. WE CONCUR:
JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge. RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge.
AUTHOR: JAMES J. WECHSLER
{1} The Santa Fe Board
of County Commissioners (the County) appeals from a district court order
dismissing its appeal from a Town of Edgewood (the Town) municipal ordinance
expressing the Town's consent to the annexation of property within the county.
Dismissal was based on the ground that the County lacked standing because it
did not own land within the annexed territory, as required by the applicable
annexation statute, NMSA 1978, §
3-7-17(C) (1998). On appeal, the County argues
that it satisfies the statutory requirement of "owning land" in the
annexed territory because its maintenance of public roads in the annexed area
has created title by prescription or common law implied dedication. The County
claims that this conclusion is supported by our recent case law interpreting
this standing requirement and by the legislative purpose behind the statute.
Because Section 3-7-17(C) requires equitable or legal fee title to real
property in the area annexed, the County's use interest is insufficient to give
it standing to appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the district court.
{2} The Town adopted a
number of ordinances in the fall of 2001 that approved the annexation of land
within Bernalillo, Sandoval, and Santa Fe counties pursuant to the petition
method of annexation, as set forth in Section 3-7-17. The County filed an
appeal in district court on January 2, 2002, challenging the validity of all of
the ordinances.
The County subsequently agreed to the dismissal of its
appeal except as to a single ordinance involving the consent to the annexation
of 18,214 acres under Section 3-7-17(A)(4). The County took the position that
there were a number of technical deficiencies with the petition method of
annexation that was used.
{3} The Town moved to
dismiss the County's appeal arguing that the County lacked standing.
Specifically, the Town argued that whatever interest the County had through its
maintenance of various public roads, this interest did not rise to the level of
"owning land" as required by Section 3-7-17(C). The County argued in
response that it "owned" a number of roads within the territory
annexed because the public's use and the County's maintenance of the roads
created a public easement by prescription. Campbell
Farming Corporation
(Campbell), owner of fee simple title to 13,538 acres of the 18,214 acres
subject to the appeal, intervened
. Campbell argued that regardless of
whether a prescriptive easement had been created, such a use interest was
insufficient to satisfy the ownership requirement of the statute. After a
hearing, the district court entered its order dismissing the appeal,
essentially agreeing with the Town and Campbell that, even if it assumed that
the County had a use interest in the property, the County's interest did not
amount to "owning land" as required in Section 3-7-17(C).
{4} The issue of
standing generally involves a question of law that is reviewed de novo on
appeal.
See Forest
Guardians v. Powell,
2001-NMCA-028, ¶ 5,
130 N.M. 368,
24 P.3d 803.
Typically, standing to contest governmental action involves a fairly broad
inquiry.
See De Vargas Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Campbell,
87
N.M. 469, 473,
535 P.2d 1320, 1324 (1975). In the context of this appeal,
however, the legislature has provided a specific, more restrictive test for
standing in cases involving the petition method of annexation.
See § 3-7-17(C) (stating requirement of
"any person owning land within the territory annexed"). In construing
the language of this statute, we likewise apply a de novo standard of review.
See Morgan Keegan
Mortgage Co. v. Candelaria,
1998-NMCA-008, ¶ 5,
124 N.M. 405,
951 P.2d
1066 (noting that interpretation of a statute is a question of law which an
appellate court reviews de novo). In doing so, we must be mindful of the
procedural posture of this case.
See City of Sunland Park v. Santa Teresa Servs. Co.,
2003-NMCA-106, ¶ 39,
134 N.M. 243,
75 P.3d 843 (stating that appropriate
standard of review depends on procedural posture if additional facts are
presented). Because the district court considered matters outside of the
pleadings, including an affidavit, in support of the County's claim that there
are county roads in the annexed area, the procedural posture is an appeal from
an order granting summary judgment.
Peck v. Title
USA Ins. Corp.,
108 N.M. 30, 32,
766 P.2d 290, 292 (1988) (upholding
treatment of motion to dismiss as motion for summary judgment after
presentation of matters outside the pleadings). Therefore, in applying our de
novo interpretation of Section 3-7-17(C), we consider the facts in the light
most favorable to the County's position.
See
Madsen v. Scott,
1999-NMSC-042, ¶ 7,
128
N.M. 255,
992 P.2d 268.
{5} Under the petition
method of annexation, standing to appeal is limited to "any person owning
land within the territory annexed." Section 3-7-17(C). In construing this
language, the guiding principle is to give effect to the intent of the
legislature.
See Roth v. Thompson,
113 N.M. 331, 332,
825 P.2d
1241, 1242 (1992). In our inquiry, we first employ the "plain meaning
rule" to determine if the language unambiguously sets forth the
legislative intent.
See Roberts v. Southwest Cmty. Health Servs.,
114
N.M. 248, 251,
837 P.2d 442, 445 (1992) ("Our interpretation of
legislative intent comes primarily from the language used by the legislature,
and we will consider the ordinary meaning of such language unless a different
intent is clearly expressed."). Even if the language appears to be free of
ambiguity, we nevertheless consider whether the plain language leads to an
absurd result, runs counter to other statutory provisions, or otherwise appears
contrary to legislative intent.
See State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos,
117 N.M. 346,
352-53,
871 P.2d 1352, 1358-59 (1994). We agree with the Town and Campbell that
the plain meaning of "owning land" is to have equitable or legal fee
title ownership of real estate within the annexed territory. To "own"
is "[t]o have or possess as property; to have legal title to."
Black's Law Dictionary 1130 (7th ed. 1999). Ownership includes the right to
convey,
see id.
at 1131, which in this case translates into the right to convey land that lies
within the territory annexed by the Town. Ownership of land also includes the
right to exclude others, "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle
of rights that are commonly characterized as property."
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176
(1979).
{6} "Land" is
most commonly understood to refer to corporeal, physical property:
"Ultimately, as a juristic
concept,'land' is simply an area of three-dimensional space, its position being
identified by natural or imaginary points located by reference to the earth's
surface. 'Land' is not the fixed contents of that space, although, as we shall
see, the owner of that space may well own those fixed contents. Land is
immoveable, as distinct from chattels, which are moveable; it is also, in its
legal significance, indestructible. The contents of the space may be physically
severed, destroyed or consumed, but the space itself, and so the 'land',
remains immutable."
Black's Law Dictionary at 881 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
{7} It follows that the
plain meaning of "owning land" as used in Section 3-7-17(C) is to
have an interest in real property that would amount to equitable or fee title.
However, it would be unusual for statutory language to be absolutely free of
ambiguity.
See Gallegos, 117 N.M. at 353, 871 P.2d at 1359. The
County argues therefore that "owning land" can mean "owning an
interest in land." However, two considerations undermine this contention.
First, we will not read language into a statute when the statute makes sense as
written.
See High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City of Albuquerque,
1998-NMSC-050, ¶ 5,
126 N.M. 413,
970 P.2d 599. If the legislature intended to
expand the class of people who had standing to those who merely held some form
of a property interest, such as a use interest, the legislature could easily
have so worded the statute. Second, as noted above, the legislature has evinced
an intent to streamline and expedite the appeal process by departing from
general rules of standing to contest governmental action.
Cf. De Vargas Sav.
& Loan Ass'n, 87 N.M. at 473, 535 P.2d at 1324 ("[T]o attain
standing in a suit arguing the unlawfulness of governmental action, the
complainant must allege that he is injured in fact or is imminently threatened
with injury, economically or otherwise."). As the Town and Campbell have
pointed out, interpreting "owning land" to mean "owning an
interest in land" would virtually eliminate the standing requirement
because, as in these circumstances, the existence of a public easement could
conceivably confer standing on all members of the traveling public. This result
runs contrary to one of our guiding principles in determining legislative
intent; we do not interpret a statute to render statutory language meaningless.
See Montoya
v. Mentor Corp.,
1996-NMCA-067, ¶ 19,
122 N.M. 2,
919 P.2d 410 ("We
have always rejected an interpretation of a statute that would make parts of it
mere surplusage or meaningless.").
{8} The County further
argues that the legislature intended a flexible standing requirement because it
did not provide any requirement for standing to appeal an annexation ordinance
adopted by a municipality under the arbitration method of annexation. It
contends that without flexibility, counties will generally not be able to
appeal an annexation ordinance because counties do not generally own roads in
fee. The County asserts that it has an interest in the annexation to ensure a
smooth transition in the transfer of services. We agree with the County that we
are to construe statutes in order to accomplish the intent of the legislature.
Burroughs v. Bd. of County Comm'rs,
88 N.M. 303,
306,
540 P.2d 233, 236 (1975). However, we interpret the legislative intent
differently from the County. As we have discussed, the legislature intended a
more narrow standing requirement for the petition method than the County urges
in order to streamline the appeal process. Under this legislative intent,
counties that do not own roads in equitable or fee title may participate in the
process leading to an ordinance consenting to an annexation petition in order to
ensure an orderly transition in services, but may not appeal from the adoption
of the ordinance.
State ex rel. State Highway & Transportation
Department v. City of Sunland Park
{9} The County, the
Town, and Campbell all argue that their positions are supported by this Court's
decision in
State ex rel. State Highway &
Transportation Department v. City of Sunland Park,
1999-NMCA-143,
128
N.M. 371,
993 P.2d 85 (Sunland Park). In
Sunland
Park, the City argued that the State of New Mexico Highway Department failed
to satisfy the "owning land" requirement in Section 3-7-17(C) because
it did not hold title to land within the annexed territory.
Sunland Park,
1999-NMCA-143, ¶ 13. The Highway
Department acknowledged that it did not have legal title, but claimed that
sufficient ownership interest was created by NMSA 1978, §
67-2-5 (1929), which
vests fee title in the state for public roads in use for a period of one year.
Sunland Park,
1999-NMCA-143, ¶ 14. This Court
held that Section 67-2-5 gave the Highway Department "what amounted to
equitable title. Indeed, the State's interest was superior to the equitable
title to real estate held by a purchaser under a real estate contract, because
all conditions necessary for the State's acquiring title had been satisfied."
Sunland Park,
1999-NMCA-143, ¶ 15.
{10} In its brief in
chief, the County maintains that "[t]he [d]istrict [c]ourt's analysis
fails to fully appreciate and contradicts this Court's holding in [
Sunland Park]." A review of the County's
arguments, however, indicates that it does not dispute the obvious holding of
Sunland Park, that one must have legal or
equitable title to land to satisfy Section 3-7-17(C). The County acknowledges
that in
Sunland Park the Highway
Department had "what amounted to a statutory right to title, with the
possibility of a reversion" by virtue of Section 67-2-5, which vests a
property interest in a right of way for one year for a public highway in the
State of New Mexico so long as it is used for highway purposes. There is no comparable
statute pertaining to counties. Instead, the County disputes the determination
that it lacked title to the property.
We therefore consider the County's
grounds for holding title.
The County's Claimed Ownership Interest
{11} The County claims
that it has "title" for purposes of Section 3-7-17(C) as a result of
either a prescriptive easement or implied or express dedication. Initially, we
note that the County's use of the term "title" appears to be an
effort to equate any property interest with an interest amounting to
"title" sufficient to constitute ownership of land. Black's Law
Dictionary defines "title" as: "The union of all elements (as
ownership, possession, and custody) constituting the legal right to control and
dispose of property; the legal link between a person who owns property and the
property itself." Black's Law Dictionary at 1493;
cf. State v.
Montano,
93 N.M. 436, 441,
601 P.2d 69, 74 (Ct. App. 1979) (adopting
similar definition for title to a motor vehicle). Therefore, the County's
claims of "title" in the context of Section 3-7-17(C) must
demonstrate that the County actually owned the land in question.
{12} The County's claim
of a prescriptive easement is based on its maintenance of certain public roads
within the annexed area. We agree with the Town, Campbell, and the district
court that it is not necessary for us to decide whether the County had an
easement. Even if it held an easement, it would not become an owner of the land
in question.
Cf. Michelet v. Cole,
20 N.M. 357, 363,
149 P. 310,
311 (1915) ("A party cannot have an easement in his own land, as all the
uses of an easement are fully comprehended and embraced in his general right of
ownership.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{13} The County also
claims that it has title by common law dedication, whereby a landowner offers
to dedicate certain property for public use and the offer is accepted.
See Watson v. City
of Albuquerque,
76 N.M. 566, 568,
417 P.2d 54, 55 (1966). The County
claims that the public has used the roads in question for at least fifteen
years and no property owner has objected or intervened in this lawsuit. Again,
however, even if we assume that there has been an implied offer by acquiescence
and an acceptance by continued maintenance, the County would merely have a use
interest, an easement in the property, which is insufficient to satisfy Section
3-7-17(C).
See 23 Am. Jur. 2d
Dedication § 54, at 46 (2002) ("By a
common-law dedication the fee does not pass; the public acquires only an
easement in the land designated for its use.");
see also Luevano
v. Maestas,
117 N.M. 580, 586-87,
874 P.2d 788, 794-95 (Ct. App. 1994)
(recognizing the difference between prescriptive easement and common law
dedication concerning rights of way and comparing common law dedication to
easement by estoppel).
{14} Standing under
Section 3-7-17(C) requires an equitable or fee title interest. The County has
at most a use interest. It is insufficient to confer standing under Section
3-7-17(C). We affirm the district court.
JAMES J. WECHSLER, Chief Judge
RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge