STATE V. RIOS, 1999-NMCA-069, 127 N.M. 334, 980 P.2d 1068
STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ANTHONY RIOS, Defendant-Appellant.
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW MEXICO
1999-NMCA-069, 127 N.M. 334, 980 P.2d 1068
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF
BERNALILLO COUNTY. Albert S. "Pat" Murdoch, District Judge.
As Corrected June 25, 1999. Released
for Publication May 28, 1999. Certiorari Denied, No. 25,694, May 24, 1999. As
Corrected May 9, 2000.
Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General,
James O. Bell, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.
Adam G. Kurtz, Albuquerque, NM, for
Appellant.
RUDY S. APODACA, Judge. WE CONCUR: RICHARD
C. BOSSON, Judge, JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge.
{1} The metropolitan
court, as a court of record, convicted Defendant for driving while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor (DWI) contrary to NMSA 1978, §
66-8-102
(1993). Defendant appealed to the district court, which affirmed the
conviction. He raises two issues on appeal to this court: (1) he was entitled
as a matter of law to assert the defense of duress to the DWI charge and (2)
there was insufficient evidence to refute this defense. We hold that the
common-law defense of duress is available to defendants charged with the strict
liability crime of DWI. We conclude, however, that substantial evidence
supported Defendant's conviction, even considering the defense, and we
therefore affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{2} After leaving a
bar at closing time, Defendant claims he and his brother were threatened with
violence by an angry mob. Both of them then sought refuge in Defendant's truck.
As the alleged attack continued, Defendant testified that he started the
vehicle and began to drive "slowly" out of the parking lot. Almost
immediately, police arrived on the scene, determined Defendant's blood-alcohol
level to be .14, and arrested him for DWI.
{3} The metropolitan
court, acting as fact finder in a non-jury trial, found that Defendant had not
acted reasonably in the face of the alleged threat. As a result, the court
found that Defendant's act of driving while under the influence was not an
excusable result of duress. Defendant appealed to the district court, claiming
error in the metropolitan court's review of the evidence. The district court,
however, did not evaluate the evidence. Instead, it held as a matter of law
that duress was unavailable to a defendant charged with DWI.
A. Availability of Duress Defense to a DWI
Defendant
{4} The question of
whether the defense of duress is available to a defendant in a DWI case is an
issue this Court has not previously been called upon to address. The specific
issue is whether it is of legal consequence that a defendant charged with DWI
{*336} allegedly violated the law only to
escape a threat of immediate death or great bodily harm.
Compare Esquibel v.
State,
91 N.M. 498, 501,
576 P.2d 1129, 1132 (1978) (holding "that
duress is a defense available in New Mexico except when the crime charged is a
homicide or a crime requiring intent to kill"),
overruled on other
grounds by State v. Wilson,
116 N.M. 793, 796,
867 P.2d 1175, 1178 (1994),
with
State v. Lucero,
98 N.M. 204, 206-07,
647 P.2d 406, 408-09 (1982) (holding
that duress is unavailable to defendants charged with the strict liability
offense of child abuse). This is a question of law that we review de novo.
See
State v. Ogden,
118 N.M. 234, 240,
880 P.2d 845, 851 (1994).
1. Strict Liability Crimes
{5} "Criminal
liability is normally based upon the concurrence of two factors, an
evil-meaning mind [and] an evil-doing hand."
United States v. Bailey,
444 U.S. 394, 402, 62 L. Ed. 2d 575, 100 S. Ct. 624 (1980) (quoting
Morissette
v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251, 96 L. Ed. 288, 72 S. Ct. 240 (1952))
(internal quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, it is well recognized that our
Legislature has the constitutional authority to establish strict liability
crimes.
See Lucero, 98 N.M. at 206, 647 P.2d at 408 ("The
Legislature may forbid the doing of an act and make its commission criminal
without regard to the intent of the wrongdoer."). The principal effect of
criminalizing acts without requiring criminal intent is to ease the
prosecution's burden in proving its case.
See id. ("The sole
question for the jury in a strict liability offense is whether [it] believes
the defendant committed the act prescribed by the statute. If it finds that the
defendant did commit the act, then the jury is obliged to bring a guilty
verdict."). The principal reason for establishing strict liability crimes
"is that the public interest in the matter is so compelling or that the
potential for harm is so great, that public interests override individual
interests."
Id.
{6} This Court has
held that DWI is a strict liability offense.
See State v. Harrison,
115
N.M. 73, 77-78,
846 P.2d 1082, 1086-87 ("We believe that the legislature
recognized this significant public interest [in deterring drunk driving] and
potential harm when it drafted [the DWI statute] and made no mention of the
need to prove a required intent in order to secure a conviction.").
Consequently, the State need not show a level of criminal intent to obtain a
conviction for DWI. It must show only that the accused exercised control of a
motor vehicle while his or her blood contained a certain percentage of alcohol.
See id. ; § 66-8-102(C) ("It is unlawful for any person who has an
alcohol concentration of eight one-hundredths or more in his blood or breath to
drive any vehicle within this state.").
{7} Without contesting
the degree of his intoxication, Defendant maintained in both the metropolitan
and district courts that he drove under duress. In New Mexico, this defense
typically consists of three elements: (1) the defendant committed the crime
under threat, (2) the defendant feared immediate bodily harm to himself or
others if he failed to commit the crime, and (3) a reasonable person in the
defendant's position would have acted in the same way under the circumstances.
See
State v. Duncan,
111 N.M. 354, 355,
805 P.2d 621, 622 (1991); UJI
14-5130
NMRA 1999 (duress in nonhomicide crimes). As a basic rule, if a criminal
defendant presents sufficient prima facie evidence to support this defense, he
or she "is entitled to instruction on that theory."
State v.
Castrillo,
112 N.M. 766, 769,
819 P.2d 1324, 1327 (1991).
3. Duress as Defense to DWI
{8} The great weight
of authority supports the conclusion "that duress is a defense available
in New Mexico except when the crime charged is a homicide or a crime requiring
intent to kill."
Esquibel, 91 N.M. at 501, 576 P.2d at 1132;
cf.
UJI 14-5130 (noting in committee commentary that "UJI 14-5130 applies to
all crimes, other than homicide, a crime requiring an intent to kill or escape
from a penitentiary");
see also State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421, 378
A.2d 755, 761 (N.J. 1977);
People v. Pena, 149 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 14,
197 Cal. Rptr. 264, 269 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1983);
State v. St.
Clair, 262 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Mo.
{*337} 1953).
Indeed, our Supreme Court has recently noted this rule.
See Reed v. State ex
rel. Ortiz, 1997-NMSC-55, P95,
124 N.M. 129,
947 P.2d 86,
rev'd on other
grounds, 524 U.S. 151, 118 S. Ct. 1860, 141 L. Ed. 2d 131 (1998);
see
also State v. Baca,
114 N.M. 668, 673,
845 P.2d 762, 767 (1992) (noting
favorably
Esquibel rule);
Castrillo, 112 N.M. at 771 n.3, 819
P.2d at 1329 n.3. That being the case, it would appear that duress should be
equally available when the crime charged is proscribed by common law or by a
statute imposing strict liability. The State, however, relying on our Supreme
Court's holding in
Lucero, decided in 1982, argues that duress is
unavailable to strict liability defendants because in such instances, the State
need not prove intent.
{9} In
Lucero,
our Supreme Court held that "duress is not a defense to [the strict
liability offense of] child abuse because the mental state of the defendant is
not essential."
Lucero, 98 N.M. at 207, 647 P.2d at 409. Phrased
differently, the court in
Lucero reasoned that, since strict liability
offenses do not require the state to put forward evidence regarding intent,
defenses turning on a defendant's mental state are not allowed.
Lucero
thus appears to require holding in this appeal that the defense of duress is
not available to Defendant. For the reasons that follow, however, we determine
that
Lucero 's holding is not dispositive of this appeal.
{10} We first note
that although this 1982 decision has not been overruled, no reported decision
has ever cited it for the wholesale prohibition of duress as a defense to all
strict liability criminal charges as the State now advocates in this appeal.
This lack of reliance is notable especially since our Supreme Court has been
presented with appeals directly implicating
Lucero 's purported holding.
See Baca, 114 N.M. at 674, 845 P.2d at 768 (noting "wholesale
rejection of the duress defense" is unnecessary in cases where a defendant
is charged with "a crime closely approaching a strict liability
crime");
Castrillo, 112 N.M. at 771, 819 P.2d at 1329 ("We
merely evaluate the different elements [of the duress defense] in the context
of the strict liability crime of felon in possession of a firearm."). On
these occasions, the Supreme Court failed even to note
Lucero and
instead reiterated the
Esquibel rule.
See Baca, 114 N.M. at 673,
845 P.2d at 767;
Castrillo, 112 N.M. at 771 n.3, 819 P.2d at 1329 n.3.
It therefore appears that the Supreme Court has distanced itself from, if not overruled
sub silentio,
Lucero and replaced its analysis of duress with
more recent pronouncements. We therefore determine that
Lucero is not
binding in the context of a DWI case.
Cf. State ex rel. Martinez v. City of
Las Vegas,
118 N.M. 257, 258-59,
880 P.2d 868, 869-70 (Ct. App.) (noting
lack of Supreme Court reaffirmance of older decision as reason to depart from
aged precedent),
cert. granted,
118 N.M. 430,
882 P.2d 21 (1994).
{11} We also observe
that commentators have specifically criticized
Lucero as a misanalysis
of the law of duress.
See Heather R. Skinazi,
Not Just a
"Conjured Afterthought": Using Duress as a Defense for Battered Women
Who "Fail to Protect", 85 Cal. L. Rev. 993, 1039-41 (1997);
Martin R. Gardner,
The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the
Role of Motive in the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 Utah L. Rev. 635,
738-41 (1993). The crux of this criticism is that
Lucero fundamentally
misunderstood the defense. In so doing, it "fell into a common mistake: it
viewed duress as negating the mens rea required for criminal culpability rather
than recognizing duress as an excuse [that] negates the culpability factor
required for the offense." Skinazi,
supra, at 1040 (footnote
omitted);
see also Gardner,
supra, at 741.
{12} We consider these
observations well-founded. A defendant pleading duress is
not attempting
to disprove a requisite mental state.
See United States v. Johnson, 956
F.2d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that defense of duress "assumes that
the defendant has voluntarily performed the criminal act"). Defendants in
that context are instead attempting to show that they ought to be excused from
criminal liability because of the circumstances surrounding their intentional
act.
See United States v. Bailey, 190 U.S. App. D.C. 142, 585 F.2d 1087,
1111 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wilkey, J., dissenting) ("The theoretical basis for
the duress defense is excuse . . . . Although
{*338}
a defendant has the mental state [that] the crime requires, his conduct . .
. is excused or justified because he has . . . avoided a harm of greater
magnitude.") (emphasis omitted),
rev'd, 444 U.S. at 397;
see
also Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr.,
Substantive Criminal
Law § 5.3, at 614-15 (1986) (noting that duress does not negate mental
state or volitional act, but instead justifies the intended criminal act).
But
cf. United States v. Mitchell, 725 F.2d 832, 835 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting
duress defense "raises broad philosophical issues concerning the nature of
voluntary action for purposes of criminal responsibility and the appropriate
conditions for holding a person morally blameworthy"; further noting
disagreement among state jurisdictions regarding the relation of mens rea and
duress). We consider this exposition of the defense compelling and one that we
will adopt in this appeal.
{13} We also note that
we have not uncovered any extrajurisdictional support for
Lucero or the
State's argument in this appeal. Even
State v. Fogarty, 128 N.J. 59, 607
A.2d 624 (N.J. 1992), a New Jersey case on which the State relies, does not
support the State's position.
Fogarty equivocates on the legal question
here raised and finds instead, as a factual matter, that the defendant failed
to present sufficient evidence to establish duress.
See 607 A.2d at
629-30 (finding it unnecessary to reach the question of whether duress was
available in DWI cases as "defendant has failed to establish that he acted
under duress in this case").
{14} Other courts
dealing head-on with this issue have explicitly held that, subject to strict
evidentiary requirements, the defense of necessity is permissible.
See Pena,
197 Cal. Rptr. at 271-72 (duress is a defense to DWI);
Toops v. State,
643 N.E.2d 387, 389-90 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (holding if defendant meets
evidentiary threshold in assertion of affirmative defense, he is entitled to a
jury instruction on necessity in DUI case);
State v. Shotton, 142 Vt.
558, 458 A.2d 1105, 1107 (Vt. 1983) (necessity is a defense to DWI);
State
v. Olson, 79 Ore. App. 302, 719 P.2d 55, 57 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (choice of
evils defense available to DUI defendant);
State v. Riedl, 15 Kan. App.
2d 326, 807 P.2d 697, 699 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that compulsion is a
defense to absolute liability traffic offenses). Also,
see generally
Michael J. Yaworsky, Annotation,
Driving While Intoxicated: "Choice of
Evils" Defense That Driving Was Necessary to Protect Life or Property,
64 A.L.R.4th 298 passim (1989) (discussing defense of necessity in DWI cases);
but
compare id. at § 1(a) (asserting legal distinction between defenses of necessity
and duress)
with Steven J. Gaynor, Annotation,
Automobiles: Necessity
or Emergency as Defense in Prosecution for Driving Without Operator's License
or While License is Suspended, 7 A.L.R.5th 73, 81 (1993) (abandoning
previously asserted distinction between necessity and duress);
see also
Bailey, 444 U.S. at 409-10 (noting that while "common law historically
distinguished between the defenses of duress and necessity . . . . modern cases
have tended to blur the distinction").
{15} Other
jurisdictions have tacitly approved of the defense but have held that
defendants failed to establish the factual prerequisites and were therefore not
entitled to a jury instruction regarding duress.
See Reeve v. State, 764
P.2d 324, 326 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (holding in DWI case that necessity
defense was unavailable where defendant failed to show that she brought her
conduct into compliance with the law after situation creating necessity had
passed);
State v. Fee, 126 N.H. 78, 489 A.2d 606, 607 (N.H. 1985)
(holding in DWI case that defense of competing harms was unavailable where
threatened harm was only speculative and uncertain);
see also State v.
Alexander, 24 Kan. App. 2d 817, 953 P.2d 685, 688-89 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that defense of compulsion was not available to defendant, a habitual
violator, where he illegally drove his vehicle after cause of compulsion had
passed). In summary, we determine the breadth of extrajurisdictional analyses
of this issue is directly contrary to
Lucero and to the State's position
in this appeal.
{16} We conclude that
Lucero
is not controlling and apply the Supreme Court's more recent reasoning on this
point: "We do not believe that a wholesale rejection of the duress defense
. . . is necessary."
Baca, 114
{*339}
N.M. at 674, 845 P.2d at 768. "Application of the concept of duress to
a charge of [a strict liability crime] does not require us to develop special
rules or alter the law of duress. We merely evaluate the different elements in
the context of the strict liability crime[.]"
Castrillo, 112 N.M.
at 771, 819 P.2d at 1329. We must approach the application of this defense to
DWI charges with care so as not to "vitiate the protectionary purpose of
the strict liability statute."
Baca, 114 N.M. at 674, 845 P.2d at
768.
{17} Baca 's narrowed
articulation of the duress defense achieves this purpose. Under this test:
the defendant must produce sufficient evidence that:
(1) he was under an unlawful and imminent threat of death or serious bodily
injury; (2) he did not recklessly place himself in a situation that would
likely compel him to engage in the criminal conduct; (3) he did not have a
reasonable legal alternative (in other words, he could not have reasonably
avoided the threatened harm or the criminal conduct in which he engaged); and
(4) a direct causal relationship existed between the criminal action and the
avoidance of the threatened harm.
114 N.M. at 674-75, 845 P.2d at 768-69.
"'The keystone of the analysis is that the defendant
must have no alternative--either before or during the event--to avoid violating
the law.'" Id. at 675, 845 P.2d at 769 (quoting United States v.
Singleton, 902 F.2d 471, 473 (6th Cir. 1990)). This view of the law takes
into consideration "'the nature of the crime, the evil the crime is
designed to prevent, and the nature of the defense.'" Id. (quoting Castrillo,
112 N.M. at 773, 819 P.2d at 1331).
4. State's Fear of Pretextual Defenses
{18} The State argues
that permitting the defense of duress in DWI cases would lead to an explosion
of "fabricated" or "pretextual defenses." We consider this
concern unfounded for the reason that pretextual defenses will fall of their
own weight. The State, for example, raises the specter of drunk drivers
starting bar brawls in anticipation of mounting pretextual duress defenses to
DWI charges. If the State were to face such arguments down the road, however,
its response would be clear--it is a prima facie element of duress that the
defendant did not recklessly create the situation from which he or she attempts
to flee.
See id. Besides, even if faced with such a case, the State has
at its disposal an arsenal of other applicable charges that it could bring to
bear, for example assault, battery, or mayhem.
{19} The duress
defense is "among the oldest principles of criminal law."
Reed,
1997-NMSC-055, P 95. We consider its wholesale foreclosure more troubling than
the possibility that DWI defendants may attempt to lay a plausible factual
foundation for a duress defense. On this point, we note the dissenting comments
of Justice Stein of the New Jersey Supreme Court:
A conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI)
ordinarily is not an occasion for hand-wringing about issues of fundamental
fairness and due process . . . .
But once in a great while a DWI case comes along that
presents facts so bizarre and remote from the public policy underlying the law
that even a Court as committed as this one to the strict enforcement of the
drunk-driving statutes can pause to make certain that no injustice has been
done.
Fogarty, 607 A.2d at 631-32 (Stein, J., dissenting).
We agree with Justice Stein's observation. The requirement of proving criminal
intent has been read out of certain statutory offenses. This Court, however,
should not read into a statute a prohibition of common-law defenses to which a
defendant may rarely but justifiably be entitled.
B. Substantial Evidence Supports Defendant's
Conviction
{20} We now turn to
Defendant's second contention that insufficient evidence refuted his defense of
duress. Defendant argues that he presented a prima facie showing of the defense
of duress to the metropolitan court. We agree. Additionally, having reviewed
the tapes of the metropolitan court proceeding, we believe that court indeed
considered Defendant's defense. The State, too, acknowledges that the
metropolitan court allowed Defendant to present evidence on duress.
{*340} Unpersuaded by that evidence, the
metropolitan court nonetheless convicted Defendant.
{21} Based on the
requirement that "the burden is on the state to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant did not act under such reasonable fear," UJI
14-5130, Defendant argues:
a guilty verdict in this matter required the trial
court to find evidence showed beyond a reasonable doubt that:
(1) the defendant was not forced to commit a crime
under threats;
(2) the defendant did not fear immediate great bodily
harm to himself or another person if he did not commit the crime; and
(3) a reasonable person would not have acted in the
same way under the circumstances.
Defendant cites no authority supporting his expansive
interpretation of the State's burden contained in the jury instruction, and we
decline to adopt it. See State v. Herbstman, 126 N.M. 683, 1999-NMCA-14,
P10, 974 P.2d 177, 180 (N.M. Ct. App., 1998) (considering interpretation of
rule unpersuasive where no cited authority supported position); see also
State v. Nelson, 121 N.M. 301, 303, 910 P.2d 935, 937 (providing that the
court should apply the plain meaning of statute where its import is clear).
Rather, the State had the burden to prove "all of the elements of DWI
beyond a reasonable doubt." See Harrison, 115 N.M. at 75, 846 P.2d
at 1084.
{22} It was then
Defendant's burden to adduce sufficient evidence to place the question of
duress before the fact finder.
See Esquibel, 91 N.M. at 501, 576 P.2d at
1132;
cf. Castrillo, 112 N.M. at 769, 819 P.2d at 1327 ("If the
evidence supports [duress], a defendant is entitled to instruction on that
theory."). Consequently, Defendant was required to present evidence regarding
each element of the prima facie case.
Cf. Duncan, 111 N.M. at 355, 805
P.2d at 622 ("The term 'element' when used with reference to a defense
means a 'constituent part' of the defense . . . [, and] is synonymous with the
term 'requirement'[.]" (citations omitted)). As we previously noted,
Defendant successfully presented a prima facie showing of duress in the
metropolitan court. The court, however, having considered Defendant's defense,
rejected it as not being supported by the evidence.
{23} As we noted
previously, the district court did not review the evidence presented to the
metropolitan court but instead held that duress was unavailable to Defendant as
a matter of law. We have held otherwise in this opinion. Because the district
court erred in that regard and did not consider the question of the sufficiency
of the evidence on which Defendant was convicted, it would appear at first
glance that we should remand the case to the district court to consider that
question. As a reviewing court, however, we are in as good a position as the
district court to examine the evidence contained in the metropolitan court
record.
See City of Albuquerque v. Jackson Bros., Inc.,
113 N.M. 149,
151,
823 P.2d 949, 951 . Doing so in this appeal would promote court efficiency
and a speedy disposition. We therefore proceed to consider whether the evidence
supported Defendant's conviction.
{24} In reviewing a
trial court's verdict, this Court will "not substitute its judgment for
that of the [fact finder]."
State v. Lankford,
92 N.M. 1, 2,
582
P.2d 378, 379 (1978). Instead, we examine the evidence in a light favorable to
affirmance and determine only whether substantial record evidence exists to
support the conviction below.
See State v. Apodaca,
118 N.M. 762,
765-66,
887 P.2d 756, 759-60 (1994);
see also State v. Weber,
76 N.M.
636, 644,
417 P.2d 444, 449 (1966) (noting presumption of correctness in the
decisions of a trial court). Upon this review, we affirm the metropolitan
court's conviction.
{25} As noted above,
New Mexico law establishes four elements to duress in the strict liability
context: (1) the defendant acted under unlawful and imminent threat of death or
serious bodily injury, (2) he did not find himself in a position that compelled
him to violate the law due to his own recklessness, (3) he had no reasonable
legal alternative, and (4) his illegal conduct was directly caused by the
threat of harm.
See Baca, 114
{*341} N.M.
at 674-75, 845 P.2d at 768-69. The second and third elements of this test echo,
while narrowing, the basic "reasonable person" standard prescribed by
Supreme Court rule.
See UJI 14-5130 (requiring proof that "a
reasonable person would have acted in the same way under the
circumstances").
{26} The metropolitan
court expressed strong doubt whether Defendant even faced a sufficiently
imminent and perilous harm. Jesse Palacio, the only witness besides Defendant
and his brother who testified concerning the events prior to the time Defendant
drove his vehicle, stated that only he and perhaps one other person approached
Defendant's truck. Palacio testified that he simply grabbed hold of the
driver's side mirror. The arresting officer testified that Defendant was
unharmed and that no one was fighting or threatening Defendant's vehicle when
he arrived. Defendant introduced no evidence that he considered any alternative
to driving his vehicle while legally drunk.
{27} In evaluating the
reasonableness of Defendant's actions, the metropolitan court stated:
Did [Defendant] act reasonably as a reasonable, objective
person would do? An objective standard, I think that's the case law, it
suggests that that's the way you analyze it . . . I can't say that the actions
of jumping behind the wheel of a vehicle and taking off in the middle of a
crowded parking lot is what most people would do.
Defendant asserts that the metropolitan court initially
articulated the reasonable person standard appropriately by considering whether
Defendant acted reasonably. He complains, however, that considering the actions
of "most people" rather those of a "reasonable person"
indicated that the metropolitan court applied an inappropriately harsher standard.
We disagree. The entirety of the context signifies that the metropolitan court
did not base its rationale on an improper standard. Because the court used the
words "most people" on one occasion does not necessarily mean that it
failed to recognize or apply the appropriate reasonable person analysis. We
thus reject Defendant's arguments on the sufficiency-of-the-evidence question
and hold that substantial evidence supported Defendant's conviction.
{28} We hold that the
district court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that the defense of duress
was unavailable against the strict liability charge of DWI. We nonetheless
affirm the district court, which affirmed the metropolitan court's conviction,
because, having reviewed the evidence adduced in the metropolitan court, we
determine that substantial evidence supported the conviction despite
consideration of the duress defense.