GOMEZ V. CHAVARRIA, 2009-NMCA-035, 146
N.M. 46, 206 P.3d 157
ROBERT GOMEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GARY CHAVARRIA, Defendant-Appellee.
Docket Nos. 28,072 and 28,073
(consolidated)
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW MEXICO
2009-NMCA-035, 146 N.M. 46, 206 P.3d 157
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DOÑA ANA COUNTY, Robert
E. Robles, District Judge.
Certiorari Quashed, No. 31,546,
December 7, 2009. Released for Publication April 14, 2009.
Law Offices of Nancy L. Simmons, P.C., Nancy
L. Simmons, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.
Montgomery & Andrews, P.A., Paul E.
Houston, Brian T. Judson, Sharon T. Shaheen, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.
JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Chief Judge. WE CONCUR:
MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge, CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge.
AUTHOR: JONATHAN B. SUTIN.
{1} Plaintiff Robert
Gomez appeals from two judgments dismissing his claims with prejudice in two
separate actions against Defendant Gary Chavarria. The district court in each
action determined that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the applicable statute
of limitations, NMSA 1978, §
37-1-8 (1976), and that the one-year extension
granted to minors in NMSA 1978, Section
37-1-10 (1975) did not save the
actions. The issues are the same in both actions. Plaintiff asserts that the
district court misapplied Sections 37-1-8 and 37-1-10. We disagree and affirm.
{2} In his action filed
on March 29, 2007, Plaintiff alleged that on February 13, 2004, he was sixteen
years old and was injured in a vehicle collision caused by Defendant. In his
action filed on April 24, 2007, Plaintiff alleged that on April 23, 2004, he
was seventeen years old and was again injured in another vehicle collision
caused by Defendant. Plaintiff turned eighteen on April 2, 2005.
{3} Defendant moved for
judgment on the pleadings in both actions based on the bar of Section 37-1-8.
In response, Plaintiff argued that his claims and the three-year limitations
period in Section 37-1-8 were tolled until he reached age eighteen, and that
additionally, under Section 37-1-10, the limitations period was also tolled for
another year after he reached eighteen. Based on the theory that, under
Sections 37-1-8 and 37-1-10, “a minor is afforded the general statute of
limitations of three years plus one year (per tolling),” Plaintiff argued that
the limitations period would not expire until February 13, 2008, in the first
action and April 23, 2008, in the second action, “or until his birthday of
April 2, 2008[,] since the tolling provision seemingly provides for both
dates.”
{4} The district court
disagreed with Plaintiff and dismissed both actions with prejudice. Plaintiff
raises three issues on appeal. First, Plaintiff contends that pursuant to
minority/disability tolling principles and Section 37-1-10 he is allowed four
years from the accrual dates within which to file the actions. Second, he
contends that an interpretation of Section 37-1-10 to the contrary “would
constitute a new rule that should not be applied to him retroactively.” Third,
he contends that the district court’s interpretation of Section 37-1-10
violated his equal protection rights and his substantive due process rights
under the United States Constitution.
{5} The limitations
period under Section 37-1-8 is three years. Section 37-1-10 states: “The times
limited for the bringing of actions by the preceding provisions of this chapter
shall, in favor of minors and incapacitated persons, be extended so that they
shall have one year from and after the termination of such incapacity within
which to commence said actions.”
{6} We first address
the deadline for filing the actions. We review issues of statutory construction
de novo.
Cooper v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,
2002-NMSC-020, ¶ 16,
132 N.M.
382,
49 P.3d 61;
Morgan Keegan Mortgage Co. v. Candelaria,
1998-NMCA-008, ¶ 5,
124 N.M. 405,
951 P.2d 1066. We also address what
constitutes a reasonable time extension and cut-off date for filing actions
under case law, and this issue involves the application of law to facts and
requires a de novo review.
Garcia v. Jeantette,
2004-NMCA-004, ¶ 15,
134
N.M. 776,
82 P.3d 947. We next address the issue of retroactive application of
rules, which we also review de novo.
Padilla v. Wall Colmonoy Corp.,
2006-NMCA-137, ¶ 7,
140 N.M. 630,
145 P.3d 110. Finally, we address Plaintiff’s
constitutional arguments, and we review those issues de novo as well.
ACLU
of N.M. v. City of Albuquerque,
2006-NMCA-078, ¶ 10,
139 N.M. 761,
137 P.3d
1215.
Deadline for Filing Actions
{7} The three-year
limitations period in Section 37-1-8 begins to run against both adults and
minors when the cause of action accrues.
Slade v. Slade,
81 N.M. 462,
466,
468 P.2d 627, 631 (1970). It is quite clear from a plain reading of
Section 37-1-10 that, when the three-year limitations period in Section 37-1-8
runs its full course during minority status, Section 37-1-10 gives the minor a
year from his or her eighteenth birthday within which to sue. It is not clear,
however, what happens when the three-year limitations period ends after the
minor reaches age eighteen.
{8} With respect to his
first action, Plaintiff reached eighteen a little over a year after the date of
the accrual of the first cause of action, February 13, 2004, the date of the
first accident. When he reached eighteen, he had almost a year and ten months
within which to sue before the Section 37-1-8 three-year limitations period
ended on February 13, 2007. With respect to his second action, Plaintiff
reached eighteen a little short of one year after the accrual of the second
cause of action, April 23, 2004, the date of the second accident. When he
reached eighteen, he had a little more than two years within which to sue
before the Section 37-1-8 three-year limitations period ended on April 23, 2007.
{9} On appeal,
Plaintiff argues that it is to be assumed “that the minority years are ‘lost
years’ in terms of ability to act on one’s own behalf.” He argues that because
the time between the accidents and his eighteenth birthday was approximately
one year, he “‘suffer[ed]’ from incapacity by way of his minority” and
“effectively ‘lost’ one year, a period of time when, legally, he was not
considered able to assert or even understand his rights under the law.” He
asserts that “[t]he logical interpretation of the statute is that [he] had a
one-year period following his eighteenth birthday during which the statute of
limitations was tolled.” In attempting to piece together Plaintiff’s arguments,
we understand him to say that the “lost year,” was a one-year period of
tolling, which should be added onto the three-year limitations period so as to
extend that period a year beyond the dates of February 13, 2007, and April 23,
2007, to February 13, 2008, and April 23, 2008, thereby bringing him within a
permissible limitations period. Nothing in the statutes or case law, however,
supports Plaintiff’s arguments.
{10} The intent of the
Legislature in enacting Section 37-1-10 was to give minors a reasonable period
of time after reaching majority within which to file an action.
See State v.
Gutierrez,
2007-NMSC-033, ¶ 30,
142 N.M. 1,
162 P.3d 156 (“The plain
language of the statute is the primary indicator of legislative intent, so we
look first to the words the Legislature used and their ordinary meaning.”).
Section 37-1-10 constitutes a legislative statement of policy that once a minor
reaches majority he or she must have a reasonable period of time within which
to file an action in the face of an early expiration of the applicable statute
of limitations. The real issue here is whether Plaintiff had a reasonable
period of time after he reached eighteen within which to file his actions to
avoid the bar of the Section 37-1-8 limitations period. We hold that he did.
{11} In both actions,
Plaintiff had more than a full year after he reached eighteen within which to
sue before the three-year limitations period in Section 37-1-8 ran its course.
Plaintiff’s arguments provide no basis upon which to hold that he had or needed
longer than the date of expiration of the three-year limitations period within
which to file his actions. Furthermore, if the three-year limitations period
had ended on a date less than one year from Plaintiff’s eighteenth birthday, we
think that the intent underlying Section 37-1-10 would allow a full year following
his eighteenth birthday for filing. Section 37-1-10 sets a standard that one
year is a reasonable period of time for suit once minors reach the age of
majority. No case exists in New Mexico law that indicates that a maximum of one
year, under the circumstances here, would be unreasonable. We agree with
Defendant’s view of the statutes: “A minor’s lawsuit for personal injury is not
barred until one year after the minor reaches the age of majority or until
three years after the accident—whichever computation of time gives the injured
minor the most time to act.” We conclude that Plaintiff had a reasonable time
and opportunity in the year following his eighteenth birthday to file his
actions. He also had a reasonable time and opportunity to file his actions
before the three-year limitations period expired. We therefore hold that the
district court did not misconstrue or misapply the statute of limitations.
{12} Plaintiff contends
that a holding that his actions were barred under Section 37-1-8 “would
constitute a new rule that should not be applied to him retroactively.”
Plaintiff cites
Whenry v. Whenry,
98 N.M. 737, 739,
652 P.2d 1188, 1190
(1982), which states that for a court decision to be applied prospectively, the
decision “must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear
past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of
first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.” (Internal
quotation marks and citation omitted.) Plaintiff argues that the district
court’s ruling created a new rule of law because there is nothing in any
precedent or case law that clearly foreshadowed an answer to the applicability
of the statutes to the circumstances here and because “this particular issue of
statutory interpretation is apparently an issue of first impression.” We
disagree and hold that the statutory bar applies to Plaintiff.
{13} As a preliminary
matter, in his argument on this issue Plaintiff asserts that his trial attorney
relied on the interpretation of the statutes that Plaintiff now presents on
appeal and that the attorney filed the actions “almost one full year prior to
what he believed [was] the applicable deadline.” Plaintiff asks this Court to
apply our holding prospectively only so as not to punish him “for his
attorney’s reasonable mistake as to the meaning of a previously unconstrued
statute.” Assuming, without deciding, that the statements of the attorney’s
reliance and belief might be material to the analysis of the issue before us,
we will not consider the statements. Plaintiff’s brief is devoid of any
citation to the record indicating where Plaintiff presented these reliance and
belief facts to the district court. We will not search the record for evidence
to support a party’s argument.
In re Estate of Heeter,
113 N.M. 691,
694,
831 P.2d 990, 993 (Ct. App. 1992). Where a party fails to cite any portion
of the record to support its factual allegations, an appellate court need not
consider its argument on appeal.
Santa Fe Exploration Co. v. Oil
Conservation Comm’n,
114 N.M. 103, 108,
835 P.2d 819, 824 (1992).
{14} On the merits of the
issue, we note that, in
Slade, our Supreme Court stated:
Statutes of limitation begin to run
against everyone, including minors, when the cause of action accrues, and
tolling statutes only extend the time for completing the bar of the statute so
that the minor shall have an opportunity to act for himself after the
disability caused by his minority has been removed.
81 N.M. at 466, 468 P.2d at 631. We note, too, it is
established in New Mexico that a litigant’s right to sue cannot be cut off by
an unreasonably short limitations period. A party must be given a reasonable
time to enforce his claims. Terry v. N.M. State Highway Comm’n, 98 N.M.
119, 122, 645 P.2d 1375, 1378 (1982). Given what we believe is the only
reasonable construction of the statutes at issue here, we hold that the
elements in Whenry based on which retroactive application is forbidden
are not met. See Whenry, 98 N.M. at 739, 652 P.2d at 1190. The
foregoing language from Slade and established case law mandating a
reasonable time to enforce a claim, together with the intent underlying Section
37-1-10, convinces us that we are not establishing a new principle of law. We
do not, therefore, have before us an issue of first impression whose resolution
was not clearly foreshadowed. Nor does our holding upset any case law on which
Plaintiff relied or could reasonably rely for his interpretation of the
statutes.
{15} Plaintiff’s reliance
on
Tafoya v. Doe,
100 N.M. 328,
670 P.2d 582 (Ct. App. 1983), is
misplaced.
Tafoya centered on limitation provisions in the Tort Claims
Act, NMSA 1978, §§
41-4-15, -16 (1977).
Tafoya, 100 N.M. at 329-32, 670
P.2d at 583-86. Although mentioned in
Tafoya, Section 37-1-10 was not at
issue.
See Tafoya, 100 N.M. at 331, 670 P.2d at 585. The
statement from
Tafoya on which Plaintiff relies, namely, that Section
37-1-10 “provides for tolling of certain general limitation periods until ‘one
year from and after the termination’ of one’s minority,” does not support
Plaintiff’s limitations or prospective- application-only theories.
Tafoya,
100 N.M. at 331, 670 P.2d at 585. By the foregoing statement,
Tafoya was
simply characterizing the statute’s language as extending the limitations
period one year when the period expired during minority.
{16} Plaintiff contends
that the district court’s construction of the statutes of limitations violates
his substantive due process and equal protection rights under the United States
Constitution. He asserts that “[s]ubstantive [d]ue [p]rocess claims are
addressed together with [e]qual [p]rotection [c]laims because a [s]ubstantive
[d]ue [p]rocess attack necessarily and implicitly includes an equal protection
attack” and cites
ACLU of New Mexico, but provides no pinpoint citation.
He acknowledges that rational-basis review is proper. We determine whether the
statutes as construed are rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
See
ACLU of N.M.,
2006-NMCA-078, ¶ 19. Plaintiff has the burden of
establishing that the construction and application of the statutes are not
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
Id. “A strong
presumption of constitutionality surrounds a statute.”
Id. ¶ 10
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{17} “The purpose of a
statute of limitations is to protect prospective defendants from the burden of
defending against stale claims while providing an adequate period of time for a
person of ordinary diligence to pursue lawful claims.”
Garcia ex rel. Garcia
v. La Farge,
119 N.M. 532, 537,
893 P.2d 428, 433 (1995). Plaintiff
acknowledges that, as a general proposition, the state has a legitimate
interest in enacting statutes of limitations.
{18} Plaintiff argues,
however, that Section 37-1-10 does not serve a legitimate interest, in that “it
cuts off the claims of some minors while bolstering the claims of others based
on an arbitrary difference in their particular ages at the time an action
accrues.” Plaintiff illustrates his argument by pointing out what he contends
is an arbitrary classification: Where the age of majority is eighteen, minors
fifteen or younger would receive the benefit of an extra year, since the three-year
limitations period would expire before they reach eighteen, whereas minors
sixteen or older would not receive that same benefit. Plaintiff offers this
further explanation:
Despite the fact that the sixteen
year old “suffers” from his status as a minor for two years, once he reaches
the age of majority[,] the trial court’s interpretation of the statute not only
counts those two years against him for purposes of the statute of limitations,
it also strips him of the benefit of an extra year of tolling. In
contrast, the fifteen year old who reaches the age of majority after three
years [is] afforded the extra year of tolling, allowing him a total of four
years in which to file suit.
Thus, as we read Plaintiff’s argument, not to accept his
interpretation of the statute arbitrarily discriminates between him and others
who are over sixteen at the time of injury, on the one hand, and persons who
are under age sixteen at the time of injury, on the other hand.
{19} We reject this
argument. First, as we discussed earlier in this opinion, Plaintiff’s
construction of the statutes at issue is not plausible or reasonable. A minor
is not harmed or prejudiced by the statute’s continuing to run during minority,
because Section 37-1-10 recognizes that a minor is not required to file an
action before turning eighteen. Further, the statute recognizes that because a
minor is not required to file before reaching majority it is fair and proper to
allow a year’s time when eighteen is reached within which to file an action. Second,
there is no reasonable basis on which to conclude that a minor who is at least
sixteen when an injury occurs would be treated differently on any arbitrary or
discriminatory basis. Third, under the district court’s determination and our
holding, Plaintiff is not denied a benefit that persons under sixteen at the
time of injury would receive. Were Plaintiff under sixteen at the time of the
accidents, he would have had a year after he reached eighteen within which to
sue. Plaintiff was over sixteen at the time of his accidents, and he had more
than one year after he reached eighteen within which to sue. The district
court’s application of the statutes was not arbitrary, unjust, or unreasonable.
{20} We therefore hold
that, in regard to Plaintiff’s argument of arbitrary discrimination as to
classes of minors, the manner in which the district court and this Court have
construed Sections 37-1-8 and 37-1-10 does not violate any substantive due
process or equal protection rights.
{21} We affirm the district
court.
JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Chief Judge
MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge
Topic Index for Gomez v. Chavarria, Nos.
28,072/28,073
CP-SL Statute of
Limitations
TR-SA Statute of
Limitations