GARZA V. UNITED CHILD CARE, INC., 1975-NMCA-061,
88 N.M. 30, 536 P.2d 1086 (Ct. App. 1975)
Carolyn GARZA, Christine Rulz, and
Martha Chavez,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
UNITED CHILD CARE, INC., a corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW MEXICO
1975-NMCA-061, 88 N.M. 30, 536 P.2d 1086
James I. Bartholomew, Clyde E. Sullivan,
Albuquerque for plaintiffs-appellants.
Michael E. Martinez, M. Aragon, Aragon,
Martinez, Garcia & Grass, Albuquerque, for defendant-appellee.
SUTIN, J., wrote the opinion. HENDLEY and
HERNANDEZ, JJ., concur.
{1} Plaintiffs recovered one
month's net wages for wrongful discharge from employment and appeal. We affirm.
{2} Plaintiffs' complaint
sought reinstatement with recovery of salaries from the date of wrongful
discharge until the date of reinstatement.
{3} After trial, plaintiffs
requested findings of fact and conclusions of law centered around plaintiffs'
readiness to return to employment together with reinstatement and back pay.
{4} The trial court did not
determine whether plaintiffs were entitled to reinstatement, but this issue was
not raised on appeal. The trial court found that plaintiffs were permanent
employees and were subject to discharge only for cause; that plaintiffs were
wrongfully discharged; and that they were entitled to damages equal to one
month's net pay.
{5} Plaintiffs' only
contention on appeal is that the trial court applied an erroneous measure of
damages.
{6} Plaintiffs misconceive
the meaning of "permanent employee". They contend that
{*31} as permanent employees they "could
assert a continuing employment relationship which would entitle them to an
award of damages commensurate with the value of the contract."
{7} Plaintiffs do not rely on
the "Employee Handbook" which they introduced in evidence, nor did
they cite any authority to support their contention.
{8} "Permanent
employees" as used in the "Employee Handbook" simply makes a
distinction between probationary and non-probationary employees. Neither does
the record show what the duration of plaintiffs' terms of employment would be.
{9} The rule is uniform that
a contract for permanent employment, not supported by any consideration other than
performance of duties and payment of wages, is a contract for an indefinite
period. It is terminable at the will of either party. A discharge without cause
does not constitute a breach of such contract justifying recovery of damages.
United Security Life Insurance Company v. Gregory, 281 Ala. 264, 201 So.2d 853
(1967); Mathew v. American Family Mutual Ins. Company, 54 Wis.2d 336, 195
N.W.2d 611 (1972); Russell & Axon v. Handshoe, 176 So.2d 909 (Fla.
App.1965); Annot. Validity and duration of contract purporting to be for
permanent employment, 135 A.L.R. 646.
{10} Where a contract for
permanent employment provides additional consideration, the employee can
recover damages for his discharge when made without just cause. Collins v.
Parsons College, 203 N.W.2d 594 (Iowa 1973); Bussard v. College of Saint
Thomas, Inc., 294 Minn. 215, 200 N.W.2d 155 (1972); Drzewiecki v. H & R
Block, Inc., 24 Cal. App.3d 695, 101 Cal. Rptr. 169 (Ct. App.5th Dist.1972).
{11} In the instant case,
there is no evidence that any consideration, other than employment and payment
of wages, was given by defendant to plaintiffs.
{12} "The record does
not support plaintiffs' claim that the trial court's award was inadequate
because of a mistaken measure of damages." Schrib v. Seidenberg,
80 N.M.
573,
458 P.2d 825 (Ct. App.1969).
HENDLEY and HERNANDEZ, JJ., concur.