CORDOVA V. LARSEN, 2004-NMCA-087, 136
N.M. 87, 94 P.3d 830
FRANK CORDOVA, as Administrator
of the Estate of Antonio Cordova
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WAYNE LARSEN, RIOLINO POLLO,
JOSE "BENNIE" SALAZAR, LEROY
URIOSTE, TED DRENNAN, RALPH MCNUTT,
ALBERT BRIGGS, SANTOS BACA, TRUMAN WOODS,
CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, COUNTY OF
BERNALILLO, STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Defendants-Appellees.
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW MEXICO
2004-NMCA-087, 136 N.M. 87, 94 P.3d 830
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF
BERNALILLO COUNTY, Robert H. Scott, District Judge.
Narciso Garcia, Jr., Garcia Law Office,
Albuquerque, NM, Lauro D. Silva, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.
Robert M. White, City Attorney, Kathryn
Levy, Assistant City Attorney, City of Albuquerque, Albuquerque, NM, for City
Appellees.
Tito D. Chavez, Bernalillo County
Attorney, Linda M. Matteucci, Assistant County Attorney, Bernalillo County
Attorney's Office, Albuquerque, NM, William D. Slease, Jonlyn M. Martinez,
Slease & Martinez, P.A., Albuquerque, NM, for County Appellees.
Jerry Walz, Walz & Associates, Cedar
Crest, NM, for State Appellees.
LYNN PICKARD, Judge. WE CONCUR: A. JOSEPH
ALARID, Judge, JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge.
{1} Plaintiff filed an
independent action in state court pursuant to Rule
1-060(B)(6) NMRA 2004,
seeking to set aside the judgment in favor of the defendants in a 1973 wrongful
death action. Defendants removed the case to federal court. Defendants moved to
dismiss, arguing res judicata and collateral estoppel based on a 2000 federal
court judgment dismissing a federal independent action in which Plaintiff and
another party sought to set aside the same 1973 judgment. Plaintiff moved to
remand the case to state court. The federal district court denied Defendants'
motion to dismiss, yet also remanded the case to state district court. On
remand, Defendants again argued that the independent action was barred by res
judicata. The district court agreed with Defendants and dismissed the claim,
and Plaintiff now appeals. We hold that the federal court order denying
Defendants' motion to dismiss did not preclude the state court's consideration
of Defendants' arguments. We also hold that the 2000 federal court judgment
precludes Plaintiff's claim. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{2} In 1972, Antonio
Cordova (Cordova) and Rito Canales (Canales) were killed by police officers.
Acting as administrator of Cordova's estate, Mary Cordova, his mother, filed a
wrongful death suit in state district court. In keeping with the understanding
of the parties, we refer to this district court case as
Cordova I. In 1973, the district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants in
Cordova I.
Cordova v. City of Albuquerque,
86 N.M.
697, 699,
526 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Ct. App. 1974). We affirmed the district court
ruling in
Cordova I in 1974.
Id. [hereinafter
Cordova
II, in keeping with the understanding of the parties]. In our discussion
of
Cordova II, we explained that Plaintiff's
unsupported innuendos that a defense witness, Tim Chapa, was in a conspiracy
with the defendants to kill Cordova and Canales did not create a factual issue
regarding whether such a conspiracy existed. We noted that Plaintiff's
innuendos were directly contradicted by the summary judgment motion, which was
accompanied by numerous affidavits that denied the existence of any conspiracy,
including one from Chapa himself.
Id. at
702, 526 P.2d at 1295.
{3} As
Cordova I proceeded in state court, the estate
of Canales filed a similar suit in federal district court, which we refer to
herein as
Canales I. That case went to
trial in January 1974 and also included the issue of whether Tim Chapa was part
of a conspiracy with the police. The jury found for the defendants.
{4} In 1999, Tim Chapa
made an affidavit that purported to "clear [his] conscience in this matter
regarding the hom[i]cides of Rito Canales and Antonio Cordova in January of
1972." The affidavit stated that Chapa had been a confidential informant
for the state police in the 1960s and 70s, that he was asked to infiltrate an
organization called the Black Berets, that he had devised a plan in conjunction
with the police to kill members of this organization, and that the plan had
culminated in the shootings of Cordova and Canales. Chapa also stated that the
police officers involved threatened to kill him if he ever exposed this plan
and that he denied the existence of the conspiracy during all the subsequent
court proceedings because he feared for his life.
{5} In 1999, based on
the Chapa affidavit, the Cordova and Canales families filed an independent
action in the federal district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), referred to
hereinafter as
Canales & Cordova I.
Canales v. Larsen, No. CIV 99-1259 JC/RLP
(D.N.M. Apr. 10, 2000). Federal Rule 60(b) reads in pertinent part:
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence;
Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On motion and upon
such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ... (6)
any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. ... This
rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a
defendant not actually personally notified as provided in Title 28, U.S.C., §
1655, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.
The suit asked the federal district court to set aside the
judgments in Cordova I and Canales I. On April 10, 2000, the federal
district court declined to do so, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to
state a claim of fraud on the court, that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate
a meritorious underlying claim as Federal Rule 60(b) requires, and that the
interests of finality required dismissal. The basis for the district court's
ruling grounded on failure to state a claim of fraud on the court was (1) the
distinction explained in Bulloch v. United States,
763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985), between fraud on the court, i.e., fraud
directed to the judicial machinery itself, and ordinary fraud, i.e., false
evidence or perjury and (2) the conclusion that Plaintiff alleged only the
latter. In February 2001, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the federal district
court's decision in a memorandum opinion. Canales
v. Larsen, No. 00-2164 (10th Cir. Feb. 26, 2001).
{6} While
Canales & Cordova I was proceeding in
federal district court, Plaintiff filed another complaint in state district
court. This complaint also cited Chapa's changed story and stated that it was
an independent action to set aside the judgment in
Cordova I, pursuant to Rule 1-060(B). Rule
1-060(B) is identical to its federal counterpart, Rule 60(b), except that it
omits the passage concerning the United States Code. We refer to the litigation
in this case, which extends to the present appeal, as
Cordova III.
{7} Defendants removed
Cordova III to federal district court in
February 2000, prior to the federal district court's disposition of
Canales & Cordova I. On April 28, 2000,
after the federal district court dismissed
Canales
& Cordova I, Plaintiff moved to remand
Cordova III to state court on the grounds that
the removal motion was untimely and that state law predominated. Then, in June
2000, Defendants moved to dismiss
Cordova III,
arguing that because the federal district court had decided that Plaintiff
failed to state a claim in
Canales & CordovaI,
Plaintiff's claims and issues in
Cordova III
were precluded.
{8} In May 2001, the
federal district court issued a memorandum opinion and order remanding
Cordova III to state court and denying
Defendants' motion to dismiss.
Cordova v. Larsen,
No. CIV 00-273 JC/RLP (D.N.M. May 11, 2001). In the opinion, the federal court
raised a jurisdictional issue sua sponte, citing the
Rooker-
Feldman
doctrine, which bars lower federal court review of state court judgments.
Id. at 5. The court cited a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction as the basis for its remand of the case back to state
court.
Id. at 6. The court also addressed
Defendants' motion to dismiss, explaining that because the
Rooker-
Feldman
doctrine was a bar to its jurisdiction to review
Cordova
I,
Canales & Cordova I was
improperly decided and could not have a preclusive effect on
Cordova III.
Id.
at 7.
{9} After returning to
the state district court following remand, Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing again that the decision in
Canales
& Cordova I precluded the claims and issues in
Cordova III. The state district court dismissed
Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff appeals from this order of
dismissal.
1. The "law of the
case" doctrine does not bar Defendants from relitigating their defense.
{10} Plaintiff argues
that the United States District Court's decision in
Cordova III already decided the issue of whether
Defendants could assert res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel
(issue preclusion) defenses, holding that they did not apply because the
federal district court lacked jurisdiction to review
Cordova I. Although Plaintiff frames his
argument as a matter of claim preclusion, the proper analysis is whether the
federal district court's order denying Defendants' motion to dismiss became the
"law of the case" in the subsequent state court proceedings.
See Joan Steinman,
Law of the Case: A Judicial Puzzle in Consolidated and
Transferred Cases and in Multidistrict Litigation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev.
595, 597 (1987). Like claim preclusion and issue preclusion, law of the case
doctrine precludes relitigation of an issue.
Id.
at 597-98. "Under the law of the case doctrine, a decision on an issue of
law made at one stage of a case becomes a binding precedent in successive
stages of the same litigation."
Souter v.
Ancae Heating & Air Conditioning,
2002-NMCA-078, ¶ 24,
132 N.M. 608,
52 P.3d 980. The doctrine is similar to issue preclusion, except that issue
preclusion relates to litigation of the same issue in successive suits, whereas
law of the case doctrine relates to litigation of the same issue recurring
within the same suit. Steinman,
supra at
598 n.8. As with other preclusion doctrines, we review the application of law
of the case doctrine de novo.
Wolford v. Lasater,
1999-NMCA-024, ¶ 4,
126 N.M. 614,
973 P.2d 866 (stating that review of claim
preclusion is a legal question to be reviewed de novo).
{11} As a general
matter, when a case is transferred from one district court to another,
decisions of the transferring court are binding on the transferee court. 18
James Wm. Moore et al.,
Moore's Federal Practice
§ 134.22[3][a] at 134-54.5 to -55 (2003). However, there are several factors
that counsel against a court's application of law of the case doctrine. Law of
the case doctrine is discretionary, and courts will not use the doctrine when
the decision to be applied preclusively is clearly erroneous or when it would
result in manifest injustice.
Trujillo v. City of
Albuquerque,
1998-NMSC-031, ¶ 41,
125 N.M. 721,
965 P.2d 305.
{12} The federal
district court in the present case based its decision on the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The
Rooker-
Feldman
doctrine stems from the federal statutory provision that the United States
Supreme Court may review state court judgments through a writ of certiorari. 28
U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2001);
see Pittsburg County Rural Water Dist. No. 7 v. City of
McAlester, 358 F.3d 694, 706-07 (10th Cir. 2004). From this starting
point, the United States Supreme Court announced in
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413,
415-16 (1923), that a federal district court correctly dismissed a petition
seeking to set aside a state court judgment on constitutional grounds because
the United States Supreme Court is the only federal court with the power to set
aside or modify state court judgments. In
District
of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), the United
States Supreme Court extended the rule that "lower federal courts possess
no power whatever to sit in direct review of state court decisions" to
encompass claims that are "inextricably intertwined with" a state
court judgment.
Id. at 483 n.16 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The
Rooker-
Feldman doctrine is a jurisdictional bar.
See Pittsburg
County Rural Water Dist. No. 7, 358 F.3d at 705, 707. The federal
district court in the present case based its remand on
Rooker-
Feldman,
stating that if it retained jurisdiction, "it would require a federal
court to determine whether or not the state court judgment in
Cordova I was erroneously entered or was
void."
Cordova v. Larsen, No. CIV
00-0273 JC/RLP, at 6.
{13} Initially, we
note that we see support for the federal court's concern about the propriety of
a federal court entertaining an independent action for relief from a state
court judgment. Commentators suggest that the federal Anti-Injunction Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2283 (1948), and comity considerations should bar federal courts from
entertaining such an action when similar relief is available in the
jurisdiction rendering the judgment to be reopened. Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 79 cmt. d (1982); 11 Charles Alan Wright et al.,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2868 at 405-07
(2d ed. 1995). Others suggest that while jurisdiction to entertain a motion for
relief from a state judgment may exist in the federal court, abstention is appropriate
when a party seeks this type of relief. 12 James Wm. Moore et al.,
Moore's Federal Practice § 60.84[3] at 60-241 to
-42 (2003). Federal circuits appear to be divided on the issue.
Compare Lundborg
v. Phoenix Leasing, Inc., 91 F.3d 265, 272-73 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding
that abstention is proper because independent actions to reopen a judgment were
available under state law, no federal interest was implicated, and comity
principles counseled against reopening a state judgment),
and Sherman v.
Marion County Child Support Div., 224 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1225-26 (S.D.
Ind. 2002) (holding that
Rooker-
Feldman doctrine barred a Rule 60(b) action to
set aside a state court judgment),
with Morrel v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 188
F.3d 218, 222-23 (4th Cir. 1999) (relying on a pre-
Rooker case to suggest that federal courts do
have jurisdiction to entertain independent actions under Rule 60(b) that seek
to reopen state court judgments),
and Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. ESM Group, Inc.,
835 F.2d 270, 272-73 (11th Cir. 1988) (evaluating the merits of a Rule 60(b)
independent action to set aside a state court judgment).
{14} However, although
the federal district court's decision to remand the case for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction appears to be well supported, Plaintiff asserts that an
order issued contemporaneously with the remand order precludes Defendants'
arguments. This is problematic because a court without jurisdiction to hear a
case cannot issue a valid order on the merits of that case.
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment,
523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998). Once the federal district court decided it had no
jurisdiction, the best course of action would have been to send the motion to
dismiss back to the state court.
See In re Bear River Drainage Dist., 267 F.2d 849,
851 (10th Cir. 1959). We recognize that adoption of a per se rule affording no
preclusive effect to a remanding federal court's orders could pose its own
problems.
See 18B Charles Alan Wright et
al.,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478.4
at 787-90 (2d ed. 2002). However, in this case, an additional issue compounds
the difficulty of applying the federal court's order denying the motion to
dismiss as the law of the case.
{15} The federal
district court in
Cordova III based its
denial of Defendants' motion to dismiss on the theory that the decision in
Canales & Cordova I cannot be used to
preclude issues or claims because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
to set aside
Cordova I. This is
inaccurate. First, it is well established that "[a] party that has had an
opportunity to litigate the question of subject-matter jurisdiction may not ...
reopen that question in a collateral attack upon an adverse judgment."
Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites
de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.9 (1982);
see
also Chicot County Drainage Dist. v.
Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 376 (1940) (stating a lower federal
court's determination of jurisdiction is not subject to collateral attack when
parties are before the court "in accordance with the requirements of due
process"). Plaintiff, having availed himself of federal court jurisdiction
in
Canales & Cordova I and never
contesting federal jurisdiction during that proceeding, cannot now advance his
cause through a collateral attack on the federal court's jurisdiction in that
case.
{16} Second, it is
critical to note that the judgment in
Canales
& Cordova I was final and all appeals were completed. In contrast to
a judgment rendered by a court that is known to have no subject matter
jurisdiction while the case is pending, federal courts have held that
"lack of subject matter jurisdiction [in a finally determined case]
generally has no bearing on the preclusive effect of the judgment." 18
Moore's Federal Practice § 131.30[1][d] at
131-89 (gathering federal cases on this point). If a court were to determine
that a final and closed judgment has no preclusive effect because the rendering
court had no subject matter jurisdiction, this would be tantamount to an
impermissible collateral attack on the closed judgment. Courts do not have the
power to prevent a party from using a finally determined case preclusively in
the way that the federal district court did here.
See Ansalve v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 669 So. 2d 1328, 1332-33 (La. Ct. App.
1996) (explaining that judgments in cases in which the federal court did not
have subject matter jurisdiction but proceeded to final judgment without
objection have preclusive effect, while orders issued by a court whose lack of
jurisdiction is determined during the proceedings do not). Accordingly,
Plaintiff's assertion that when "jurisdiction is lacking the judgment is
void" applies to the federal district court's denial of Defendants' motion
to dismiss because the case was still pending. However, Plaintiff's assertion
does not apply to permit a collateral attack on the final and closed judgment
in
Canales & Cordova I.
See id.
{17} Plaintiff's
contention that Defendants should be bound by the federal district court's
decision because they failed to take an appeal from it is also incorrect. The
remand order in this case was made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2001),
which states, "If at any time before final judgment it appears that the
district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be
remanded." Federal law clearly states that there is no appellate review of
remand orders based on 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d);
Kennedy v. Lubar, 273 F.3d 1293, 1297 (10th Cir.
2001). Because we have held that the federal court decision on the motion to
dismiss in this case prior to remand was void for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, we see no reason to consider whether Defendants might have
applied for interlocutory appeal of that motion alone.
{18} In summary, our
holding casts no doubt on the federal district court's decision to remand the
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It is this very decision that
left the court without power to render a decision on Defendants' motion to
dismiss. In addition, even if the court had the authority to decide Defendants'
motion to dismiss, it denied the motion through an erroneous collateral attack
on
Canales & Cordova I. For these
reasons, we hold that the federal district court's denial of Defendants' motion
to dismiss does not preclude Defendants from raising their arguments again in
state district court.
2. Claim preclusion bars
Plaintiff's claims.
{19} "The
doctrine of claim preclusion ... prevents a party from repeatedly bringing the
same cause of action against the same person."
Ford v. N.M. Dep't of Pub. Safety,
119 N.M. 405,
407,
891 P.2d 546, 548 (Ct. App. 1994). Defendants argue that the federal court
decision in
Canales & Cordova I bars
Plaintiff's claim because Plaintiff raised the same issues and the federal
courts decided that his arguments were insufficient to support a Rule 60(b)
independent action.
{20} We review the
trial court's application of claim preclusion de novo.
Wolford,
1999-NMCA-024, ¶ 4. In determining the
preclusive effect of a federal court judgment, we look to the federal law of
claim preclusion.
Ford, 119 N.M. at 409,
891 P.2d at 550. There are four elements that must be present in order to
determine that a claim is precluded: (1) there must have been a final judgment
on the merits, (2) the parties must be identical or in privity, (3) the suit
must have been based on the same cause of action, and (4) the plaintiff must
have had the full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim.
Nwosun v. Gen. Mills Rests., 124 F.3d 1255, 1257
(10th Cir. 1997),
limited on other grounds by
Yapp v. Excel Corp., 186 F.3d 1222, 1227
(10th Cir. 1999).
{21} Plaintiff does
not contest that the parties and cause of action are the same in this action
and
Canales & Cordova I. Plaintiff
argues that there was no valid final judgment on the merits because of the
subject matter jurisdiction issues discussed above, which we have already
resolved and need not reiterate. Plaintiff also argues that he has not had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the matter because there has never been a
judgment on the merits of his original wrongful death claim due to the alleged
conspiracy detailed in the Chapa affidavit. Plaintiff misapprehends the
requirements of this element. Defendants do not assert that the judgment on the
merits of his wrongful death claim in
Cordova I
precludes the present claim. Instead, Defendants assert that the merits of
Plaintiff's Rule 60(b) independent action have already been determined in
Canales & Cordova I. Plaintiff does not
argue, and there is no question that, Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate his Rule 60(b) independent action in the federal district court and
on appeal. Thus, this requirement is fulfilled.
{22} Plaintiff also
argues that an extraordinary and compelling reason exists to overcome claim
preclusion. He cites our opinion in
Apodaca v.
AAA Gas Co.,
2003-NMCA-085, ¶ 84,
134 N.M. 77,
73 P.3d 215, which stated
that a party may overcome policies favoring preclusion when "one of the
parties conceals material information, labors under some physical or mental
disability that impedes effective litigation, or where the different amounts in
controversy between the two actions would render preclusion unfair." He
argues that in this case, parties concealed material information as alleged in
the Chapa affidavit. Again, this is the incorrect analysis. There is no allegation
that Defendants concealed material information in the case being applied
preclusively, that is, in
Canales & Cordova I.
Defendants' alleged concealment of information occurred during
Cordova I, and this allegation was part of
Plaintiff's fully litigated case in
Canales &
Cordova I. No other extraordinary circumstances counsel against
application of claim preclusion here.
{23} To the contrary,
policy considerations informing the doctrine of claim preclusion counsel in
favor of Defendants. "The underlying principle behind res judicata is to
relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve
judicial resources, and by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage
reliance on adjudication."
Three Rivers Land
Co., Inc. v. Maddoux,
98 N.M. 690, 694,
652 P.2d 240, 244 (1982)
(internal quotation marks, citation, and emphasis omitted),
overruled on other grounds by Universal Life Church v. Coxon,
105 N.M. 57, 58,
728 P.2d 467, 468 (1986). We are presented here with a case in which Plaintiff
did not even await resolution of his claim in federal court in
Canales & Cordova I before filing an
identical claim in state court in
Cordova III.
Two weeks after receiving an unfavorable decision in federal court, Plaintiff
moved to remand his state court action, which had been removed to federal
court, back to state court. This was a blatant attempt to avoid the federal
court's adverse decision, as evidenced by a statement in Plaintiff's response
to Defendants' motion to dismiss: "[I]f this [c]ourt denies Plaintiff's
[m]otion to [r]emand, then Plaintiff agrees that the doctrines of res judicata
and/or collateral estoppel, based upon the court[']s prior judgment, bar
Cordova's claim." Plaintiff provides us with no authority for the
proposition that a judgment that is preclusive in federal court is not
preclusive in state court. Yet, he seeks to capitalize on the federal district
court's remand of the case to force Defendants into another round of litigation
on the same claim. This is completely contrary to the considerations of
conservation of judicial resources and avoidance of the cost and effort
associated with protracted litigation.
{24} We affirm the
trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff's claim based on the doctrine of claim
preclusion.